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Macquarie strategists, including Walt Chancellor, revealed that they are forecasting that U.S. crude inventories will be down for the week ending October 17.
In a report sent to Rigzone by the Macquarie team late Monday, Macquarie strategists, including Walt Chancellor, revealed that they are forecasting that U.S. crude inventories will be down by 2.5 million barrels for the week ending October 17.
“This follows a 3.5 million barrel build in the prior week, with the crude balance realizing modestly tighter than our expectations,” the strategists said in the report.
“For this week’s balance, from refineries, we model an increase in crude runs (+0.3 million barrels per day) following a surprisingly weak print last week; turnaround timing represents a source of meaningful potential variability in this week’s stats,” they added.
“Among net imports, we model a moderate reduction, with exports higher (+0.6 million barrels per day) and imports up slightly (+0.1 million barrels per day) on a nominal basis,” they continued.
The strategists also warned in the report that the timing of cargoes remains a source of potential volatility in this week’s crude balance.
“From implied domestic supply (prod.+adj.+transfers), we look for a slight decrease (-0.1 million barrels per day) on a nominal basis this week,” the strategists went on to note.
“Rounding out the picture, we anticipate a slightly larger increase (+0.9 million barrels) in SPR [Strategic Petroleum Reserve] stocks this week,” they added.
The strategists stated in the report that, “among products”, they “look for draws in gasoline (-4.0 million barrels) and distillate (-1.2 million barrels), with a build in jet (+0.5 million barrels)”.
“We model implied demand for these three products at ~14.4 million barrels per day for the week ending October 17,” the strategists added.
In its latest weekly petroleum status report at the time of writing, which was released on October 16 and included data for the week ending October 10, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) highlighted that U.S. commercial crude oil inventories, excluding those in the SPR, increased by 3.5 million barrels from the week ending October 3 to the week ending October 10.
The EIA report showed that crude oil stocks, not including the SPR, stood at 423.8 million barrels on October 10, 420.3 million barrels on October 3, and 420.6 million barrels on October 11, 2024. Crude oil in the SPR stood at 407.7 million barrels on October 10, 407.0 million barrels on October 3, and 383.9 million barrels on October 11, 2024, the report revealed.
Total petroleum stocks - including crude oil, total motor gasoline, fuel ethanol, kerosene type jet fuel, distillate fuel oil, residual fuel oil, propane/propylene, and other oils - stood at 1.696 billion barrels on October 10, the report highlighted. Total petroleum stocks were up 2.4 million barrels week on week and up 60.7 million barrels year on year, the report showed.
Frank Walbaum, a market analyst at Naga, defined the crude inventory build of 3.5 million barrels as “larger than expected” in a market analysis sent to Rigzone on October 17.
In a Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (SEB) report sent to Rigzone by the SEB team on October 16, which focused on the EIA’s latest weekly petroleum status report at the time of writing, Ole R. Hvalbye, Commodities Analyst at the company, highlighted that, “in total, commercial petroleum inventories (excluding SPR) increased by 1.7 million barrels on the week”.
“The build was not as large inventory build as API [American Petroleum Institute] indicated … [Wednesday] night, but still up in total (including SPR) 2.4 million barrels vs normal decline of about 2.4 million barrels this time of year,” he added.
In an oil and gas report sent to Rigzone on October 13 by the Macquarie team, Macquarie strategists, including Walt Chancellor, revealed that they were forecasting that U.S. crude inventories would be up by 5.2 million barrels for the week ending October 10.
The EIA’s next weekly petroleum status report is scheduled to be released on October 22. It will include data for the week ending October 17.
In its weekly petroleum status report, the EIA describes itself as the independent statistical and analytical agency within the Department of Energy. Although the White House website highlights that the U.S. government is currently shut down, a banner visible on the EIA website on Wednesday states that the EIA “is continuing normal publication schedules and data collection until further notice”.
Following a vote in the House of Representatives on 21 October, Japan has elected its first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. Cabinet appointments are underway. But the Takaichi government now faces numerous challenges.
Takaichi claims to be the successor to former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his assertive Japanese foreign policy, which built new security partnerships, boosted defence spending, and expanded the remit of the country’s Self Defense Forces. But Takaichi’s ability to replicate Abe’s success is uncertain, as she leads a weakened Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), confronts a surging far right at home, and negotiates relations with an unpredictable US partner.
The most significant problem facing Takaichi’s ability to form a government was the withdrawal of the Komeito Party from its coalition earlier this month. Komeito had been a partner for the past 26 years.
Komeito’s decision to leave the coalition was ostensibly based on the LDP’s recent record in government. The LDP faced nationwide criticism after it was revealed during the Kishida administration that it had neglected its reporting obligations regarding income from party fundraising systems. This impacted Komeito’s performance in the 2024 House of Representatives election and the 2025 House of Councillors election, where it saw significant losses – a major blow to a party already facing an aging supporter base and declining strength.
However, Komeito’s true reason for withdrawal was likely that it judged it impossible to maintain the coalition when Takaichi became LDP president. Komeito leader Saito has repeatedly made statements suggesting they would return to the coalition under the next president, implying that anyone but Takaichi would have continued to enjoy their support.
Komeito has historically appealed to pacifist, liberal-minded supporters, presenting itself as a check on the LDP security policies. The concern was likely that under Takaichi, this restraint would cease to function – Takaichi is described as a hawk on security issues and has previously visited the Yasukuni shrine which honours Japanese war dead. (Prime Minister Abe’s 2013 visit to the shrine angered China and South Korea).
This shift in Japan’s coalition politics can be attributed in part to changing social norms. Traditionally, older generations, who retain memories of the Second World War, have regarded Japan’s pacifist constitution as a national imperative, opposing measures like strengthening the country’s Self-Defense Forces. Such voters traditionally backed peace-oriented parties like Komeito and the Constitutional Democratic Party.
But for younger generations who have fading or no memories of war, the perspective is very different. Many feel threatened by China’s military rise and North Korea’s missiles. Events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the re-election of President Donald Trump in the US have eroded their trust in an international order based on the rule of law.
More voters believe Japan should strengthen its national capabilities, including its military, or risk being dominated by foreign powers. Domestically, migration is an increasingly important issue, fuelling discontent and feeding support for right wing parties. This dynamic underpinned the breakthrough of the far-right Sanseito party, which campaigned on a ‘Japanese First’ platform in July’s House of Councillors election. It also led the overwhelming majority of LDP members to support Takaichi’s leadership bid in an effort to hold off the Sanseito challenge.
Fortunately for Takaichi, a strong ally has emerged as a new coalition partner: The Japan Innovation Party (Ishin). This coalition will be just two seats short of a majority in the House of Representatives and five short in the House of Councillors. While still a minority government, this significantly increases the administration’s stability.
The Ishin is a political party founded with the goal of expanding the Osaka Restoration Party nationwide. Its policies centre on the Osaka sub-capital concept, aiming to resolve the excessive concentration of power in Tokyo, and on eliminating administrative inefficiencies through the Osaka Metropolitan Plan. This reflects its character as a libertarian party aspiring to smaller central government.
Ishin presented twelve demands but identified three as minimum requirements: a proposal to make Osaka Japan’s secondary capital; social security reform; and a 10 per cent reduction in the number of Diet members.
The Secondary Capital proposal requires complex administrative measures and is a long-term issue, presenting few immediate problems for the LDP. Social security reform poses more significant challenges, as the LDP has significant elderly support and has allowed social security-related budgets to grow steadily. But Ishin is not expected to pursue radical policies on this point, planning instead to address it as a long-term goal.
The biggest issue is reducing the number of Diet seats. The LDP already signed an agreement with the ruling Democratic Party in 2012 to reduce seats – but, the effort stalled due to opposition from within the LDP. Consequently, the Ishin demand is also highly unlikely to materialize.
Ishin’s inclusion of seat reduction as a coalition condition was largely intended to test how seriously the LDP views the coalition and showcase Ishin’s libertarian policy of reducing administrative waste.
The LDP–Ishin coalition increases the likelihood that Japan will pursue more proactive foreign and security policies than before. Previously, the LDP’s coalition with Komeito imposed constraints on ambitions to enhance Japan’s capabilities. Dissolving that coalition removes them. Ishin holds a more hawkish stance on foreign and security policy than the LDP and aligns closely with the international outlook of Prime Minister Takaichi.
Ishin also supports constitutional reform, and formally establishing the Self-Defense Forces as a national military. In this sense, it overlaps significantly with the foreign and security policy pursued by Shinzo Abe. For Takaichi, Ishin is an ideal coalition partner.
However, such hawkish foreign and security policies carry risk.
Relations with South Korea improved during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. They remained positive under President Lee Jae-myung, a progressive who also advocates ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ and chose to visit Japan before visiting the US in August – a very unusual move for a newly elected South Korean president. It implies that Lee regards the relationship with Japan as highly important for his administration.
However, were Takaichi or a member of her cabinet, to visit Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine or mention the Takeshima/Dokdo territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea, it could potentially appear as signs of resurgent nationalism in Japan and undermine these positive relations. (Takaichi has ruled out visiting the shrine as prime minister).
Regarding China, Takaichi has taken a clearly confrontational stance. The challenge now lies in how clearly she can articulate the difference between her position when she was outside the government and could speak freely, and her new role as prime minister.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for her administration will be navigating relations with the administration of US President Donald Trump. The Ishiba administration secured an agreement on tariffs and investment with Washington. But it falls to the Takaichi administration to implement it. Failure to do so could invite pressure from the US and potentially worsen relations.
Takaichi will need to build a personal relationship with President Trump – who tends to avoid international commitments and make statements undermining the credibility of extended deterrence – to ensure Japan maintains deterrence against China, North Korea, and Russia.
Takaichi sees herself as the successor to Abe’s diplomacy. She must now demonstrate her capabilities.
Indonesia's central bank surprised markets by leaving interest rates on hold at its October meeting, pausing after three consecutive cuts as it keeps an eye on the rupiah.Bank Indonesia held its benchmark seven-day reverse repo rate at 4.75% on Wednesday, upending the expectations of six of seven economists polled by The Wall Street Journal.The rupiah strengthened slightly after the decision, which Gov. Perry Warjiyo said is consistent with the central bank's expectations of low inflation within the 1.5%-3.5% target range and its mandate to maintain currency stability amid global uncertainty.
Indonesia's economic growth remains solid and must continue to be supported to align with the economy's potential, Warjiyo said. He added that Bank Indonesia will continue to strengthen its policy mix with fiscal measures to bolster growth, with full-year 2025 GDP expected to come in slightly above the midpoint of the 4.6%-5.4% range and rise further in 2026.Going forward, the central bank will monitor the effectiveness of monetary-policy transmission, as well as prospects for growth, inflation and rupiah stability, to determine whether there's room for additional rate cuts, he said.
Bank Indonesia also left its overnight deposit facility rate unchanged at 3.75% and its lending facility rate at 5.50%.Indonesia's policymakers likely want to gauge the impact of previous rate cuts before acting further, analysts say.Bank Indonesia's focus on reviewing "monetary policy transmission so far" suggests a dovish bias and indicates it may not be long before rates are lowered again, said Jason Tuvey, deputy chief emerging markets economist at Capital Economics.
Capital Economics expects three more rate cuts, bringing the policy rate to 4.0% by early next year, as inflation remains subdued and growth concerns persist.While Wednesday's decision may ease concerns over the central bank's independence amid government pressure for looser policy, Tuvey warned there remains a risk that political influence could push Bank Indonesia to ease more aggressively than expected in pursuit of President Prabowo's 8% GDP growth target.
The surprise signals a cautious approach as the central bank assesses the transmission of prior easing measures amid rupiah volatility and global uncertainty, said Kevin Khaw Khai Sheng at iFast Capital.Given the uncertain domestic growth outlook and external risks, especially from U.S. policy, he expects BI to resume rate cuts in early 2026--assuming a firmer rupiah on a weaker dollar, with the central bank prioritizing financial stability over aggressive stimulus.
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