Could the US Seize Greenland? A Strategic Breakdown

A Cycle of Unrest and Misunderstanding

Iran is once again gripped by widespread protests. For the last month, citizens have filled the streets demanding fundamental change, triggered initially by soaring inflation but quickly escalating into calls for an end to the Islamic regime.

As speculation mounts, the outcome remains uncertain. Popular uprisings are inherently unpredictable. Yet, to many observers, this wave of protest feels different from those in 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022. Whether it truly is different or simply appears so because Western policymakers have misunderstood the Islamic Republic for decades is the critical question.

With so much at stake, now is the perfect time to reexamine the flawed assumptions that have guided Washington's—and the West's—failed approach to Iran. Even if the current regime survives, the country will not be the same as it was before the protests began on December 28, 2025. This analysis aims to learn from past mistakes without assigning blame, providing a necessary update for a foreign policy community facing a changing Iran.

The Faulty Blueprint: America's Core Beliefs About Iran

For three decades, U.S. policy toward Iran was built on a set of core assumptions that recent events have proven to be fundamentally flawed. These beliefs shaped everything from diplomatic outreach to nuclear negotiations.

The central pillar of this thinking was that the Iranian regime is ultimately pragmatic. Its revolutionary rhetoric was seen as a public front for a realistic and practical leadership. This led to several key conclusions:

• Susceptibility to Incentives: It was believed that Iran's leaders could be influenced by American and Western diplomacy and financial offers.

• Desire for Integration: The supreme leader and his advisors were thought to prioritize integration into the international community over repressing their population and dominating the region.

• Dismissal of the Opposition: Supporting the Iranian opposition was framed as self-defeating and counter to U.S. interests, partly because the opposition was seen as too divided to be a viable alternative.

These ideas formed the foundation for President Bill Clinton's "dual containment" strategy, the nuclear negotiations under President George W. Bush, the Obama administration's Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and even Vice President J.D. Vance's "America First" approach.

How Washington Built Its Iran Echo Chamber

These persistent misconceptions didn't appear out of thin air. They were cultivated and reinforced within Washington's foreign policy ecosystem, shaped by who holds power, who they listen to, and how they view the world.

The Influence of Insiders

Certain Iranian expatriates have consistently had the ear of senior U.S. officials, giving them a platform in the media and in government simulations. These war games often portray Tehran's decision-making as supremely pragmatic in ways that clash with real-world events. Nonetheless, this is the perspective frequently presented to military officers and intelligence analysts.

While other Iranian expats hold far more critical views of the regime, they are rarely given a seat at the table. This selective access reinforces the dominant narrative that the supreme leader is open to accommodation with the United States.

The Lingering Shadow of Iraq

The 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq left a deep scar on Washington. Haunted by the high costs of regime change in Iraq, the foreign policy community adopted the view that a similar outcome in Iran must be avoided at all costs.

This aversion wasn't just a strategic preference; it evolved into a rationale for why regime change was unnecessary in the first place. This narrative conveniently relied on the same flawed assumptions: that the Iranian leadership was pragmatic and willing to strike a deal with Washington.

The JCPOA and the Partisan Divide

President Barack Obama was not the first U.S. leader to extend an olive branch to Tehran. President George H.W. Bush signaled a desire for better relations, and President Clinton sought reconciliation after Mohammad Khatami’s election in 1997. Even President George W. Bush, famous for his "axis of evil" speech, supported European diplomatic overtures and multilateral nuclear talks with Iran late in his presidency.

Obama’s outreach, however, went further and culminated in the JCPOA. Despite official denials, the deal was widely seen by his administration as a pathway to a new relationship with the Islamic Republic. There was little evidence the Iranian leadership shared this goal, but the White House set the agenda.

Support for the JCPOA became widespread within the foreign policy community, partly due to a social network effect in the Beltway. To remain in good standing, many analysts and former officials praised the deal, regardless of its shortcomings. Ben Rhodes, Obama's deputy national security advisor, claimed the Washington establishment was united against the JCPOA, but the reality was the opposite; while critics were vocal, a far larger contingent was in favor.

This dynamic contributed to the political polarization of Middle East policy. Countries that opposed the deal—namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel—became identified with the Republican Party. Their security concerns, highlighted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 2015 address to Congress, were often dismissed by Democrats as bad-faith arguments rather than genuine strategic assessments. In retrospect, their skepticism about the nature of the Iranian regime appears to have been more accurate than Washington's.

A Time for Clarity on Iran

The debate over President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA may never be resolved, but it is clear that America’s regional partners had a better grasp of the Iranian regime than many in Washington. It is long past time to reframe our understanding.

A new approach must recognize the direct link between the clerical system's domestic repression and its aggressive foreign policy. These are not separate issues; they are core components of the Islamic Republic's identity. U.S. diplomacy and goodwill cannot change the fundamental nature of the regime.

Once this is understood, it becomes obvious that the current negotiations offered by Iran's foreign minister are a ruse—a lifeline for a regime that has lost its credibility and legitimacy. Engaging in these talks not only harms U.S. interests but also undermines the Iranian protestors fighting for change.

For decades, U.S. policy on Iran has failed because its assumptions have been detached from reality. The ongoing uprisings offer a golden opportunity to finally see the regime as it is, not as the United States wishes it to be.

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Jeff Schmid argued that interest rates need to remain high enough to continue pressuring the economy and ensure inflation cools down completely.

"With inflation pressures still evident, my preference would be to keep monetary policy modestly restrictive," Schmid stated in remarks prepared for a Thursday event in Kansas City.

He also addressed the labor market, noting that while it has cooled, some of this slowdown is necessary to prevent inflation from worsening.

A History of Dissent and the Current Rate Outlook

Schmid's cautious stance is consistent with his past actions. He dissented against the Federal Reserve's final two interest rate cuts in October and December of 2025, warning at the time that strong economic growth could reignite inflation.

Looking ahead, the Fed is widely expected to hold rates steady at its next meeting. Investors are not anticipating another cut until at least the middle of the year. The current benchmark federal funds rate sits in a range of 3.5%-3.75%, a level many Fed officials consider "neutral"—meaning it neither stimulates nor restricts economic activity.

Labor Market Woes vs. Inflation Risks

Schmid reiterated his belief that further rate cuts would be ineffective in boosting hiring, which was sluggish in 2025. He contends that the slowdown is driven by deep-seated structural issues rather than a cyclical downturn that the Fed could easily address.

"I do not think further cuts in interest rates will do much to patch over any cracks in the labor market—stresses that more likely than not arise from structural changes in technology and immigration policy," Schmid explained.

He warned that premature cuts could have dangerous long-term consequences. "I worry that cuts could have longer-lasting effects on inflation as our commitment to our 2% objective increasingly comes into question."

In Defense of the Fed's Structure

Schmid also commented on the Federal Reserve's independence and its unique federal structure, which includes officials in Washington and at 12 regional reserve banks across the country. The system has faced increased scrutiny from the Trump administration, with some calling for a reexamination of the reserve banks' role.

Schmid framed this decentralized model as a key advantage.

"The decentralized Fed also allows for differing views on the correct course of monetary policy," he said. "This is a strength of the system. Policy discussions are stronger when they incorporate a diversity of views."

San Francisco Federal Reserve President Mary Daly stated on Thursday that the central bank's monetary policy is currently positioned to adapt to any future economic developments.

In a public post, Daly affirmed that the Fed’s policy is "in a good place to respond to however the economy evolves," providing a flexible foundation for navigating the path ahead.

A Look Back at Recent Fed Actions

Daly noted that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had previously cut its policy rate by 75 basis points last year. This move was a direct response to two key factors: a significant slowdown in the labor market and inflationary pressures that were milder than anticipated.

Promising Data Tempered by Uncertainty

Looking at the current landscape, Daly described incoming economic data as "promising." She pointed to several positive indicators:

• Solid projections for economic growth

• A stabilizing labor market

• Inflation expected to improve through 2026

Despite this optimistic outlook, she stressed that significant uncertainty remains. Daly highlighted that risks persist for both sides of the Fed's dual mandate—maintaining price stability and achieving full employment. This means the central bank must remain "deliberate" as it calibrates policy to meet both objectives.

A Broader Approach to Future Decisions

According to Daly, future policy decisions will require more than just a narrow focus on individual data releases. She emphasized the importance of gathering direct input from businesses, households, and communities to gain a comprehensive understanding of economic conditions.

While models, data, and analysis are crucial, Daly argued that direct feedback provides invaluable insight into how people are planning for the future. By combining all available information, she concluded, the Fed can craft monetary policy that responds effectively to changes in the economic outlook and remains appropriate for the challenges ahead.

Source: AP

As Iran’s clerical rulers confront one of the most significant threats to their power in years, their key partner, China, is showing increasing hesitancy to intervene. With the United States threatening potential military action in support of Iranian protesters, Beijing’s limited options and quiet stance reveal the true nature of its relationship with Tehran—one built on convenience, not conviction.

Experts argue that this alignment is pragmatic, driven by mutual interests rather than deep-seated trust. This has become clear as Iranian authorities carry out a bloody crackdown on mass anti-establishment protests, which has prompted US President Donald Trump to impose new tariffs and warn of "very strong action" against the country.

Jonathan Fulton, a specialist on China-Middle East relations at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, notes that while Iran is an important partner, Beijing isn't necessarily committed to the current regime. "I don't think Beijing is particularly wedded to the Islamic Republic," he wrote. "There is utility [for China] in a large anti-Western government in the Gulf, but whether that's run by the Ayatollah or the military or a council of elders, I think Beijing is largely agnostic. As long as the energy flows, they're fine with it."

Beijing's Measured Response

China's official response to the crisis in Iran has been carefully limited. Beijing has focused its public statements on condemning US economic pressure, particularly Trump's announcement of an additional 25 percent tariff on countries doing business with Iran.

"We have always believed that there are no winners in a tariff war, and China will resolutely safeguard its legitimate rights and interests," stated Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning on January 13.

When asked a day earlier about Tehran's violent crackdown, which has reportedly killed at least 2,400 protesters, Mao expressed hope that "the Iranian government and people will overcome the current difficulties and maintain national stability." This cautious wording highlights a desire to avoid direct involvement in Iran's internal affairs.

Oil Defines and Limits the Partnership

The China-Iran relationship is anchored in energy and a shared goal of countering US influence. China serves as an economic lifeline for the heavily sanctioned Iranian economy, purchasing an estimated 90 percent of its oil exports. In turn, Iran supplied roughly 12 percent of China's oil imports, often through a shadow fleet of tankers to circumvent sanctions.

However, this energy dependence is not as critical for China as it once was, exposing cracks in the partnership.

China's Strategic Buffer Against Shocks

According to Joseph Webster, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center, China has been preparing for potential disruptions in the oil market for years. "China has been stockpiling crude oil since 2024," he explained.

Data from commodity intelligence firm Kpler shows that Chinese refineries held between 1.2 and 1.4 billion barrels of oil by the end of 2025. Webster calculates this provides about three months of import cover if supplies were cut off. Furthermore, a substantial amount of Iranian oil remains in floating storage off Malaysia's coast, which China could likely access to further insulate itself from geopolitical shocks.

A Diversified Energy Portfolio

Beijing has also strategically diversified its oil suppliers to avoid over-reliance on any single source. Its major energy partners now include:

• Russia

• Saudi Arabia

• Iraq

• Malaysia

This strategy ensures that even with recent disruptions, such as Washington's strike on Venezuela, China's energy imports remain stable.

An Uneven Economic Lifeline

The trade relationship is deeply asymmetrical. While China is Iran's top trading partner, Iran is a minor player in China's global economic footprint. In 2024, China's official exports to Iran totaled $8.9 billion—a fraction of its $6 trillion in global trade.

In contrast, Iran is highly dependent on China. US sanctions have left Tehran with few buyers for its oil, and Beijing’s purchases, often part of a barter system trading oil for Chinese manufactured goods and technology, have been crucial in propping up the Iranian economy.

Cracks in a Fragile Alliance

Despite formal efforts to deepen ties, friction and unmet expectations plague the relationship. While China supported Iran's entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2023 and the BRICS bloc in 2024, these diplomatic wins haven't translated into unwavering support.

The landmark 25-year economic cooperation agreement signed in 2021 was met with public skepticism in Iran, partly because its text has never been publicly disclosed. Iranian officials have since urged China to do more to implement the deal, which has yielded limited results due to ongoing international sanctions.

The limits of Beijing’s support were also starkly revealed in June when it did little to assist Tehran after Israel and the United States launched strikes on Iran.

A Plea Met with Public Backlash

Tehran’s appeals for help have not been well-received in China. On January 8, amid a communications blackout and rising death toll, Iran's ambassador in Beijing, Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli, told state-owned Phoenix TV that Iran would protect Chinese interests and hoped for assistance from "friendly countries."

According to Tuvia Gering, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel, this appeal was met with sharp criticism on China's heavily monitored social media. A popular nationalist account on WeChat, Zhanhao, bluntly dismissed the ambassador's comments: "Iran continues to expect China to take the bullet for it. That's pure fantasy!"

This sentiment underscores a fundamental disconnect. "It confirms what some Iran-China watchers have warned for years," Gering wrote. "Tehran and Beijing do not see the relationship in the same way."

Britain's economy is on track to expand by 1.4% this year, a performance that would see it outpace major European nations and mark its strongest growth since 2022. However, the forecast still falls short of the government's ambitious goal to lead the world's wealthiest countries.

According to new figures from Bloomberg Economics, the UK's economic outlook for 2025 has improved, with data from November showing stronger momentum than previously thought. This projected 1.4% expansion would be a significant step up from the post-lockdown recovery period.

The UK's Position in the G7 Growth Race

When Prime Minister Keir Starmer took office in 2024, he pledged to make Britain's economic development the fastest in the Group of Seven (G7) nations. The country has long struggled with slow growth, which has squeezed household incomes and created fiscal challenges for the government.

A 1.4% growth rate would place the UK third among G7 countries, trailing only the United States and Canada. This performance stands in sharp contrast to Germany, Europe's largest economy, which recorded just 0.2% growth last year. Britain appears set to maintain this third-place ranking throughout the current year.

Despite the relative strength, the outlook isn't entirely clear. While the economy now looks likely to have posted modest growth in the final quarter of the year—avoiding the flat performance some analysts and the Bank of England predicted—concerns remain. Weak job market figures and cautious consumer activity continue to weigh on the Labour government's economic agenda.

Will Consumer Spending Drive Future Growth?

The central question for the UK economy is whether consumers will become more willing to spend, according to Bloomberg Economics experts Ana Andrade and Dan Hanson. They project quarterly growth of around 0.3% through the end of 2026 but caution that this forecast might be "too optimistic, particularly in the context of a cooling labor market."

Looking further ahead, the expansion is expected to moderate. Economists polled by Bloomberg anticipate growth will slow to 1.1% in 2026, a rate that remains below the levels the UK consistently achieved during the 2010s.

Deconstructing the Latest GDP Figures

November’s 0.3% GDP growth surprised many, coming in higher than expected. However, a significant portion of this boost came from a rebound in industrial output after a hack disrupted operations at Jaguar Land Rover. This one-off event raises questions about the underlying strength of the economy.

Adding to the uncertainty is the impact of Chancellor Rachel Reeves' budget, which included a £26 billion tax increase. The effects of this fiscal tightening are yet to be fully seen.

Kallum Pickering, chief economist at Peel Hunt, offered a measured perspective. "While momentum clearly weakened in the second half of the year as households and businesses turned cautious amid worries over further tax increases, economic activity seems to have been less soft than surveys and anecdotes from businesses had indicated," he noted.

Ultimately, the government faces the difficult task of sustaining economic momentum while navigating the challenges of a hesitant consumer base and a softening labor market.