Soaring Import Tariffs Spark a Surprising Trend: Americans Fly to China for Bargain Shopping

China–U.S. Trade War

Summary:

Following the U.S. repeal of tax exemptions for low-value imports from China, many Americans are opting to fly directly to China to shop, leveraging price gaps, visa waivers, and tax refunds to offset the soaring import duties....

Policy change reshapes consumer behavior

On May 2, 2025, the U.S. government officially eliminated tax exemptions on imported goods valued under $800 from China—a decision that has quickly reshaped American consumer habits. Previously, online shoppers could take advantage of this loophole to receive small parcels duty-free, but now face import tariffs as high as 120% of the item’s value, with each package potentially incurring a $100 fee. This abrupt cost spike has sparked a wave of unconventional responses.

Instead of abandoning access to affordable goods, a growing number of American consumers—ranging from middle-class shoppers to small business owners—are turning to a novel alternative: traveling directly to China. The phenomenon has gained momentum on social media platforms under the trending term "China Shopping", as individuals seek to bypass heavy taxes by sourcing products firsthand.

Economic logic behind a cross-border shopping spree

At first glance, international airfare might seem prohibitive. However, the price differential between Chinese and American retail markets has reached a point where the savings can not only offset travel costs, but even make the journey profitable. For example, according to Sina Finance, prices at major Chinese supermarkets are estimated to be 30–40% lower than in the U.S. A Huawei Mate60 phone retails for around $600 in China—half the price in the U.S.—and locally produced cosmetics often sell for just one-third of their American counterparts.

The economic rationale becomes even more compelling when considering favorable visa policies. U.S. citizens benefit from China’s 240-hour visa-free transit policy, allowing up to 10 days of travel without a visa, and a 13% VAT refund at departure airports. These incentives reduce logistical friction, transforming what would be a niche workaround into a viable alternative for cost-conscious consumers and micro-entrepreneurs alike.

E-commerce disruption and the rise of alternative platforms

Prior to this travel boom, many Americans had turned to Chinese e-commerce platforms like DHgate, which surged in popularity as consumers sought affordable alternatives to domestic options. According to market trackers, DHgate briefly ranked among the most downloaded apps in the U.S., second only to ChatGPT. Its rise illustrates not just a search for cheaper goods, but a larger pattern of consumers circumventing traditional supply chains to access global pricing.

The new import duties, however, threaten the viability of such platforms by making small-scale shipping prohibitively expensive. As a result, physical travel—previously unthinkable for everyday shopping—is being reframed as a rational economic strategy. For some consumers, particularly influencers and livestreamers, the journey also doubles as content generation and audience engagement, blending commerce with entertainment.

Strategic trade motivations and unintended outcomes

From a policy standpoint, the U.S. administration’s move aims to rebalance the trade deficit with China and encourage domestic consumption. Yet the immediate effect has been paradoxical. Rather than redirect spending toward U.S. goods, the tax hike has motivated a segment of consumers to spend more abroad—and more creatively. This suggests a divergence between the intended economic effect of protectionist tariffs and the actual behavioral response of market-savvy consumers.

Chinese media has been quick to highlight this unintended outcome, portraying the trend as evidence of China’s manufacturing competitiveness and consumer appeal. Meanwhile, small businesses and informal resellers in the U.S. are embracing the travel-and-shop model as a new supply chain tactic—purchasing goods in person, claiming tax refunds, and reselling domestically with minimal overhead.

Policy, price, and the power of adaptation

The sharp rise in import taxes has not curtailed American demand for affordable Chinese products—it has simply rerouted it. With price gaps persisting across sectors, and with tools like visa waivers and tax refunds making travel more feasible, “China Shopping” is becoming more than just a trend. It reflects a larger dynamic: when trade barriers rise, adaptable consumers find new paths—sometimes literally across borders.

Whether this behavior will remain a niche workaround or grow into a mainstream solution depends on future policy shifts in both Washington and Beijing. But for now, it underscores the complexity of global trade, and the surprising lengths to which consumers will go to beat the system.

Source: The New York Times

Risk Warnings and Disclaimers

You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.

Add to Favorites

Gerik

Cryptocurrency

Rising prominence of digital assets on a global scale

The exponential rise of digital currencies—led by Bitcoin, which alone accounts for over 60% of the $3 trillion market capitalization as of May 1, 2025—has compelled governments worldwide to reassess their regulatory frameworks. With Bitcoin’s individual market cap equaling 6% of the U.S. GDP and over three times that of Vietnam’s 2024 GDP, the scale and influence of cryptocurrencies have clearly moved beyond speculative assets to systemic financial actors.

The penetration of crypto into everyday economic life is also reflected in user adoption. Vietnam ranks second globally in cryptocurrency ownership, with over 20% of its population holding crypto, trailing only the UAE’s 34.4%. These trends have forced governments to confront both the opportunities and systemic risks posed by these assets.

Divergent regulatory responses and strategic priorities

China’s prohibition-based model offers the clearest example of a zero-tolerance approach. Since 2013, the People's Bank of China has systematically restricted crypto-related activities, culminating in a total ban in 2021 on trading and mining. These moves reflect China’s prioritization of state-controlled financial instruments such as the central bank digital currency (CBDC), the digital yuan. Yet, China’s parallel investment in blockchain technologies shows it does not reject innovation entirely—only those innovations beyond state control.

Japan and the European Union, by contrast, represent structured regulatory models that embrace crypto within existing financial ecosystems. Japan has treated crypto as a legal asset since 2017, mandating strict KYC and AML requirements and offering investor protection through financial regulators like the FSA. The EU, through the MiCA regulation effective December 2024, has harmonized crypto oversight across member states. MiCA introduces strict registration and compliance standards, especially for stablecoins, and aligns digital assets with broader financial risk management frameworks.

These strategies reflect not just a parallel movement but a clear interdependence: as crypto gains prominence, jurisdictions with robust financial systems are increasingly compelled to integrate these assets rather than ignore or reject them.

Toward an innovation-friendly yet cautious approach

The United States illustrates a more fragmented yet evolving regulatory landscape. Various federal and state agencies currently oversee crypto through disparate frameworks. While the SEC historically viewed most crypto assets as securities and pursued enforcement-first strategies, 2025 has seen a softening of this stance. The establishment of a Crypto Task Force and reduced legal pressure on firms like Coinbase reflect a shift toward clarification over litigation.

Political support is also reshaping regulatory tone. Former President Donald Trump, having returned to the White House, has openly embraced the digital asset economy—proposing a Bitcoin reserve, easing restrictions on mining, and urging crypto integration into banking. His executive order in January 2025 signaled a national strategy to establish U.S. leadership in fintech and digital currency, moving the country closer to regulatory consolidation.

Singapore, the UK, and Dubai have positioned themselves as crypto-friendly hubs. Singapore’s Payment Services Act offers clear guidelines on digital tokens while embedding anti-money laundering standards. The UK aspires to be a global crypto and blockchain hub, focusing on investor protection and technological leadership. Meanwhile, Dubai’s dedicated regulatory authority has attracted a large number of crypto exchanges, making the emirate a prime location for crypto business expansion in the Middle East.

Regulatory alignment and future outlook

The regulatory adjustments seen globally point toward a converging realization: digital assets cannot remain in a legal gray zone. However, the methods differ significantly. Some countries use regulation to facilitate adoption within conventional finance, while others prioritize sovereign control or risk aversion.

What remains consistent is the causal relationship between rising crypto adoption and regulatory evolution. As digital currencies become more embedded in financial markets and consumer behavior, the regulatory focus is shifting from reactionary controls to proactive governance.

In essence, governments are not merely responding to crypto—they are recalibrating the architecture of financial regulation itself. This pivot underscores the shared need to protect consumers, mitigate systemic risks, and harness the potential of digital innovation in a controlled yet forward-thinking manner.

Risk Warnings and Disclaimers

Add to Favorites

Gerik

Economic

A historic moment during the annual shareholders’ meeting

The 2025 annual meeting of Berkshire Hathaway unexpectedly turned into a landmark event when Warren Buffett announced his intention to step down as CEO at the end of the year. After six decades of transforming Berkshire from a struggling textile business into a $1.2 trillion conglomerate, the legendary investor is preparing to hand over the reins.

Buffett made the announcement during an extended Q&A session on Sunday, stating that he had already proposed the transition to the board. Only his two children were informed prior to the public disclosure. While many had long speculated about succession, the actual timing caught shareholders off guard. As Jim Ross, a longtime investor from Omaha, expressed, “I didn’t think this moment would come so soon.”

A planned succession and early indicators of change

Greg Abel, who currently leads Berkshire’s energy division, is set to take over as CEO—pending board approval. While Buffett will retain involvement in certain capacities and has no intention of selling his Berkshire shares, his departure from the top executive role marks a symbolic turning point. Few leadership tenures in corporate America have matched Buffett’s in both longevity and cultural impact.

Hints of this transition had been present for some time. In his 2024 annual letter to shareholders, Buffett hinted that it wouldn’t be long before Abel began writing those letters in his place. He also referenced the physical limitations of old age, such as now relying on a cane—another quiet signal that the transition was approaching.

Market sentiment and investor reaction

While the news did not cause immediate market volatility, its emotional impact on shareholders and the broader investment community was significant. Buffett’s decision to announce the succession proactively helped reduce uncertainty and gave the market time to absorb and adapt to the change. Grant Macklem, a software engineer from Colorado, noted, “I always knew this time would come, just not this year. Still, it’s better that the announcement came from him directly.”

This year’s shareholder meeting also revealed subtle changes that reinforced the shifting landscape—such as a shorter Q&A session and the absence of the traditional opening video. These adjustments, while minor on the surface, contributed to the growing sense of transition and marked a departure from long-held traditions.

A legacy beyond business performance

Warren Buffett’s legacy extends far beyond his investing prowess. Thousands of attendees stood and applauded after his announcement, with many wearing shirts bearing his image. His approach to life and values has earned him admiration not only as an investor but also as a moral compass. “He’s not just an investor—he’s a way of life,” said Brazilian shareholder Polliana Elena Varnier.

Buffett’s closest business partner, Charlie Munger, passed away in 2023, marking the first significant leadership loss at Berkshire in decades. The absence of the Buffett–Munger duo—once synonymous with the company’s identity—further cements the significance of this transition. Bill Smead, CIO at Smead Capital, remarked, “Losing Charlie and the aging of Warren brings an era to an end.”

Despite the leadership change, shareholders expressed unwavering respect for Buffett’s lasting influence. His presence has symbolized consistency and trust, two qualities highly valued by institutional investors who have long associated Berkshire’s stability with Buffett’s leadership.

The next chapter for Berkshire Hathaway and Omaha

Buffett’s impact also resonates deeply with his hometown. Jim Ross noted how much Omaha has transformed since Buffett moved back from New York in the late 1950s, attributing part of that evolution to Buffett’s presence and civic contributions.

Though the official handover signals the end of a historic leadership era, it also opens the door to a new phase for Berkshire Hathaway. While leadership may evolve, the principles and culture that Buffett built are likely to endure. His legacy, built not only on financial success but also on ethical leadership and long-term vision, will remain a cornerstone for future generations of investors.

Source: CNBC

To stay updated on all economic events of today, please check out our Economic calendar

Risk Warnings and Disclaimers

Add to Favorites

Owen Li

Economic

It is difficult to determine the precise impact of tariffs on emerging market economic activity. There are too many moving parts, including the possibility of negotiated reductions, retaliatory actions by US trading partners and fluctuations in the currencies of affected economies.

That said, we can look at the current level of tariffs and exports to the US to give us an idea about the extent of EM gross domestic product that is at risk (see Figure 1). Economic theory suggests that tariffs should lead to weaker exports and reduce domestic inflation in the tradable goods sector.

First-order impact

Based on the level of tariffs as of 8 April, Asia will bear the brunt, with Latin America coming off better. Elsewhere, Central and Eastern Europe countries have limited trade with the US, so any direct impact will be relatively muted. Most Middle Eastern countries are only facing the baseline tariffs, while energy might be excluded. Africa is a mixed bag, with some markets at or close to the baseline and others more significant.

There is also a more indirect impact that will be felt by countries that are more trade-orientated and integrated in global supply chains. Tariffs will result in a drag to the overall trade cycle, reducing exports and growth. Asia will be in the firing line, given trade links with China, but also CEE and Türkiye given their links to the European Union.

Figure 1. Direct impact from tariffs on EM countries

Tariff rate and exports to the US

Emerging markets and tariffs: Asia will bear the brunt_1

Source: DataStream and White House. As at 7 April 2025.

THB = Thailand, MYR = Malaysia, DOP = Dominican Republic, HUF = Hungary, CLP = Chile, COP = Colombia, ILS = Israel, PHP = Philippines, NGN = Nigeria, CNY = China, ZAR = South Africa, INR = India, IDR = Indonesia, PLN = Poland, BRL = Brazil, SAR = Saudi Arabia, RON = Romania, TRY = Türkiye.

Secondary effects

Secondary effects are likely to dominate EMs through the following channels.

Slower US growth is expected, but there is a possible upside from China stimulus. Higher US import prices will negatively impact domestic consumers, while the uncertainty around tariffs might cause businesses to postpone investment and hiring. Slower US/global growth (and potentially a recession) has the potential to impact EM countries through weaker demand for exports, lower tourism and remittances. That said, a significant stimulus package from China, if it materialises, could offset some of the weakness in US growth.

Oil prices have dropped, which will affect EM countries differently. Saudi Arabia is the most exposed among Gulf Cooperation Council economies, while the United Arab Emirates remains the most diversiﬁed. Meanwhile, lower oil prices will be a significant positive for the big energy importers like India and Türkiye, where the benefits could outweigh the negative impact of slower US growth.

Lower EM inflation looks likely. Unlike the US, which is facing higher inflation risks, tariffs might heighten deflationary pressure in China, which may then spill over to other EMs. With Chinese exporters increasingly excluded from the US market, Chinese goods might be redirected to other countries, thereby lowering prices in those economies. Weaker global growth and lower commodity prices may also lead to lower EM inflation.

Market sentiment is currently weak, but core EM should be resilient. The last few years have seen a bifurcated EM universe emerge, consisting of higher-rated core EM countries and lower-rated frontier economies. Lower-rated economies may struggle with a prolonged downturn in market sentiment, with some of them only regaining access to international markets fairly recently. The more developed core countries, meanwhile, have altered their borrowing characteristics to become less reliant on short-term foreign borrowing than in the past. Many of these countries have strong enough external balance sheets and access to capital to withstand any volatility.

With tariffs specifically, markets will also be determining which EMs have a higher share of household consumption in their GDP and a higher share of services in their export basket, as well as those that have the fiscal and monetary headroom to support their economies if needed.

Investing in this environment

EM credit: EMs with lower external vulnerabilities and smaller internal imbalances offer greater market resilience and more flexibility for policy-makers to address external risks. That said, spreads are generally fairly tight in these higher-rated economies. Currently, we see opportunities in certain Latin American corporates, where companies are expected to have a competitive advantage due to the relatively lower tariffs imposed. Additionally, the companies and sectors we favour are generally not overly dependent on the US.

Exchange rates: In theory, the dollar should be stronger because there is greater demand for US dollars and lower demand for foreign currencies. But longer term, tariffs may reduce US growth, leading to lower real rates, which both tend to weaken the dollar. Current dollar weakness most likely reflects the lack of clarity on tariffs and their impact on US growth.

As well as any impact from the dollar, EM currencies could be more directly impacted through the trade channel and growth concerns/market sentiment. Regionally, EM Asian currencies might weaken the most, especially if this supports exports in the face of tariffs. CEE could fare better given their higher correlation to the euro, while Latin American currencies could outperform given the region’s relatively better outcome.

EM local currency debt: During the pandemic, many major EM central banks allowed weaker currencies and cut interest rates to support growth. We could see a similar approach now, especially given current levels of real rates, inflation dynamics, lower commodity prices and the softening dollar. More developed EM countries might focus more on their domestic mandates, relying less on guidance from the Federal Reserve.

We anticipate the most policy easing in Asia, where inflation is at or below target levels and real interest rates remain in restrictive territory. There are several opportunities in Asian duration, particularly in Indonesia, which offers high real rates and stable low inflation. India’s large deficits are mitigated by local funding and a multi-year tightening trend, making it an attractive option for longer-duration investments.

We also see duration opportunities in Latin American countries. Mexico and Brazil are particularly noteworthy, both offering relatively high yields. Mexico is experiencing a slowdown in inflation and economic activity, combined with a relatively stable currency, which should pave the way for further rate cuts. Brazil has historically been less affected by tariff-induced volatility due to its relatively closed economy, and aggressive rate hikes have helped stabilise its macroeconomic environment.

Overall, the high carry of select EM positions should provide a sufficient income cushion against any meaningful slowdown in global growth.

Source:Kirstie Spence

To stay updated on all economic events of today, please check out our Economic calendar

Risk Warnings and Disclaimers

Add to Favorites

Damon

Economic

Laughter over tariffs set by US President Donald Trump on imports from various countries quickly turned to chills as stock markets plummeted. Then, once plans were paused after tanking financial markets, we all laughed again.

Yet somehow, in the glee over Trump’s apparent defeat, we failed to notice that we’ve accepted as a baseline for negotiations tariffs on our US exports that are roughly five times higher than those applied to the European Union and UK until April 2025.

Financial markets and fairness

The administration’s stance on international trade has long been driven by the belief that the US trade deficit results from unfair trade relationships. In order to curb a significant weakening of the US position in its critical rivalry with China, this leads to three core approaches to US import tariffs.

First, for Trump’s team, global trade isn’t governed by principles of fair, equal competition. The only way to measure this unfair competition is the outcome itself: the US trade deficit. The formula for calculating new ‘reciprocal’ tariffs doesn’t focus on tariffs for specific goods but on the overall trade balance between the US and its partners.

Second, US import tariffs have two main goals: weakening China in global competition and generating federal revenue to enable the elimination or significant reduction of corporate and individual income taxes, even capital gains taxes. Tariffs, therefore, cannot remain at current levels – they must increase.

Third, they were prepared for – and expected – radical changes to the US tax system and new tariffs to cause disruption and potential financial market shocks before delivering a manufacturing revival. Only the threat of collapsing government bond prices, signalling broader financial market trouble, might have prompted some reflection.

It’s also worth noting that Trump’s team often speaks of other measures beyond tariffs, such as taxes on incoming capital to reduce its attractiveness to the US. Less frequently, but still notably, they mention the possibility of restructuring US debt, likely targeting debt held by foreign owners.

In outlining the Trumpian worldview, it’s only fair to add a few factual notes. The loss of manufacturing jobs in the US stopped long ago. US manufacturing actually added jobs compared with the situation more than 10 years ago. Average wages in manufacturing have grown steadily at over 3% annually, with hourly wages now exceeding $35. The median real income has risen by about 23% since its 2012 low. That’s roughly 1% per year, not spectacular but hardly a collapse into poverty. As for growing inequality, data suggest it has largely stabilised for over a decade.

Europe’s role in America’s worldview

In discussions about Europe’s part to play for the US, their perspective and goals can’t be ignored. This defines the potential compromise the EU could achieve – ideally to our benefit – on tariffs and industrial policy.

Any compromise must include easing our non-tariff barriers. Changes to the General Data Protection Regulation framework, under discussion in the European Parliament in March 2025 – with talk of possibly abandoning it – could be a promising start.

Another demand from Trump’s negotiators will surely be limiting EU trade with China. It’s hard to imagine the US tolerating the EU becoming a ‘backdoor’ for Chinese subcomponents entering the US market via European products.

Similarly, zero tariffs for European goods seem highly unrealistic. Tariffs are meant to generate revenue and the EU – ignoring US objections to value-added tax – is too significant an importer to the US market to be exempt from ‘contributing to the federal coffers’. Nor does the UK’s position seem dramatically different.

This doesn’t mean the EU must agree or lacks alternatives. Closer co-operation with China is one option but, as a citizen of one of the EU’s ‘new economies’ I believe such co-operation today is likely to require compromise with China’s eastern ally, Russia. I struggle to see how that would benefit central and eastern Europe or the Balkans – former satellites of an ally that openly dreams of our return to that status.

Tariffs as compensation for tax cuts

This brings us to Trump’s other economic goals: a not-too-strong dollar and lower interest rates. Achieving higher tariffs, lower rates and a stable currency without raising prices is simply impossible in today’s US economy.

The US federal budget expects revenues of around $5.5tn this fiscal year. Individual income taxes account for roughly $2.6tn, corporate taxes $4.7bn and capital gains taxes about $3bn. US imports in 2024 totalled around $3.5tn, with goods making up $2.8tn and services the rest. Imports from China were under half a trillion. At best, they might offset reductions in capital gains or corporate taxes. Meanwhile, the federal deficit, projected at $1.9tn, is likely to exceed that based on first-half trends.

This matters because new tariffs will inevitably raise the price of goods US voters consume. The announced tariffs will hit not only cheap Chinese goods but even cheaper products from other Asian manufacturers – think $5 t-shirts and socks – that US workers can hardly produce.

We must remind ourselves that voter dissatisfaction with rising prices partly swung the 2024 election against Democrats. Meanwhile, in 1981, when another Republican president, Ronald Reagan, arrived in office, he was mocked by media as a ‘second-rate actor’ with no intelligence. Today, he is regarded as one of America’s most successful presidents. That doesn’t mean he didn’t face fierce criticism for radically changing US policy but there’s a key difference.

Reagan welcomed capital inflows and opened the economy to foreign competition, driven by optimistic faith in deregulated US businesses succeeding globally. Unlike Trump, he didn’t shy from military confrontations with the US’s main global rival at the time. The differences – perhaps shaped by today’s reality with China – are clear. The Trump administration’s economic philosophy carries far more pessimism about America’s global role than Reagan’s did.

The mid-term elections could split Congress between Democrats and Republicans, ending the Trump administration’s ability to push through major changes. This may delay the implementation of decisions, but the administration wants them not just drafted but approved.

Source:Miroslav Singer

To stay updated on all economic events of today, please check out our Economic calendar

Risk Warnings and Disclaimers

Add to Favorites

Devin

Central Bank

Delegates from across the globe will descend on Washington DC on 21 April for this year’s International Monetary Fund-World Bank spring meetings. They will try to decipher if there is any rhyme or reason to the Trump administration’s economic policy chaos and the ensuing global financial market turmoil. They will leave as they arrived – scratching their heads with few answers.

Pity sensible economic policy-makers.

The US entered 2025 with good momentum and many projections anticipated annual growth of 2.25% to 2.5%. But given the huge uncertainties generated by President Donald Trump’s tariff chaos, forecasts are being marked sharply downward. Meanwhile, progress in bringing down US inflation is stalling and tariffs will worsen the outlook. Stocks tanked, yields soared and Trump mind-bogglingly brought into question the dollar’s safe-haven status.

Recession and stagflation are buzzwords of the day. The Federal Reserve will face a ticklish position – will it hold back due to higher inflation prospects or be more inclined to cut rates if the economy tanks?

Trump will most likely succeed in extending his 2017 tax cuts, though the timing is uncertain. What is clear is that debt and deficits are likely to rise – the US is now on track for continued 6% to 7% of gross domestic product deficits for the coming decade – despite the noise surrounding Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency cuts and contrary to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s delusion that growth will surge and deficits be cut to 3%. Continued high deficits will put upward pressure on rates and cause Treasury market indigestion on top of the turmoil generated by Trump’s misguided tariff policies.

Impact of tariffs will be felt globally

China’s deflationary challenges and other entrenched woes, such as housing and demographics, remain in place. Trump’s tariffs will bring US-China trade towards a standstill and others fear Chinese dumping in their markets. The authorities are providing modest stimulus but should use the considerable space on hand to do more. One shouldn’t underestimate China’s leverage over the US. President Xi Jinping will hardly back down. A full on US-China trade war will shift derisking to decoupling, amplifying global fragmentation.

The U-turn in Germany’s fiscal stance is highly welcome and long overdue given geopolitics, enormous fiscal space and a longstanding need to boost domestic demand and reduce external orientation. It is deplorable this turn was prompted by an apparent US abandonment of transatlanticism. But the economic impact will take time to unfold. German stagnation, along with debt woes in other major euro area countries, will hold European growth down, despite European Central Bank cuts, which may now go deeper than expected a month ago given weaker global growth, falling oil prices and a somewhat stronger euro.

Japanese prospects had appeared more favourable, but US automobile tariffs could deliver a blow. Canada and Mexico – America’s neighbours and close friends – may well be thrown into recession.

With Team Trump shamefully shuttering foreign economic aid and others cutting back assistance due to tight budgets, plus weakness generating lower commodity demand, Africa and the poorest nations will be hurt as well.

Pity the IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasting team. It will have to mark down its global forecasts amid the height of uncertainty. The Global Financial Stability Report, pointing to the latest worldwide financial market turmoil, will rightly tell us that these events constitute a potentially lethal cocktail for significantly dampened investment and increased market volatility and short-termism, if not instability and panic.

The Fund’s fiscal minders will correctly rail with even more vituperation against excess leverage and the mistaken path many highly indebted countries, including the US, are embarked on.

Only China benefits if US backs away from the IMF

The IMF faces an existential moment. Project 2025 called for US withdrawal from the Fund and the administration has seemed to revel in retaliating against critics. The Fund’s activities vitally support US national security and economic interests and are a great deal for America. The only winner in any effort by America to back away from the IMF would be China.

Yet, the Fund’s very ethos – a stalwart defender of multilateralism and megaphone for fiscal rectitude – is in many respects contrary to Trump’s agenda. The Fund is supposed to use its bully pulpit to call out misbehaviour, especially for its largest shareholder. But it will encounter challenges in criticising a thin-skinned administration and trying to avoid putting a bullseye on its back. Mind the gap!

US leadership has been key for an economic order that produced decades of unprecedented global gains in living standards. Admittedly, that order has been fraying in recent decades and the US record is hardly without blemish. But the Trump administration appears intent on jettisoning it.

The IMF meeting delegates will inveigh against, fret about and seek answers to America’s sorrowful abandonment of the foundations that have generated global prosperity. They will flatter and plead with the Trump administration to change course to little avail and leave with perhaps no more clarity than with which they arrived.

At least Washington will be in bloom and the libations omnipresent!

Source:Mark Sobel

Risk Warnings and Disclaimers

Add to Favorites

Kevin Du

Economic

The European Investment Bank has been at the forefront of guiding and advancing the green and sustainable bond market, becoming the first issuer of a green bond back in 2007. Now the EIB has met another significant milestone by issuing the largest transaction so far under a new regulation for green bonds, dubbed the premium standard for the market.

This so-called ‘gold’ label is the European Union’s Green Bond Standard, a framework that became applicable at the end of 2024 and aims to enhance integrity and standardise disclosure for better comparability of green bonds. While the EuGBS label is voluntary, it has been viewed as the gold standard due to the strict conformity of the use of proceeds to the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable and Economic Activities.

In 2025, issuers have started to sell bonds under the EuGBS label. A2A, the Italian utility company, brought the first transaction in January with a €500m deal. This was closely followed by a €1bn trade by Île-de-France Mobilités, the French state public transport network, which became the first public sector borrower to issue an EuGBS-aligned bond.

But the most significant transaction has come from the EIB with a €3bn climate awareness bond in April. This was not only the biggest EuGBS bond to date but also the first from a supranational and a frequent borrower in the capital markets. The bond was more than 13 times subscribed, with demand exceeding €40bn and led by BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Deutsche Bank and LBBW.

Green bond pioneer

‘This transaction – our first climate awareness bond aligned with the EuGBS – continues the strategy we began in 2007 when we brought the first green bond to the market,’ said Aldo Romani, head of sustainable finance at EIB, who structured and executed that pioneering green bond 18 years ago. ‘The main motivation of our initiatives was and still is to create a framework for higher transparency and accountability allowing investors to monitor the flow of EIB’s disbursements for green projects,’ he added. ‘This approach has been honed by the establishment of the EU legislative framework on sustainable finance and notably by the EuGBS.’

As the ‘EU bank’, the EIB has been a natural leader in the discussion about EU legislation on sustainable finance and the application of the EU Taxonomy regulation, which entered into force in 2020 to create a common set of definitions for sustainable economic activities. ‘In the green bond space, we started gradual alignment with the EU Taxonomy in 2019 and reached full alignment of taxonomy-eligible allocations with the taxonomy criteria for substantial contribution in 2022,’ said Romani.

The EIB has also been gradually adapting the non-taxonomy components of its CAB framework, notably allocation and impact reports for both stocks and flows, presenting already available information in accordance with the EuGBS regulation.

Its first transaction under the EuGBS label has been the next step in this journey. ‘Alignment with the EuGBS is the culmination of this process and enhances at the same time the value of non-EuGBS-aligned CABs,’ said Romani. ‘It clarifies to the market that we are using both instruments as part of an overarching process improving the quality of the information we provide to investors on the use of proceeds.’

Manual for others to follow

Going forward, the EIB will issue CABs both with an EuGBS label and without, with both instruments remaining aligned to the International Capital Market Association’s Green Bond Principles – a complementary set of voluntary guidelines for green bonds. However, the EIB, with its inaugural EuGBS transaction, hopes to have provided a manual for other issuers and public sector borrowers to prepare and bring their own deals under this label.

The EuGBS had previously been heavily criticised for setting a bar too high for issuers to meet. At a forum by OMFIF’s Sovereign Debt Institute in April 2023 – shortly after the entry into force of the regulation – one third of the attendees said the EuGBS was a ‘wasted opportunity’ for borrowers, highlighting the frustration among issuers in aligning with this new regulation.

‘The distance between the GBP and the EuGBS is not as large as it has been depicted,’ said Romani. ‘If you consider non-taxonomy requirements, there is a very big overlap between EuGBS and GBPs.’ If issuers realise this, it may lead to more issuance under this format. The key thing is that issuers have a template to follow from the EIB.