The New Middle East: Two Blocs Compete Beyond Iran

Recent headlines about Iran’s internal turmoil and potential military confrontations obscure a more fundamental shift in the Middle East. Tehran is no longer the primary force shaping the region’s strategic direction. Instead, a new era is dawning, defined by competition between two emerging coalitions: an Abrahamic bloc and an Islamic bloc. The evolution of this rivalry—not Iran's next move—will determine the future of the region and America's role within it.

The Rise of the Abrahamic Coalition

Though not yet a formal alliance, the first bloc is becoming increasingly coherent. Centered on Israel and the United Arab Emirates, this group extends to include Morocco, Greece, and even India. This coalition aims to reconfigure the region through a combination of military power, technological partnership, and economic integration.

Core members believe the existing Middle Eastern order has failed to stop militant Islam, whether the Shiite version backed by Iran or the Sunni variant supported by Turkey and Qatar. They argue that true stability can only be achieved by intervening in regional conflicts to support more secular forces. Capitalizing on President Donald Trump's push to broaden the Abraham Accords, these nations are prioritizing the expansion of Arab-Israeli normalization, regardless of progress on Palestinian self-determination or a two-state solution.

This Abrahamic coalition is gaining momentum. Israel's military operations following the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack have bolstered its deterrence and power projection capabilities. The UAE, known as "Little Sparta," continues to use its economic might and diplomatic agility to expand its influence far beyond the Gulf. United Nations experts and international NGOs suspect the UAE of supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, and Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar.

Greece has become a vital partner in the Eastern Mediterranean, collaborating with Israel on military drills and energy projects to counter their shared competitor, Turkey. Further east, India’s growing ties with both Israel and the UAE—through bilateral agreements and multilateral platforms like I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor—give the bloc strategic depth far beyond the region itself.

The Islamic Bloc Forms a Counterweight

Opposing the Abrahamic axis is the Islamic coalition, a counterbalancing effort led by Saudi Arabia and including Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar, and a more cautious Egypt. These nations view the Israel-UAE axis as a source of instability, arguing that its support for separatist groups worsens fragmentation in conflict zones. They see the narrative of pushing back against Islamists as a self-serving excuse to project power.

This group prefers to preserve and operate within existing structures, however flawed. In Yemen, Sudan, and elsewhere, they are backing weak states struggling to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Over the past year, Saudi Arabia has bolstered its defense relationship with Pakistan, creating a mutual security pact after an Israeli airstrike on Qatar. Its military cooperation with Turkey has also grown, with a more formal defense agreement seemingly on the horizon. Egypt, concerned by Israeli and Emirati activities in the Horn of Africa, is also discussing closer coordination with Riyadh on Sudan and Somalia. Together, these states are forming a loose but expanding counterweight across the region.

The Saudi-UAE Rivalry at the Center

At the heart of this realignment is the most critical bilateral rift in the Middle East today: the escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Once close partners, the two Gulf powers are now strategic competitors. This divergence was highlighted in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia struck the Port of Mukalla to stop Emirati arms shipments, ultimately forcing a UAE withdrawal.

If left unchecked, this competition could escalate from proxy conflicts to direct confrontation. Threats of airspace restrictions, border closures, and even a UAE withdrawal from Saudi-led institutions like OPEC+ have already been voiced by senior officials. Such moves, once unthinkable, would disrupt energy markets, regional travel, and cross-border business. While Gulf diplomacy has contained the friction so far, the underlying divide is structural, not merely personal.

U.S. Strategy in a New Regional Order

This new competition complicates a key U.S. foreign policy goal: Saudi-Israeli normalization. Riyadh still sees the value in a deal that would grant it a U.S. security treaty in exchange for integrating Israel into the region. However, without significant changes in Israeli policy, especially regarding Gaza and the West Bank, the kingdom is more likely to align with Turkey and Pakistan than with Israel.

For the United States, the primary challenge is no longer countering an Iranian regime that appears critically weakened. The new task is managing the damaging rivalries among its own partners to prevent further fragmentation. This is made more difficult by divisions within Washington, where officials reportedly have diverging views and independent business interests in the region, leading to a hands-off approach.

To achieve a breakthrough, the Trump administration must take two steps. First, it needs to actively manage the rivalries among its partners and its own aides, perhaps by appointing a special envoy to coordinate a unified regional strategy. Second, it must preserve a viable path to Saudi-Israeli normalization by influencing political outcomes in Jerusalem after upcoming elections. The next Israeli government cannot be beholden to radical elements opposed to Palestinian self-determination.

Saudi Arabia is the Middle East's crucial swing state. A senior Saudi official described the kingdom's policy as pragmatic, guided by "maximum flexibility at a time of maximum uncertainty." If President Trump can secure Saudi-Israeli normalization, he could steer Riyadh and the wider region away from its current path of rivalry. This would fold both coalitions into a broader American-led framework, stabilizing the post-Iran Middle East for decades to come.