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Bernstein analysts are forecasting the onset of a U.S. natural gas supercycle, driven by a combination of robust demand growth and constrained supply.
Bernstein analysts are forecasting the onset of a U.S. natural gas supercycle, driven by a combination of robust demand growth and constrained supply. In a detailed sector outlook, Bernstein projects that total U.S. gas demand will rise from approximately 120 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) in 2024 to about 148 bcfd by 2030.
The key drivers of this growth are an expected surge in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports and a sharp increase in power demand, particularly from data centers.
According to the Bernstein report, LNG exports are forecast to grow by 10 bcfd through the end of the decade, based on projects that are already sanctioned or under construction.
The analysts see this export-driven demand as “highly certain,” emphasizing that international markets will account for the vast majority, around 80%, of the demand growth over this period.
Power demand is expected to add another 8 bcfd, continuing a linear trend observed over the past two years.
This increase is attributed primarily to data center expansion, which the report characterizes as a structurally new source of demand.
Despite ongoing coal plant retirements, Bernstein assumes that renewables will largely offset the lost generation capacity, but acknowledges that natural gas could fill some of the gap depending on renewable deployment rates.
While demand is projected to climb steadily, supply growth appears more constrained.
Bernstein highlights that over 70% of U.S. gas supply does not interact with price due to either being associated with oil drilling or limited by infrastructure constraints.
In particular, production from Appalachia, the nation’s largest gas-producing region, is expected to remain flat due to pipeline limitations.
This leaves the Haynesville and Midcontinent regions as the primary sources of flexible, price-responsive supply.
Bernstein models suggest that to balance the market, these basins will need to contribute an additional 17 bcfd by 2030.
However, current activity levels, particularly in the Haynesville, are below the necessary pace, raising concerns about the industry’s ability to respond.
The supply-demand mismatch leads Bernstein to forecast a sustained rise in gas prices.
Their model indicates a long-term equilibrium price around $5 per million cubic feet (mcf), above recent spot and forward prices.
Under more bullish assumptions, such as a shortfall in Haynesville growth, prices could exceed $8 or even $10/mcf, triggering both demand destruction and increased incentive for supply expansion.
Bernstein’s assessment calls this environment a “supercycle,” driven not by speculative hype but by underlying structural trends.
They stress that global dynamics, including rising LNG demand for power and transport in Asia, will ensure that U.S. exports continue to run at or near capacity, further tightening the domestic market.
In this context, Bernstein recommends increased exposure to gas-weighted equities, naming EQT (ST:EQTAB) as their top investment idea to capture long-term value from this structural shift.
In a call on Friday, Chinese President Xi Jinping and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasized the significance of their countries’ relationship, as China and Europe navigate the uncertainties brought about by U.S. tariff policies.
China and Europe are among the largest trading partners of the U.S. and maintain substantial trading connections with each other. Last year, the trade volume between China and Germany alone was around 246 billion euros ($279 billion), based on official data.
Germany has been striving to maintain a delicate balance in its relationship with China, which Berlin views as both a strategic competitor and a crucial trading partner. The vast Chinese market has been a significant support for Germany’s export-oriented economy.
During the call, President Xi acknowledged the world is experiencing changes unseen in a century, marked by "intertwined turmoil and transformation," as reported by official broadcaster CCTV. "China is willing to work with Germany to open a new chapter in their all-round strategic partnership, to lead China-EU relations toward new development, and to contribute to the stable growth of the global economy," President Xi was cited as saying.
A spokesperson for Chancellor Merz stated that both leaders expressed their readiness to cooperate in addressing global challenges. The Chancellor underscored the importance of fair competition and reciprocity, the spokesperson added.
For intellectuals of a certain bent, no game is more absorbing than discovering the “real” power behind the throne. Who is pulling the strings? What class interests does the regime serve? Who is “really” in charge? Such questions inspire learned disquisitions as well as conspiracy theories.
So far, the favorite target when it comes to the Trump administration is the tech industry. Ian Bremmer, the head of the Eurasia Group, a political consultancy, talks about the “technipolar moment” and the “frightening fusion of tech power and state power.” Steve Bannon, Trump’s former adviser, laments the influence of “technofuedal globalists bent on turning Americans into digital serfs.” The opening session of an Aspen Institute Italia conference on the future of capitalism in Milan on May 16 (at which I spoke) addressed the subject of “Techno Capitalism: America’s New Gilded Age.”
The appeal of this argument is easy to see. The US tech industry exercises an extraordinary influence over the US economy: The “magnificent seven” account for roughly one-third of the value of the S&P 500. Tech bros contributed generously to both Trump’s re-election campaign and his inauguration ceremony. Elon Musk earned the reputation of “co-president” as he strolled around the Oval Office with his son on his shoulders.
But the closer we look at the “technipolar moment,” the more it turns into a mirage. Arguably, the most striking thing about the American tech industry, given its extraordinary economic dominance, is its relative lack of political influence.
It looks as if Musk has been expelled from Trump’s inner circle despite spending almost $300 million to help re-elect him. His spell in the sun was both brief and unsuccessful. DOGE (the Department of Government Efficiency) was sound and fury signifying very little. Musk’s promise to cut $2 trillion in government spending has shrunk to $150 billion and will probably shrink still further. This is not just because the courts have largely stymied Musk’s firing blitz but also because the entire project was misconceived: As Musk himself acknowledged, the only way to save serious money is to reform entitlements, which takes years of careful coalition-building. Musk failed to get Trump to rescind his tariffs despite denouncing Trump’s leading trade advisor, Peter Navarro, as “truly a moron” and “dumber than a sack of bricks.” Musk’s sojourn in democratic politics has so far cost him roughly a quarter of his net worth, as Tesla stocks have plummeted and the Tesla-owning classes have turned against him. Little wonder that he himself also just signaled his intention to retrench and retreat.
Musk’s failure over tariffs is a sign of the tech industry’s wider failure to set the economic agenda. A Bernie Sanders’ presidency could not have done more to damage the pillars of the tech industry. Trump’s addiction to tariffs is naturally bad for an industry that depends on global sourcing. Amazon briefly considered listing the cost of tariffs in price breakdowns on items it sold before Trump called CEO Jeff Bezos in a fury. But just as bad is Trump’s addiction to changing tariffs, which has made it impossible to plan ahead. Trump’s anti-immigration policies are making it harder to hire the skilled foreign workers that the tech companies rely on; indeed, recent figures suggest that the US is no longer a net importer of top AI talent.
Trump’s war on the universities, which includes withholding future grants, canceling existing ones and changing the funding formula for research bodies, threatens America’s thriving innovation system. American visitors to the Aspen conference talked of research grants being frozen, departments being cut, visiting professorships being abandoned and star academics hunting for jobs in Europe. The war could well intensify. Trump’s proposed 2026 budget would cut funding for the National Institutes of Health by about 40% and for the National Science Foundation by 57%; moreover, his proposals to tax university endowment income at 14% or 21%, or take away their tax-exempt status, would hamper attempts to use university funds to plug the gap.
The Trump presidency owes far more to populism than to tech power. Trumpian populists might cheer Musk when he talks about feeding bits of the government into the “woodchipper,” but they have not forgotten that, until only the other day, many tech bros were social liberals who donated heavily to the Democratic Party and exported American jobs abroad. Vice president JD Vance denounces Apple Inc. and Google as latter-day versions of the parasitic East India Company. Bannon goes further in his fire-and-brimstone podcast.
The tech industry had assumed that Trump’s election would mean the unwinding of Joe Biden’s anti-trust machinery. Far from it: The Federal Trade Commission is continuing its case against Meta for snuffing out nascent competition when it purchased Instagram and WhatsApp, and the Justice Department is determined to force Google to sell its Chrome web browser. Both cases were filed during Trump’s first term and carried over during Biden’s term in a sign of a growing anti-tech consensus.
To the extent that Trump has any economic policy, it is restoring manufacturing rather than boosting tech. He wants to bring manufacturing back to the US partly because it supports the sort of blue-collar workers who he thinks made America great and partly because America needs to make more things if it is to face down its Chinese rival. In general, tech executives opened their wallets to Trump not because they shared his vision of America, but because they realized that the Democrats were shuffling to defeat behind Biden and because they were terrified that Trump would turn on them.
To the extent that Trump has a “class base,” in the old Marxist phraseology, it is in family businesses rather than the tech goliaths on the West Coast. Trump’s natural milieu is with his fellow family businesspeople who inherited their companies, who work in real estate and the extractive industries, who loathe the box-ticking culture of the corporate world, and who relish flashing their wealth in places like Mar-a-Lago. These people are very different from the high-IQ nerds building the virtual world (though they are not averse to making easy money from “crypto”).
But even Trump’s identification with his fellow family business owners is limited. The most important thing to grasp about Trump is that he doesn’t represent anybody’s interests but his own. Indeed, the worrying thing about his presidency is not that sinister business forces are pulling the strings from behind the scenes. It is that the businessman who is pulling the strings (and grabbing the spoils) is Trump himself.
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