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Vietnam has become the third country (after the UK and China) to reach an agreement with President Donald Trump over the ‘reciprocal tariffs’ he announced on 2 April. Trump had originally imposed a 46 per cent tariff on Vietnamese exports to the US – the fifth highest figure announced on his ‘Liberation Day’.
Vietnam has become the third country (after the UK and China) to reach an agreement with President Donald Trump over the ‘reciprocal tariffs’ he announced on 2 April. Trump had originally imposed a 46 per cent tariff on Vietnamese exports to the US – the fifth highest figure announced on his ‘Liberation Day’. All those tariffs were suspended within hours but were due to be reimposed within 90 days (a deadline that has now been pushed to August 1).
Announcing the deal with Vietnam last week, Trump said that the US will instead impose a 20 per cent tariff on Vietnamese goods. A higher rate of 40 per cent will apply on any goods from Vietnam it considers to have been ‘trans-shipped’ – i.e. simply moved through Vietnam rather than being manufactured or assembled there. The Trump administration has previously accused Vietnam of trans-shipping Chinese goods into the US market, in effect concealing part of China’s trade surplus with the US.
The Vietnamese government has worked hard to reach an agreement with Washington. It has conducted well-publicized raids on sellers of counterfeit products to try to assuage Washington’s concerns over protecting intellectual property. Ministers have held multiple rounds of talks online, sent trade delegations to the US and pledged to buy billions of dollars’ worth of American products. Some reports even suggest Vietnam is considering buying American F-16 fighter jets, which would have been unthinkable even a few months ago in line with Hanoi’s long-held aversion to becoming dependent on Washington for strategic defence systems.
That said, all these purchases add up to a tiny fraction of Vietnam’s overall trade surplus with the US, perhaps $10 billion compared to a surplus in 2024 of $123 billion. According to President Trump, Vietnam has also pledged to cut all tariffs on imports from the US. This prompted him to declare that American-made SUVs ‘will be a wonderful addition to the various product lines within Vietnam’. While this seems optimistic given that many Vietnamese streets are too small for American cars, it is quite possible that Vietnamese government ministries might be told to ‘buy American’ for their next vehicle purchase to reduce the trade surplus a little more.
Vietnam has moved so fast to reach an agreement with Washington primarily because its economy depends on exports to the American market, and the country’s leadership knows it will be judged on its economic performance. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) will hold its five-yearly Congress within a few months and its General-Secretary, To Lam, wants to be selected for another term in office. Keeping the country’s exports flowing to the US is a big win for him and his recently unveiled development strategy, which is firmly aimed at increasing economic growth.
To Lam’s strategy involves the embrace of the private sector, which was endorsed by the new Politburo in May. He has also largely ended the anti-corruption campaign initiated by his hard-line predecessor, which had hobbled the economy. This approach is intended to help catapult Vietnam into the ranks of ‘high income countries’ by 2045, the centenary of the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, and avoid falling into the ‘middle income trap’ like most of its Southeast Asian neighbours.
To achieve this ambitious goal, Vietnam needs to sustain annual economic growth of at least eight per cent for the next 20 years. This will depend on maintaining very high levels of exports, particularly to the US and Europe.
At the same time, Vietnam is becoming more connected to Chinese-controlled supply chains. Vietnam’s economic growth has been driven in part by foreign firms building factories in the country to assemble products using components made in China. Historically, these assembly lines were owned by Japanese, Korean or Taiwanese firms. Increasingly, however, Chinese-owned companies are also setting up production in Vietnam.
There are three reasons for this. Firstly, corporations are seeking to mitigate the risks of having all their production in one country; secondly, they need to reduce their exposure to US tariffs on China; and thirdly, because it is made possible by Vietnam and China both being part of the huge 15-country free trade area known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
For now, Vietnam’s major economic role globally is as an assembly line between Chinese producers and Western markets. This has rankled the Trump administration, which says China has trans-shipped products via Vietnam to avoid US tariffs. The higher tariff rate on trans-shipped products in the deal announced by Trump is intended to counter this. But exactly where the boundary lies between Vietnamese goods and trans-shipped goods will occupy trade negotiators, diplomats and customs officials for many months to come.
While the deal will certainly contribute to improved US–Vietnam relations it is unlikely to signal a major change in Vietnam’s foreign policy orientation. Hanoi cannot afford to antagonize either of its major partners. It needs the US as a market, but also relies on trade with, and political support from, China.
While Vietnam has developed close economic ties with the US, the CPV has remained wary of Washington’s political agenda. President Trump’s apparent lack of interest in promoting democracy abroad will help alleviate some of those fears, though some suspicion will inevitably remain.
China has been damaging its relations with Vietnam recently with aggressive moves in the South China Sea and it is possible that Hanoi could reach out to Washington for some assistance in defending its position. This was certainly the case during the 2010s. However, Vietnam will not be part of any potential American military efforts that specifically target China.
China will have mixed feelings about the US–Vietnam deal. Some of its companies and factories may benefit from continuing to route their production networks through Vietnam, but others may lose out from having their trans-shipment practices curtailed. Officials in Beijing may also be concerned about whether Hanoi has privately agreed other issues with Washington, such as greater security cooperation in the future. Hanoi will have to make full use of its communist party-to-party connections to reassure Beijing that it has not been flipped into the US camp.
There is also a role here for third parties. Vietnam risks becoming a casualty of the power competition between China and the US. European countries and others with an interest in a multipolar world and a liberal trading order can offer stability to Vietnam. But perhaps they could also start to ask for things in exchange.
Rather than reducing carbon emissions, Vietnam has been increasing the use of coal and gas-fired power stations and European manufacturers of, for example, clean energy generation technology have been blocked from the Vietnamese market by various non-tariff barriers. Vietnam is also failing to curb illegal migration to Europe. These issues are included in the EU and UK free trade agreements with Vietnam, and in other agreements on partnership and migration, but Vietnam is not upholding its side of the bargain. Perhaps it is time for Europeans to get tough too.
An Israeli strike hit Palestinians near a medical centre in Gaza on Thursday, killing 16 including children and wounding more people, local health authorities said, as ceasefire talks dragged on with no result expected soon.
The strike in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip came as Israeli and Hamas negotiators hold talks with mediators in Qatar over a proposed 60-day ceasefire and hostage release deal aimed at building agreement on a lasting truce.
However, a senior Israeli official said on Wednesday that an agreement was not likely to be secured for another one or two weeks.
Khalil al-Deqran, spokesperson for the health ministry in Gaza's Hamas-run government, said Israel had targeted a medical centre and that six of the dead were children. Many of those injured had suffered severe wounds to the head and chest, he said.
Israel's military said it had struck a militant who took part in the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, attack that triggered the war. It said it was aware of reports regarding a number of injured individuals and that the incident was under review.
Videos on Thursday verified by Reuters showed a scene of carnage, with the bodies of dead and injured, mainly women and children, lying in blood amid a cloud of dust as people screamed all around, and of motionless children lying in blood on a donkey cart.
At Deir al-Balah's al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital, where the dead and wounded were taken, Samah al-Nouri said her daughter had been killed in the morning's strike after attending the clinic to seek treatment for a throat ailment.
"They hit her with a shell. Her brother went to check and he said they all died. What did they do? What's their fault? She was only getting treatment in a medical facility. Why did they kill them?" she said.
Israeli attacks on Palestinian hospitals and health facilities, detentions of medics, and restrictions on the entry of medical supplies have drawn condemnation, opens new tab from the United Nations.
The United Nations humanitarian agency OCHA said in May that the U.N. had documented at least 686 attacks impacting healthcare in Gaza since the war began.
Dwindling fuel supplies risk further disruption in the remaining, semi-functioning hospitals, including to incubators at the neonatal unit of al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City, doctors there said.
"We are forced to place four, five or sometimes three premature babies in one incubator," said Dr Mohammed Abu Selmia, the hospital director, adding that premature babies were now in a critical condition.
U.S. President Donald Trump met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu this week to discuss Gaza amid reports Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas were nearing agreement on a U.S.-brokered ceasefire proposal after 21 months of war.
The Israeli official who was in Washington with Netanyahu said that if the two sides agree to the ceasefire proposal, Israel would use that time to offer a permanent truce requiring Hamas to disarm.
If Hamas refuses, "we'll proceed" with military operations in Gaza, the official said on condition of anonymity.
A Palestinian official said the talks in Qatar were in crisis and that issues under dispute, including whether Israel would continue to occupy parts of Gaza after a ceasefire, had yet to be resolved.
The two sides previously agreed a ceasefire in January but it did not lead to a deal on a permanent truce and Israel resumed its military assault in March, stopping all aid supplies into Gaza and telling civilians to leave the north of the tiny territory.
Israel's military campaign in Gaza has now killed more than 57,000 people, according to Palestinian health authorities. It has destroyed swathes of the territory and driven most Gazans from their homes.
The Hamas attack on Israeli border communities that triggered the war killed around 1,200 people and the militant group seized around 250 hostages according to Israeli tallies.

After years of mounting concern over deflation and the bruising price wars that have plagued much of China’s economy, President Xi Jinping’s government is showing signs of finally taking action.
Beijing’s messaging has noticeably shifted in recent weeks, with Xi and other top officials offering their bluntest assessment yet of the cutthroat competition that’s been dragging down prices and profits across industries, from steel and solar panels to electric vehicles. This pivot comes after nearly three years of factory-gate deflation and growing pressure from US tariffs and trade tensions.
Finding a solution would be welcome news for much of the world. A successful effort to rein in industrial overcapacity, long a source of friction with trading partners, stands to ease trade tensions and restore confidence in the globe’s second-biggest economy.
But the path forward is far from clear. Xi’s government must curb excess supply without stalling growth or putting jobs at risk, especially as external demand slows and a lasting trade deal with the US remains elusive.
“If executed right, it could be helpful to global trade, in terms of easing tensions coming from China’s overcapacity, output spilling into the global markets,” Wendy Liu, chief Asia and China equity strategist at JPMorgan Chase & Co., told Bloomberg Television on Wednesday. “But short term, it’s not GDP-friendly or employment-friendly, so it’s a balancing act.”
China reported this week that factory deflation persisted into a 33rd month in June, with the producer price index falling 3.6% from a year earlier. The decline was the most since July 2023 and sharper than any economists had forecast, underscoring the urgency of the problem.
While no formal plan has been announced, optimism is building that a more coordinated policy response is on the way. A meeting this month of the top Communist Party body in charge of economic policy acknowledged the underlying causes of the problem, ranging from local governments’ drive to promote investment to a tax system that favors output over efficiency.
Though it doesn’t directly reference deflation, until recently a taboo topic in Beijing, the assessment “represents the strongest signal yet that Chinese policymakers are intending to tackle disorderly competition and the price wars in sectors like autos,” said Duncan Wrigley, chief China economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics.
It omitted a mention of industry associations — whose efforts at self-regulation have largely failed at limiting production — in what Pantheon said could indicate a new approach “with greater top-down determination.”
Industry groups and official media have echoed the shift in tone, calling for efforts to end the price wars. Some companies in sectors ranging from steel to glassmaking are reportedly planning to cut output. The cost of reinforcing bars, a key steel product used in construction, has fallen to the lowest since 2017, while glass prices are hovering near a nine-year low.
The People’s Bank of China expressed similar concerns, naming “prices running at a low level continuously” as a key challenge of the economy for the first time in recent years. In May, the central bank offered another detailed analysis of downward pressure on prices, which highlighted the limits of relying on monetary easing to reflate the economy under a growth model that’s tilted toward investment and supply.
China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, or MIIT, met with solar companies, while a group of almost three dozen construction firms signed on to an “anti-involution” initiative, a term used in China to describe intense competition sparked by excess capacity. The government also launched a platform to handle supplier complaints over late payments, part of a broader push to clean up unfair business practices.
For now, the lack of concrete policy measures is tempering expectations. If officials follow through, as they did after a similar meeting early 2024 that led to a consumer goods trade-in program — many economists expect them to reprise a playbook used between 2015 and 2017.
That supply-side reform largely consisted of aggressive cuts of heavy industry capacity including steel and coal, as well as a shantytown redevelopment program that encouraged residents to buy new homes. The effort helped revive commodity prices and home sales. Eventually, it contributed to a recovery in industrial profits and stabilized economic growth.
But the challenge now is more complex. Domestic demand remains weak, export prospects are deteriorating, and many of the sectors engaged in the most intense price wars — like EVs — are dominated by private firms, limiting the government’s ability to impose capacity cuts. Local officials, wary of unemployment, may resist moves that threaten jobs, even if it means keeping unprofitable firms alive.
And while China is eager to defuse the pressure on prices, it’s equally determined to increase its manufacturing might in the face of President Donald Trump’s push to bring more factories back to the US. Beijing is considering a new version of its “Made in 2025” campaign to boost production of high-end technological goods, Bloomberg News previously reported.
For Citigroup Inc., upcoming measures could include capacity cuts in sectors dominated by big state-owned enterprises, such as coal, steel and cement, as well as stricter enforcement of environmental, labor and quality standards in private-dominated industries.
Authorities could also reduce subsidies for industries, including those motivated by local favoritism, or cut export tax rebate, according to a Citi report last week. The latter already happened for products including aluminum, copper and batteries in late 2024.
Officials may also move to rein in bad business practices, such as exploiting suppliers to win lower prices or delaying payments. In March, new rules required firms to pay suppliers within 60 days, and several automakers have since pledged to comply.
Analysts at HSBC Holdings Plc argue that demand-side measures will be equally important, with steps such as improving the social safety net as well as stabilizing employment and the property market.
But longer-term change will require deeper reforms to the China’s growth model, one which relies on investment and production. That could mean adjusting how local officials are evaluated, shifting from pure economic expansion targets to metrics like consumption and income growth, according to Morgan Stanley.
For now, the shift in tone is notable, but the follow-through remains uncertain. “The tone is sharper, the intent more coherent,” Morgan Stanley economists led by Robin Xing wrote in a report. “But no timeline has been laid out, and no mechanism for enforcement has been introduced,” they said, adding that “the gap between diagnosis and delivery remains wide.”

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