US Presses Israel on Next Phase of Gaza Peace Deal

King Ten

Remarks of Officials

Middle East Situation

Latest news on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Palestinian-Israeli conflict

Political

Summary:

US presses Israel on Gaza peace phase two, prioritizing Rafah and hostage returns as ceasefire falters.

Top US officials met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Saturday to advance the second phase of the Trump administration's peace plan for Gaza. The discussions come amid ongoing tensions and a fragile ceasefire that has failed to stop the bloodshed.

The American delegation included Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Senior Advisor Jared Kushner, and White House advisor Josh Gruenbaum. Their primary goal is to implement the next stage of a 20-point peace plan, which involves a series of critical steps designed to stabilize the region.

Key components of this second phase include the reopening of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, a further withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, and the transfer of the enclave's administration from Hamas to a committee of Palestinian technocrats. Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by Israel, the US, and several other nations.

US Delegation Pushes for Progress

Following the meeting, Witkoff stated that the US and Israel are "advancing together in close partnership" on the peace process. In an online post, he described the relationship as "strong and longstanding" and called the discussions with Netanyahu "constructive and positive."

Witkoff confirmed that both sides are aligned on the next steps and underscored "the importance of continued cooperation on all matters critical to the region."

According to a report from Israeli news site Ynet, which cited an unnamed Israeli official, Witkoff specifically pressed Israel to reopen the Rafah border crossing, a central and contentious element of the plan.

The Rafah Crossing: A Diplomatic Flashpoint

The Rafah crossing is a critical lifeline for the more than 2 million Palestinians living in Gaza, which has been devastated by two years of war. Israel's control of the crossing, which it seized in May 2024, created a major diplomatic rift with neighboring Egypt. After a brief withdrawal in January 2025, the IDF reoccupied it in March of the same year.

The issue remains a high priority for Egypt. On Sunday, the country's Foreign Ministry announced that top diplomat Badr Abdelatty had raised the need to reopen the crossing with US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau.

There are signs of potential movement. Ali Shaath, who is slated to chair the 15-member committee of Palestinian technocrats intended to govern Gaza, said on Thursday that he expects the crossing to reopen next week.

Israel's Stance: Hostage Return a Prerequisite

Despite US pressure, Netanyahu's government maintains a firm precondition for entering the second phase of the deal: the return of all hostages from Gaza.

The issue is focused on the remains of Ran Gvili, the last of the 251 Israelis taken hostage during the Hamas-led attacks on October 7, 2023. Gvili's family has been actively pressuring the administration to secure the return of his body before any further peace steps are taken.

On Wednesday, Hamas claimed it had provided ceasefire mediators with "all information" it possessed regarding Gvili's remains. The group also accused Israel of obstructing search efforts in areas it controls within Gaza. According to an anonymous US official cited by the AP, the visiting American delegation has been working closely with Netanyahu on this specific issue.

Fragile Ceasefire Overshadowed by Violence

The first phase of the peace plan established a ceasefire that took effect on October 10 of last year. This initial stage also involved the withdrawal of Israeli forces to a designated "yellow line" inside Gaza and the return of all living Israeli hostages.

However, the truce has not ended the violence. According to health authorities in Gaza, whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations, at least 480 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli fire since the ceasefire began. In the same period, Israel has reported that four of its soldiers have been killed by militants.

Israeli forces often state they open fire on individuals approaching or trying to cross the "yellow line," or during operations targeting militants. In contrast, local civil and health authorities frequently report that the majority of those killed are civilians.

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King Ten

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Remarks of Officials

A landmark security agreement between the United States and Ukraine is "100% ready" and awaiting a final sign-off, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy announced on Sunday. Speaking from Vilnius, Lithuania, Zelenskiy indicated that recent negotiations with Russia in Abu Dhabi have yielded some progress.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy addresses the media in Vilnius, Lithuania, on January 25, 2026.

"For us, security guarantees are first and foremost guarantees of security from the United States," Zelenskiy stated during a news conference. "The document is 100% ready, and we are waiting for our partners to confirm the date and place when we will sign it."

Following the signing, the pact will require ratification from both the U.S. Congress and Ukraine's parliament to take effect.

Progress in Abu Dhabi Peace Talks

Zelenskiy's comments came after Ukrainian and Russian negotiators met for US-mediated talks in Abu Dhabi on Friday and Saturday. While the meeting did not result in a final deal to end the nearly four-year conflict, it marked a step forward in dialogue.

According to a U.S. official, both Moscow and Kyiv have expressed openness to further discussions, with more talks anticipated in Abu Dhabi next Sunday.

The negotiations centered on a 20-point framework proposed by Washington. "The 20-point (U.S.) plan and problematic issues are being discussed," Zelenskiy explained. "There were many problematic issues, but now there are fewer."

Territorial Integrity Remains a Sticking Point

Despite the positive momentum, fundamental disagreements persist. Zelenskiy noted that Moscow continues to push for Ukraine to cede its eastern regions, which Russia has failed to capture since its full-scale invasion.

Kyiv's position remains firm: Ukraine's territorial integrity must be upheld.

"These are two fundamentally different positions – Ukraine's and Russia's," Zelenskiy said, highlighting the challenge for mediators. "The Americans are trying to find a compromise." He added that a resolution would require all parties, including the United States, to be prepared to compromise.

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Economic

From Strategic Entry To Structural Exposure

Nearly two decades ago, China moved decisively into Venezuela’s oil sector after U.S. majors were expelled during the nationalization campaign under Hugo Chávez. At that moment, Beijing capitalized on political alignment, financing constraints, and Caracas’ need for external partners, gradually securing access to more than 4.4 billion barrels of oil reserves. This volume is nearly five times larger than the holdings of Chevron, the sole major U.S. oil company that retained a presence in the country.

China’s strategy rested on long-term production agreements, infrastructure investment, and a debt-repayment model anchored in oil shipments. For years, this structure allowed Venezuela to bypass sanctions pressure while giving China discounted crude and strategic leverage in Latin America.

That architecture is now under strain as Washington reasserts control over Venezuela’s energy flows.

Political Reset And The End Of Discounted Oil

The removal of Nicolás Maduro in early January marked a decisive turning point. Shortly after, U.S. President Donald Trump publicly signaled that China could continue purchasing Venezuelan oil, but only at market prices. This effectively dismantled the opaque discount mechanisms that had defined Sino-Venezuelan oil trade under sanctions.

While higher prices alone do not materially disrupt China’s energy security, they eliminate a key economic advantage that justified years of political risk and capital deployment. More importantly, Beijing’s concern now centers on production rights and reserve ownership rather than short-term import costs.

Production Rights Versus Reserve Reality

Chinese state firms such as China National Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec control assets concentrated in Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt and offshore zones like the Gulf of Paria. These areas are geologically challenging, characterized by extra-heavy crude that requires high capital intensity and advanced upgrading capacity.

Despite holding massive reserves, Chinese operators account for only about 15 percent of Venezuela’s total oil output. This discrepancy reflects operational inefficiencies at PdVSA, whose declining performance under Maduro constrained joint venture output. As a result, reserve ownership did not translate into proportional production control.

This imbalance now exposes China to political risk without the buffer of operational dominance.

Debt-Oil Mechanism Under Threat

For Beijing, the deeper shock lies in the potential unraveling of the oil-for-debt model. Venezuela owes China more than 10 billion USD, much of it structured around future oil deliveries. If Washington’s renewed oversight restructures export channels and revenue collection, these arrangements may lose legal or logistical viability.

This risk is causal rather than merely correlated. If the U.S. controls the monetization process of Venezuelan oil, then China’s repayment mechanism weakens regardless of reserve size. In that scenario, past investments convert from strategic assets into stranded exposures.

Limited Energy Impact, Significant Strategic Signal

From an energy security perspective, Venezuela remains marginal for China. Venezuelan crude represents a small fraction of China’s daily oil imports of roughly 11 million barrels. Even a complete disruption would not materially affect domestic supply.

The strategic signal, however, is far larger. Venezuela was one of China’s most visible examples of converting geopolitical alignment into long-term resource control. The current reversal highlights the limits of that model when U.S. financial and political leverage re-enters the equation.

Signs Of Quiet Retrenchment

Recent developments suggest Beijing is adjusting rather than confronting. Last year, Sinopec quietly agreed to sell part of its Venezuelan assets to Amos Global Energy Management, led by former Chevron executive Ali Moshiri. The deal’s terms were not disclosed, but it signaled a partial de-risking of exposure.

At the same time, smaller Chinese firms continue limited engagement, including new drilling projects on Lake Maracaibo, and Chinese exports of oilfield equipment to Venezuela have risen. This indicates tactical flexibility rather than wholesale withdrawal.

Why The U.S. Is Unlikely To Push China Out Completely

According to analysts such as Parsifal D’Sola Alvarado, Washington’s objective is not to expel China but to control flows. As long as oil revenues and export mechanisms fall under U.S. oversight, Chinese participation may be tolerated.

This mirrors patterns seen elsewhere, including Argentina, where governments critical of China have nonetheless allowed Chinese economic activity to continue when it does not undermine Western financial control.

A Strategic Lesson For Beijing

China’s 4.4 billion-barrel exposure in Venezuela illustrates a broader structural lesson. Reserve access alone does not guarantee strategic security when revenue channels, pricing power, and political legitimacy are externally controlled. In the Venezuelan case, the shift in power dynamics has transformed what once looked like a long-term energy triumph into a reminder of how quickly geopolitical conditions can redefine asset value.

In the evolving global energy order, Venezuela stands as a cautionary chapter in China’s overseas resource strategy rather than a decisive defeat.

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Commodity

Middle East Situation

Traders' Opinions

Political

Economic

Energy

Geopolitical analyst Xueqin Jiang has outlined a detailed scenario for the global fallout from a potential United States military strike on Iran. In a recent interview with financial journalist David Lin, Jiang, host of the Predictive History YouTube channel, examined the strategic consequences for energy markets, trade routes, and international alliances.

Reading the Signs: Betting Markets Price In Conflict

Jiang pointed to several developments he interprets as raising the risk of imminent military action, including reported naval deployments and flight cancellations by major airlines. While no official plans have been announced, he argued these factors, combined with internal unrest in Iran, increase the likelihood of U.S. airstrikes.

This speculation is reflected in betting markets. As of this weekend, Polymarket traders have priced a 66% probability of a U.S. strike on Iran by June 30. A separate market shows a 76% consensus that no military action will occur by January 31, though a small 5% probability remains for that specific day. Traders also assign a 17% chance of U.S. troops entering Iran by March 31. This speculation has grown following recent U.S. military activity in Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro.

Iran's Playbook: Asymmetric Warfare and the Hormuz Chokepoint

Jiang contended that a U.S.-Iran conflict would look different from past military operations. He asserted that Iran could deploy an asymmetric response by targeting critical regional infrastructure and trade routes.

The most significant vulnerability he identified is the Strait of Hormuz, a vital chokepoint for a large portion of global oil shipments. Any disruption in this strait could have immediate effects on global energy prices and supply chains.

Global Dominoes: Why the Conflict Wouldn't Stay Local

In response to a question from Lin about whether such a conflict could be contained, Jiang stated that the interconnected nature of the global economy would make it difficult. The economic repercussions, he argued, would almost certainly extend beyond the Middle East.

According to Jiang's analysis, Iran's strategic location and regional alliances could pull other nations into the crisis. Major Asian economies that rely heavily on Middle Eastern energy would be under immense pressure to react, either through diplomatic intervention or other measures to prevent severe economic damage.

Reshuffling Alliances and Shifting Markets

The discussion also explored the long-term geopolitical implications of a sustained conflict. Jiang argued that it could weaken existing international institutions and accelerate a realignment of global alliances, particularly affecting the relationships between the United States, China, and Russia.

He framed this potential shift as part of a broader transition in international relations, citing recent remarks from leaders at Davos and other forums as evidence of growing skepticism toward current global economic structures.

Jiang also connected these geopolitical tensions to investor behavior, noting that recent price movements in precious metals like gold reflect rising concerns over instability. This analysis was presented as his personal interpretation of market sentiment.

As an educator and historian, Jiang applies structural history and game theory to analyze contemporary events on his Predictive History channel, an approach that has garnered both attention and debate.

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Commodity

Oil Abundance Without Full Financial Sovereignty

Iraq possesses approximately 145 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, ranking fifth globally and accounting for roughly 17 percent of the world’s total, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration. Oil exports generate around 90 percent of Iraq’s state budget, making petroleum revenues the backbone of national finances. Yet, despite this resource endowment, Iraq does not exercise full control over the cash flows derived from its oil sector.

Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Washington has overseen Iraq’s oil revenues through financial arrangements that remain in place today. This structure has fundamentally shaped Iraq’s economic sovereignty and constrained Baghdad’s policy autonomy.

The Origin Of U.S. Control Over Oil Revenues

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority established the Development Fund for Iraq to manage oil revenues. The fund was placed under the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, with the stated objective of safeguarding Iraq’s oil income from legal claims linked to the Saddam Hussein era and channeling funds toward reconstruction.

This framework was formalized through executive orders signed by then-President George W. Bush, and subsequently renewed by later administrations. Over time, the Development Fund evolved into an account held by the Central Bank of Iraq at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a structure that remains active.

According to Iraqi officials cited by local media, between 80 and 85 billion USD of Iraq’s foreign exchange reserves are currently held at the Fed. This arrangement establishes a direct causal relationship between U.S. financial oversight and Iraq’s macroeconomic stability.

Leverage Through Financial Gatekeeping

The custody of Iraq’s reserves has given Washington a powerful, non-military lever. In 2020, when Baghdad formally requested the withdrawal of U.S. troops, reports emerged that U.S. officials warned of potential restrictions on Iraq’s access to its funds at the Fed. Shortly afterward, the Iraqi government softened its position, illustrating how financial dependence can translate into political influence.

Although Iraq has gradually regained administrative control over fiscal operations since the early years of occupation, the continued reliance on U.S.-managed accounts demonstrates that sovereignty over oil production does not automatically equate to sovereignty over oil income.

Dollar Restrictions And Market Distortions

U.S. oversight has also reshaped Iraq’s domestic currency system. For years, the Central Bank of Iraq relied on daily dollar auctions as its primary mechanism for supplying foreign currency to the market. This system allowed private banks and exchange companies to purchase U.S. dollars using Iraqi dinars.

Under pressure from Washington, Iraq terminated the auction mechanism in early 2025. The U.S. argued that the system facilitated dollar transfers to sanctioned entities, particularly linked to Iran. The tightening of dollar flows has produced a parallel currency market, widening the gap between the official exchange rate and the informal market rate.

This divergence reflects a correlation between external financial controls and internal economic distortions, as reduced access to official dollars increases transaction costs and fuels speculative behavior.

Iraq Caught Between U.S.–Iran Rivalry

Since Donald Trump returned to office for a second term, Washington has intensified its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. Iraq has been repeatedly drawn into this confrontation, as Iran views Iraq as a critical economic outlet, while the U.S. seeks to block financial channels that could benefit Tehran.

In 2025, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Iraqi banks and individuals accused of facilitating money laundering for Iran. These measures further tightened U.S. oversight of Iraq’s financial system and reinforced the strategic importance of controlling oil-derived dollar revenues.

Enduring Influence In A Resource-Rich State

More than two decades after the invasion, Iraq’s experience highlights how control over financial infrastructure can outlast direct military presence. While Baghdad exports oil independently and formally manages its budget, the placement of its reserves at the Federal Reserve continues to shape policy choices and limit room for maneuver.

The Iraqi case demonstrates that in resource-dependent economies, sovereignty is not defined solely by ownership of reserves, but by control over revenue flows, currency access, and financial plumbing. As Iraq attempts to balance relations with both Washington and Tehran, the legacy of U.S. oversight over its oil revenues remains a central constraint on its economic and political trajectory.

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Commodity

Rising Imports Amid A Delicate Political Context

In 2025, Georgia significantly increased its natural gas purchases from Russia, even though the two countries have had no formal diplomatic relations since the 2008 conflict. According to figures released by Gazprom, gas deliveries to Georgia reached 1.1 billion cubic meters, representing a year-on-year increase of more than 40 percent. This surge forms part of Moscow’s broader strategy to redirect gas exports toward southern markets as demand from the European Union continues to contract under sanctions.

For Georgia, however, the issue extends beyond volume. The country is now paying higher prices for Russian gas, highlighting a growing trade-off between political distance and economic necessity.

Higher Prices And Changing Contract Terms

A government decree dated December 25, 2025, and made public in January, revealed new pricing terms under Georgia’s gas contract with Gazprom. According to reporting by Georgian Business Media, Georgia pays 215 USD per 1,000 cubic meters for the first 250 million cubic meters of gas imported from Russia. Any volume above that threshold is priced at 185 USD per 1,000 cubic meters.

Previously, Georgia had paid a flat rate of 185 USD per 1,000 cubic meters. The revised structure therefore implies a higher average import cost as Russian gas volumes expand. The relationship here is causal rather than coincidental: increased dependence on a single supplier with limited political leverage options has reduced Georgia’s bargaining power on pricing.

Energy Dependence And Strategic Rebalancing

Georgia’s growing reliance on Russian gas marks a notable shift at a time when the country is recalibrating its geopolitical orientation. Under the ruling Georgian Dream party, economic ties with Russia have gradually deepened, while relations with the EU and the United States have stalled.

Although Azerbaijan remains Georgia’s primary gas supplier and is expected to account for 87 percent of total imports in 2026, deliveries from Azerbaijan have been declining. This reduction has directly contributed to the rising share of Russian gas in Georgia’s energy mix, even at higher prices.

In 2025, Georgia imported a total of 444 million USD worth of natural gas, an increase of 2.1 percent year-on-year. Of this amount, imports from Russia totaled 206.4 million USD, underscoring the growing financial significance of the Russian supply channel.

Economic Necessity Versus Political Sensitivity

The expansion of Russian gas imports reflects structural constraints rather than ideological alignment. Georgia lacks extensive domestic energy resources and faces limited short-term alternatives to pipeline gas. Liquefied natural gas imports remain costly and infrastructure-intensive, while regional supply diversification options are constrained by capacity and geopolitics.

As a result, Georgia’s energy policy demonstrates a correlation between supply security concerns and pragmatic economic choices, even when such choices carry political risk. The decision to accept higher prices suggests that continuity of supply has become the overriding priority.

Transparency Dispute And Domestic Fallout

The publication of the pricing details triggered controversy within Georgia’s political system. Although the decree appeared on a platform linked to the government, senior figures within Georgian Dream described the disclosure as an unauthorized and potentially illegal leak. The State Security Service of Georgia subsequently launched an investigation into alleged cyber interference and unauthorized access to government systems.

In its statement, the agency claimed the incident involved attempts to manipulate official information in a way that could harm Georgia’s national interests by generating political and economic instability. This response highlights the sensitivity surrounding energy policy decisions and their domestic political implications.

Russia’s Southern Energy Pivot

From Moscow’s perspective, Georgia’s increased imports fit neatly into a broader regional strategy. Gazprom has reported gas export growth of more than 20 percent to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, signaling a deliberate shift toward Eurasian markets. The contraction of EU demand has thus accelerated Russia’s focus on neighboring and politically flexible buyers.

For Georgia, this alignment is less strategic than circumstantial. The country’s growing purchases from Russia are best understood as a response to constrained alternatives rather than an endorsement of Moscow’s regional agenda.

Energy Security At A Rising Cost

Georgia’s experience illustrates a wider dilemma facing small, energy-import-dependent states in an era of geopolitical fragmentation. Even without diplomatic ties, economic interdependence can intensify when infrastructure, geography, and market realities leave few viable substitutes.

The sharp rise in Russian gas imports, combined with higher prices, signals that energy security considerations are increasingly outweighing political symbolism. Over the longer term, this trajectory may deepen Georgia’s exposure to external pressure, reinforcing the need for diversification strategies that extend beyond short-term supply stability.

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A State-Led Turn In Critical Minerals Policy

The Trump administration is preparing a landmark investment of 1.6 billion USD into USA Rare Earth, a rare earth mining and magnet manufacturing company headquartered in Oklahoma. In return, the U.S. government would secure a 10 percent equity stake, equivalent to 16.1 million shares, alongside warrants to purchase an additional 17.6 million shares at a fixed price of 17.17 USD per share. This transaction, expected to be announced on January 26, would be paired with a separate 1 billion USD private financing round.

This move reflects a structural shift in U.S. industrial policy. Rather than relying solely on incentives or tariffs, Washington is increasingly using direct equity participation to shape strategic supply chains. The causal logic is clear: by embedding itself as a shareholder, the U.S. government gains both influence and long-term security over assets deemed essential to national security and advanced manufacturing.

Why USA Rare Earth Matters

USA Rare Earth occupies a strategically valuable position within the domestic rare earth ecosystem. The company is developing a mining project in Sierra Blanca, Texas, and constructing a neodymium magnet manufacturing facility in Stillwater, Oklahoma, with commercial operations targeted for the first half of 2026. Neodymium magnets are a critical input for semiconductors, electric vehicles, defense systems, and advanced electronics, making them a focal point of geopolitical competition.

With a market capitalization of approximately 3.45 billion USD, USA Rare Earth has emerged as one of the few U.S.-based players capable of producing neodymium magnets at industrial scale. Recent share price gains reflect investor expectations that state backing will accelerate project execution, reduce financing risk, and enhance the company’s role in reshoring critical manufacturing.

Industrial Policy Meets National Security

According to officials at the CHIPS Program Office under the U.S. Department of Commerce, the investment is explicitly designed to repatriate critical mineral capacity and reinforce supply chains vital to semiconductor manufacturing and defense readiness. This framing underscores the causal link between rare earth availability and national security resilience.

USA Rare Earth has partnered with Cantor Fitzgerald to coordinate its capital raise, a move that integrates private financial markets into Washington’s strategic objectives. The structure reflects a hybrid model in which public capital de-risks early-stage investment while private capital scales production capacity.

Reducing Structural Dependence On China

The investment forms part of a broader and highly coordinated U.S. effort to reduce reliance on Chinese rare earth supply chains. China currently dominates global rare earth extraction, processing, and magnet manufacturing, using this position as leverage in trade and diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. response has evolved from reactive trade measures to proactive supply chain construction.

In 2025, Washington acquired equity stakes in MP Materials, Lithium Americas, and Trilogy Metals, establishing a precedent for direct government participation in mining ventures. The USA Rare Earth deal extends this approach downstream into processing and magnet manufacturing, addressing a long-standing bottleneck in the U.S. rare earth ecosystem.

The relationship between Chinese export controls and U.S. investment policy is causal rather than coincidental. As Washington deploys tariffs and technology restrictions in negotiations with Beijing, China’s control over rare earth exports remains a critical counterweight. Securing domestic capacity reduces vulnerability to supply disruptions and weakens China’s bargaining position.

Building A Global Web Of Mineral Alliances

Beyond domestic investments, the U.S. has pursued parallel agreements with resource-rich allies to diversify supply. In October 2025, Washington and Australia established a strategic framework covering mining, refining, and processing of rare earths and critical minerals. Similar arrangements followed with Japan, focusing on permanent magnets, stockpiling, and rapid-response mechanisms for supply chain disruptions.

The strategy extends to Southeast Asia, where agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia aim to expand extraction and processing capacity. Additional cooperation with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Argentina, and Quad members reflects a deliberate effort to construct a geographically diversified mineral network that reduces systemic risk.

A New Phase Of Resource Nationalism

Taken together, the USA Rare Earth investment illustrates a broader transformation in U.S. economic strategy. Critical minerals are no longer treated as ordinary commodities but as strategic assets warranting direct state involvement. This shift does not merely respond to market failure; it anticipates geopolitical contestation in which control over inputs such as rare earths may shape industrial competitiveness and security outcomes.

In this context, the 1.6 billion USD investment is less about short-term financial return and more about long-term strategic optionality. By anchoring rare earth mining and magnet production within U.S. borders, Washington is laying the groundwork for a more resilient industrial base, even as global competition over resources intensifies.

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US Presses Israel on Next Phase of Gaza Peace Deal

US Delegation Pushes for Progress

The Rafah Crossing: A Diplomatic Flashpoint

Israel's Stance: Hostage Return a Prerequisite

Fragile Ceasefire Overshadowed by Violence

Zelenskiy: US Security Deal for Ukraine is 100% Ready

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy addresses the media in Vilnius, Lithuania, on January 25, 2026.

Progress in Abu Dhabi Peace Talks

Territorial Integrity Remains a Sticking Point

China’s 4.4 Billion-Barrel Setback: How Venezuela Became A Strategic Shock For Beijing

From Strategic Entry To Structural Exposure

Political Reset And The End Of Discounted Oil

Production Rights Versus Reserve Reality

Debt-Oil Mechanism Under Threat

Limited Energy Impact, Significant Strategic Signal

Why The U.S. Is Unlikely To Push China Out Completely

A Strategic Lesson For Beijing

US-Iran Conflict: Analyzing the Economic & Geopolitical Fallout

Reading the Signs: Betting Markets Price In Conflict

Iran's Playbook: Asymmetric Warfare and the Hormuz Chokepoint

Global Dominoes: Why the Conflict Wouldn't Stay Local

Reshuffling Alliances and Shifting Markets

Iraq’s Oil Wealth Under External Control: How the U.S. Has Shaped Baghdad’s Revenues for Two Decades

Oil Abundance Without Full Financial Sovereignty

The Origin Of U.S. Control Over Oil Revenues

Leverage Through Financial Gatekeeping

Dollar Restrictions And Market Distortions

Iraq Caught Between U.S.–Iran Rivalry

Enduring Influence In A Resource-Rich State

Paying More For Energy Security: Why Georgia Is Buying More Russian Gas Despite Political Estrangement

Rising Imports Amid A Delicate Political Context

Higher Prices And Changing Contract Terms

Energy Dependence And Strategic Rebalancing

Economic Necessity Versus Political Sensitivity

Transparency Dispute And Domestic Fallout

Russia’s Southern Energy Pivot

Energy Security At A Rising Cost

Washington Bets Big On Rare Earths In Strategic Push To Cut China Dependence

A State-Led Turn In Critical Minerals Policy

Why USA Rare Earth Matters

Industrial Policy Meets National Security

Reducing Structural Dependence On China

Building A Global Web Of Mineral Alliances

A New Phase Of Resource Nationalism

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