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President Donald Trump said he had reached a trade deal with Vietnam following weeks of intense diplomacy between the nations and ahead of a deadline next week that would have seen higher tariffs imposed on the country’s imports.
President Donald Trump said he had reached a trade deal with Vietnam following weeks of intense diplomacy between the nations and ahead of a deadline next week that would have seen higher tariffs imposed on the country’s imports.
Under the agreement, Vietnam will pay a 20% tariff on exports to the US, with a 40% levy on any transshipments, Trump said in a social-media post on Wednesday. Trump said that Vietnam had agreed to drop all levies on US imports.
“In other words, they will “OPEN THEIR MARKET TO THE UNITED STATES,” meaning that, we will be able to sell our product into Vietnam at ZERO Tariff,” Trump wrote. The president said he he had secured the deal after discussions with Communist Party chief To Lam.
The deal with Vietnam would be just the third announced following agreements with the UK and China as trading partners race to cut agreements with the US ahead of a July 9 deadline.
Trump had imposed a 46% duty on Vietnam as part of his initial rollout of so-called reciprocal tariffs in early April that were levied on dozens of countries, but were then pared back to 10% to allow time for negotiations.
The Southeast Asian nation has seen its sales to US markets surge in recent years, partly because manufacturers shifted production there from China. It’s a major supplier of textiles and sportswear, hosting factories for companies such as Nike Inc., Gap Inc. and Lululemon Athletica Inc. Vietnam was the sixth-biggest supplier of US imports last year, sending goods worth almost $137 billion, according to Census Bureau data.
Shares in furniture stocks and apparel makers rose after Trump’s post, with ON Holding, Nike and Lululemon jumping to hit session highs, rising as much as 7.2%, 3.9% and 2.9%, respectively.
The deal with Vietnam was struck after weeks of discussions during which the US pressured the country to get tougher on trade fraud, ensure stricter enforcement against the transshipment of Chinese products, and also pushed for the removal of non-tariff barriers.
Vietnam offered to remove all tariffs and repeatedly promised to purchase more American goods. Senior Vietnamese officials flew to the US to rally support and sign deals, including for $3 billion of agricultural goods. The trade minister also wooed executives from Nike, Gap and others to encourage them to get behind negotiation efforts.
Brands raced to move manufacturing to Vietnam over the past decade as US-China tensions escalated. The industrial shift from China to Vietnam also helped build the kind of massive trade gap that made it a prime tariff target for Trump.
Last year, Vietnam’s trade surplus with the US was the third-largest globally on a country basis behind only China and Mexico. Shipments in May jumped 35% as firms sought to get goods onto vessels as quickly as possible ahead of the deadline.
The European Central Bank has reached the end of its rate cycle - and has become ensnared in the very problems to which it has significantly contributed. In Sintra, this was all but hidden behind a facade of central banker utopia.
The annual Sintra conference, just west of Lisbon, serves the ECB much as Jackson Hole does for the Federal Reserve. It’s a moment to review, to look ahead, and to tie the past year’s monetary policy into a broader political narrative. For ECB President Christine Lagarde, that narrative is easily summed up: after eight cuts, rates now rest at two percent; inflation hovers around the two-percent target; employment across the eurozone remains stable; and a fresh debt crisis is nowhere in sight.
That is the essence of Lagarde’s Sintra address—designed to convey one message: everything is under control. Even uncertainties such as Trump-era trade volatility, geopolitical upheavals, or the collapse of German industry are said not to derail the ECB’s set course. Following the market flood during the lockdowns, things are now deemed normal—markets “swing” around their equilibrium. In central bank parlance: they’ve found the “neutral rate.”
The “neutral rate” is the holy grail of central banking mystique. When policy makers feel secure, and media campaigns successfully mask the erosion of fiat currency, it becomes the mantra. In this worldview, the ECB’s policy rate and some theoretical, consolidated market rate align—not by chance, but by design. Even before Lagarde’s closing remarks, ECB Executive Board members Joachim Nagel and Philip Lane had laid the groundwork all through June, repeatedly sending the “neutral-rate” message.
That message? That they have balanced inflationary and deflationary forces and steered the eurozone back onto a growth trajectory. Let’s skip debates over manipulated inflation stats and dramatically understated unemployment figures. These neutral-rate narratives are nothing more than central-bank fairy tales from One Thousand and One Nights—prepackaged press releases meant to evoke sovereignty. Economic processes don’t reduce to such simplistic frameworks. But that’s precisely not the point: the neutral-rate story is a sedative—for governments and markets alike.
The tale of the ECB as guardian of monetary stability is a relic of Bundesbank days. That era is long gone. Central banks worldwide, dragged into political-fiscal entanglements during the last debt crisis 15 years ago, have since become dependent. During the lockdowns alone, the ECB’s PEPP absorbed €1.85 trillion of eurozone sovereign debt—and today still holds roughly a third of that mountain of obligations.
Today, the ECB’s sole goal is to keep those sovereign debt-stacks liquid—buying up bonds shunned by the market to maintain the illusion that public debt, generous welfare, and Keynesian interventionism are all sustainably reconcilable.
Eurozone governments have long relied on external liquidity. With public debt averaging 100 percent of GDP, many member states would be insolvent without the ECB’s backstop. That would have consequences—not just for markets, but for social cohesion, internal stability, and the self-image of an EU-Europe built on oversized welfare motors that offer citizens a false sense of security and dangerously misjudge public capacity.
A withdrawal of the ECB from this nexus of fiscal irresponsibility, monetary support, and political overreach is thus unthinkable. The central bank is no longer just a guardian of the currency—it is the stabilizer of an eroding social model. Through indirect means and backdoor channels, it is underwriting pensions, welfare budgets, bureaucratic cogs—and obscuring how fragile the whole edifice has become.
The ECB is the last mortar holding that crumbling structure together. Remove it, and the house of cards collapses instantly. Which is why Lagarde and cohort must preserve the illusion of a steerable eurozone.
Beyond the gloss of Sintra—in the real world of data—the eurozone is in serious crisis. Industry continues to shrink, and construction is in a deep recession. Over 50 percent of firms cite insufficient orders. Since 2021, German industry alone has cut 217,000 jobs—and by year’s end will lose another 100,000. Deindustrialization is advancing. Production is being moved abroad. Capital is fleeing, and productivity has stalled for eight years running.
The result: countries’ tax bases are eroding. Revenues fall and welfare costs rise, pushing debt burdens higher. Without genuine reforms, the eurozone risks a debt crisis that will once again force the ECB to serve as lender of last resort.
Years of zero interest have immersed the eurozone in the sweet poison of cheap credit. Now, subvention-dependent firms are collapsing under real positive rates. That’s “zombie economy.” And the latest casualty of green industrial planning—Northvolt—is just the latest to close its doors, a consequence of centrally managed economic policy.
Making matters worse: across the Atlantic, the Federal Reserve stands firm on its consolidation path, keeping rates at 4.5 percent—well above other major central banks. The U.S. is clearly prepared to accept a positive market rate, giving its economy room to purge unproductive elements. This lets productive capital reposition and fuel a fresh investment cycle. With tax cuts, energy deregulation, and rolling back green agendas, the U.S. is becoming a capital magnet—one that European economies can only envy.
In Washington, the view is clear: a period of pain brings greater rewards. While the U.S. equips itself administratively, technically, and innovatively for the digital age, EU-Europe stages a competition in ever-expanding welfare plans—rent caps, social handouts, green subsidies: consumption decreed and regulated to substitute for the productive machinery of revenue generation.
Europe has become addicted to welfare-state subventionitis—sticking to a hyper-statist model to defer social and economic pain. And always in the wings: the ECB and its fatal money press. How long this can last, only time will tell. But market tensions are mounting. The day when those tensions trigger a seismic shift, shaking the tectonic plates of the economy into new alignment, looms ever closer.



When will the letters with Trump's promised "take it or leave it" offer be sent out? Will tariff rates revert to the 11% to 50% range announced on 2 April, or will there be multiple extensions beyond the 9 July deadline in cases of "good faith" negotiations?
With exactly one week remaining until the 90-day tariff pause ends, here's a snapshot of the current situation. Bear in mind that a lot can change between now and then.
Here is a list of the currently effective tariff rates:
World:
China:
Canada and Mexico:
In recent weeks, there has been sporadic news about finalised or almost finalised deals, as well as stalled trade negotiations. According to news reports, agreements with up to 10 major trading partners, following China and the UK, are imminent, as countries race to avoid the steep tariff hikes. But with time running out, tariff exemption extensions may still be needed after 9 July.
China: The US has already finalised a key deal with China, securing rare earth mineral exports in exchange for lifting certain countermeasures. Details or an official document have not been disclosed – likely due to the sensitivity of the agreement, which touches on strategic resources and ongoing geopolitical tensions.
While the US-China agreement marks a significant de-escalation with both nations previously imposing sweeping tariffs and non-tariff barriers, we should not forget that the effective tariff rate for goods entering the US from China still stands at 55%. Additionally, several anti-dumping countermeasures are in place. Tensions remain high as China voices strong discontent over other countries entering trade agreements with the US, which it considers to be undermining its interests.
EU: US President Trump has threatened to increase tariffs to 50% instead of 20% from 9 July, if the US and the EU are unable to strike a deal. EU retaliation, on the other hand, would kick in as of 14 July. A sticking point for the US remains non-tariff barriers, such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) or its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Reports suggest, however, that the EU signalled readiness to grant American companies exceptions from the DMA, if it were to get sector-specific exemptions from US tariffs or quotas, especially in key sectors such as automobiles, steel, aluminium, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors, while accepting a 10% universal tariff.
Canada: Trade talks between Canada and the US have resumed after a period of tension, primarily caused by Canada’s proposed Digital Services Tax (DST). Canada had planned to implement a 3% digital services tax on large tech companies operating in the country. This tax, retroactive to 2022, was seen by the US as a direct attack on American businesses, with Trump terminating all trade discussions with Canada. To de-escalate the situation and resume negotiations, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced the repeal of the DST just before it was set to be enforced. Both sides now aim to finalise a new trade deal by 21 July.
Our base case: We do not anticipate the current negotiations to be fully concluded by 9 July, so extensions for the ongoing talks are likely. Canada has already secured itself an extension until 21 July by agreeing to US demands to scrap the digital tax. For China, the official deadline remains 12 August, although it is unclear whether the recent framework trade agreement between the US and China has nullified this deadline. No formal announcement has been made yet.
Temporary tensions are possible, e.g. between the US and Japan, especially over car tariffs, or between the US and the EU, with symbolic retaliation in areas where there are not enough concessions from the US to trade partners (e.g. EU retaliation, but in non-sensitive areas).
Despite trade talks, the US is not pursuing reciprocity – tariff revenue is a strategic goal to finance at least part of the Big Beautiful Bill Act. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has made it clear: zero-for-zero deals are off the table.
A closer look at Project 2025 also suggests that mirroring foreign tariffs could reduce the trade deficit more than reciprocal reductions.
Our base case: The average current tariff rate of 13% is unlikely to change by year-end. Protectionism is still the name of the game for the US, although tariff rates will not increase back to reciprocal levels as of April. The 10% baseline tariff is here to stay. And we still expect sector-specific tariffs to rise in the third and fourth quarters as Section 232 and 301 investigations conclude, though these tariff rates will vary by trading partner, with either a reduced MFN rate or quotas in place.
Targeted sectors: copper, lumber, cranes, critical minerals, pharma, semiconductors, shipbuilding, trucks and aircraft, while tariffs on cars and car parts, aluminium and steel are already in place. That means that the average US tariff rate will remain around its current level, e.g. between 12-15%, with the EU still facing some 10-15% and China around 50% tariff rates.
Despite potential trade deal announcements, the trade war and the reshuffling of trade flows are far from over. With Canada introducing a new tariff quota (TRQ) on steel mill product imports from non-free trade agreement (FTA) partners as of 27 June, redirecting goods via third countries is becoming increasingly difficult. China has once again expressed strong discontent with other countries entering trade agreements with the US that it perceives as undermining its interests. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce warned that it would take “firm, resolute countermeasures” if such deals come at China’s expense, calling the US strategy of reciprocal tariffs “unilateral bullying” that disrupts the international trade order.
We have warned before that the US tariff strategy could prompt global concessions and isolate China, with countries targeted by potential US tariff action making significant concessions, ultimately improving trade relations between the US and the rest of the world, but at the expense of China.
As China is perceived as the largest geopolitical threat to the US administration, there is a huge possibility that American policies will focus more on indirect trade impediments, including investment, social media, and technology cooperation, pressuring companies to reduce their business with China if they wish to invest in the US. This places both Asian/Chinese trade partners and US allies in a difficult position.
While many trading partners have launched anti-dumping investigations into some of China’s trade practices, the Chinese market is even more important to ASEAN nations, African, Latin American countries and even Germany in terms of imports than the US market. Many countries rely on Chinese components and raw materials, and the flexing of China curbing rare earth exports shows that there is no easy way out when choosing between the US and China.
31 July remains the key date to watch in the legal battle over the IEEPA tariffs. While the US Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that Trump overstepped his authority under the IEEPA – impacting tariffs on China, Canada, Mexico, and others – the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a stay on the CITs ruling, meaning that the IEEPA tariffs remain in effect for now. A final decision is expected in August, though the exact timing depends on how quickly the court rules after the hearing.
If the CAFC upholds the CIT’s ruling, the case is likely to go to the US Supreme Court (the Supreme Court denied a request by two small businesses to expedite the case, meaning it will proceed through the normal appellate process). Additionally, the Supreme Court ruling from 27 June, which significantly restricts the use of nationwide (or universal) injunctions, could impact the IEEPA tariff litigation. This means that only the plaintiffs in that specific case may benefit, and those seeking broader relief may now need to pursue class certification.
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