Robinhood vs Webull: Which Trading Platform is Better for You

Silver, a precious metal, has long been a popular asset for traders seeking both hedging opportunities and exposure to commodity markets. With Webull, a commission-free trading platform, gaining popularity for its user-friendly interface and robust set of trading tools, trading silver has become more accessible than ever. Whether you’re an experienced trader or a beginner, Webull offers a simple yet powerful platform to engage in silver trading. In this article, we will explore how to trade silver on Webull, the tools you can use, and some tips to make your trading experience more effective.

Webull allows you to trade silver in several ways: through silver ETFs (Exchange-Traded Funds), silver futures, and even silver stocks of companies involved in the silver mining industry. However, Webull does not directly allow the trading of physical silver like some other platforms. Instead, traders can invest in silver’s price movement via financial products like ETFs, options on ETFs, or futures contracts.

One of the most popular ways to trade silver on Webull is through silver ETFs. These funds track the price of silver or the performance of companies engaged in silver production. Some of the most popular silver ETFs include:

This ETF holds physical silver and attempts to track the price of silver in real-time. It is one of the most widely traded silver ETFs.

While not purely silver-focused, this ETF includes silver mining companies, offering an indirect way to trade silver through exposure to the mining sector.

These ETFs are easy to trade on Webull, with real-time pricing, the ability to buy and sell shares, and no commissions on trades.

Another method of trading silver on Webull is through silver futures. Webull offers access to various futures markets, including precious metals like silver. Silver futures are contracts that allow traders to agree to buy or sell silver at a specified price at a future date. Trading silver futures can be more complex and carries a higher degree of risk compared to ETFs, so it’s recommended for experienced traders.

Futures contracts offer leverage, meaning traders can control a larger position with a smaller investment. However, the potential for loss is also amplified, so risk management is key when trading futures.

For those interested in silver mining, Webull provides access to stocks of companies involved in silver production, like Pan American Silver Corp (PAAS) or First Majestic Silver Corp (AG). While these stocks do not directly track the price of silver, they are often closely correlated with it, as their revenues are heavily dependent on silver prices.

Trading silver stocks on Webull works similarly to trading any other stock. You can research the companies, analyze their financials, and execute buy or sell orders directly from the platform. Silver stocks can be a good alternative if you want exposure to silver with the added benefit of potential dividend payouts and corporate growth.

Before you can begin trading silver on Webull, you’ll need to set up an account. The process is straightforward:

Download the Webull App: Available on both iOS and Android, Webull’s app provides an intuitive interface for trading silver and other assets.

Open an Account: You’ll need to provide some personal information and verify your identity. Webull also requires that you complete a short questionnaire about your trading experience.

Deposit Funds: After your account is set up, you’ll need to deposit funds into your Webull account via bank transfer or other payment methods.

Choose Your Trading Products: Once funded, you can start trading silver via ETFs, futures, or silver stocks, depending on your preference.

To make informed decisions when trading silver, it’s important to understand the factors that influence silver prices. Silver, like gold, is often seen as a safe haven asset during times of economic uncertainty. Market dynamics such as inflation, interest rates, and geopolitical tensions can cause silver’s price to rise or fall.

Webull offers a variety of charting tools that allow you to analyze silver’s price history, track market sentiment, and identify potential entry or exit points. Features such as real-time data feeds, customizable charts, and technical analysis tools like moving averages and RSI (Relative Strength Index) will help you make data-driven decisions.

Silver trading, particularly through leverage in futures markets, involves a considerable amount of risk. To manage this, consider the following strategies:

Don’t put all your capital into silver. Diversify across different commodities, stocks, and assets to reduce risk.

To protect your downside, set stop-loss orders to automatically sell if the price of silver moves against your position.

Control the size of your trades. Don't risk more than you can afford to lose on any single trade.

If you’re looking for another platform to complement your Webull trading, consider using Fastbull. Fastbull is a broker that offers a wide range of trading products, including silver CFDs (Contracts for Difference). This allows you to trade the price movements of silver without owning the underlying asset, providing additional flexibility compared to Webull’s offerings.

Fastbull offers a robust trading platform with a variety of tools and educational resources that can help you become a more proficient silver trader. It is especially suited for those who wish to trade silver with more advanced features, such as leverage and the ability to trade in both rising and falling markets.

Fastbull also supports a range of trading accounts that cater to different types of traders, from beginners to advanced investors. If you're new to silver trading, their customer support team can guide you in getting started.

Trading silver on Webull is a great option for those who want to access this precious metal in a straightforward, low-cost manner. Whether you’re interested in silver ETFs, stocks, or futures contracts, Webull offers a versatile platform with all the tools you need to start trading. As with any investment, it’s important to stay informed about market conditions, manage risk carefully, and use the available tools to enhance your strategy. Additionally, if you’re looking for more flexible options, platforms like Fastbull may offer added leverage and opportunities for trading silver.

The construction industry has long been a cornerstone of economic growth, but with the rise of new technologies, changing global demands, and increased environmental consciousness, this sector is undergoing a major transformation. ONE Construction Group, a leading player in this evolving landscape, is preparing for a promising Initial Public Offering (IPO) that could shake up the market. Slated to raise significant capital, the ONEG IPO offers a fresh investment opportunity in a growing industry that is ripe for innovation.

Founded with a vision to innovate and streamline the construction process, ONE Construction Group has rapidly established itself as a key player in the sector. Specializing in the design, construction, and management of commercial and residential buildings, the company has carved out a reputation for delivering high-quality, sustainable projects.

ONE Construction Group’s expertise spans a range of services, from general contracting to project management, engineering, and procurement. Their approach blends cutting-edge technology with traditional construction practices, making them a forward-thinking leader in the space. The company has also focused on integrating green building practices, meeting the increasing demand for eco-friendly and energy-efficient structures.

ONE Construction Group’s mission goes beyond just building structures—it aims to set a new standard in the construction industry by prioritizing innovation, sustainability, and efficiency. The company is keen to leverage emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, smart building systems, and modular construction to redefine the way buildings are designed, built, and maintained.

The upcoming IPO marks a significant milestone for the company as it seeks to expand its operations, fund new projects, and enhance its technological capabilities. With a robust growth strategy in place, ONE Construction Group is positioning itself as a key player in the global construction market.

The global construction industry has been experiencing steady growth, with increased demand for both residential and commercial properties. In particular, the market for sustainable and green buildings has been expanding rapidly, driven by both regulatory pressures and a growing public interest in environmental sustainability.

ONE Construction Group is well-positioned to capitalize on these trends. By focusing on innovation and sustainability, the company is tapping into a market with tremendous growth potential. The rise of urbanization, increased infrastructure development in emerging markets, and the ongoing need for sustainable building solutions make this an exciting time for the construction industry.

In addition to traditional construction projects, ONE Construction Group is looking to expand its portfolio by exploring new technologies and construction methods that will set it apart from competitors. This includes the adoption of 3D printing for building components, use of modular design to speed up construction, and the implementation of AI-driven project management tools to improve efficiency.

The ONEG IPO will see the company offering shares to the public for the first time, aiming to raise substantial funds to support its growth and expansion efforts. According to the latest filing, ONE Construction Group plans to raise $100 million through the sale of 10 million shares at an expected price of $10 per share. The company will trade under the ticker symbol ONEG on the NASDAQ.

This capital will be used to scale the company’s operations, enhance its technological infrastructure, and fund strategic acquisitions that will further diversify its portfolio. In addition, the company intends to use a portion of the funds for debt reduction, which will strengthen its financial position and improve its long-term prospects.

ONE Construction Group’s management team brings together decades of experience in the construction and real estate sectors. The team has a strong track record of successfully managing large-scale projects and navigating complex market conditions. With expertise in areas like engineering, procurement, project management, and finance, the team is well-equipped to execute the company’s growth strategy and capitalize on new opportunities in the construction space.

Led by an experienced CEO and backed by a team of skilled professionals, ONE Construction Group has already established strong relationships with key players in the industry, including suppliers, subcontractors, and clients. This network will be crucial as the company seeks to expand its footprint both domestically and internationally.

The ONEG IPO presents an exciting opportunity for investors looking to capitalize on the growth of the construction sector. With its focus on innovation, sustainability, and efficiency, ONE Construction Group is well-positioned to generate strong returns for shareholders. However, as with any investment, there are risks involved.

The construction industry is cyclical and can be subject to fluctuations in demand, economic conditions, and regulatory changes. Additionally, the company’s ability to scale its operations and adopt new technologies will play a critical role in determining its future success. Investors should weigh these factors carefully when considering whether to invest in the ONEG IPO.

Following its IPO, ONE Construction Group plans to continue expanding its market share and building its reputation as an innovator in the construction industry. The company’s strategic focus on sustainability, combined with its efforts to adopt new technologies, positions it as a forward-thinking leader in a rapidly changing market.

As urbanization accelerates and the demand for sustainable construction grows, ONE Construction Group is poised to be at the forefront of the industry. The IPO will help fuel this growth, providing the company with the resources needed to expand its operations and bring new, innovative projects to market.

ONE Construction Group’s IPO offers investors an exciting opportunity to get in on the ground floor of a company that is reshaping the future of the construction industry. With its focus on innovation, sustainability, and technological advancements, the company is well-positioned to capitalize on the growing demand for modern and eco-friendly buildings. As ONE Construction Group continues to expand and diversify its offerings, it has the potential to become a leader in the global construction market, delivering substantial returns for investors who recognize its long-term growth potential.

By combining cutting-edge technology with sustainable practices, ONE Construction Group is setting itself up for success in an increasingly competitive market. The ONEG IPO is an opportunity not to be missed by those looking to invest in the future of construction.

The government has published the provisional Local Government Finance Settlement for 2025–26, setting out funding allocations for English councils next year. This confirms an important shift in grant funding to councils serving more deprived areas first highlighted in a policy statement at the end of November, but we can now understand the implications for specific councils.

The settlement confirmed a substantial cash-terms increase in councils’ core funding (or ‘core spending power’) next year: of £3.8 billion, or 6.3%, if all councils make full use of council tax increases. This is equivalent to 3.8% in real-terms, after forecast economy-wide inflation. The most significant year-on-year changes in funding are:

Increased revenues from council tax, with all councils again being allowed to increase bills by 3%, and those with social care responsibilities by a further 2%, without a local referendum. If all councils put bills up by the maximum allowed, revenues are expected to increase by around £2.0 billion next year.

Increased business rate revenues, as a result of inflation. The government has confirmed that retained rates revenues and the Revenue Support Grant will increase in line with CPI, which will add £0.4 billion to revenues next year.

An increase in the Social Care Grants worth £0.9 billion. The share of this allocated to offset differences in the amount councils can raise via the council tax ‘adult social care precept’ has been increased from previous years, meaning this grant is more targeted at councils with low council tax bases.

A new Children’s Social Care Prevention Grant worth £0.25 billion. This is being allocated via a new formula to assess spending needs for children’s social care services that was originally commissioned by the May administration but not used until now. Areas with more children, higher levels of deprivation, ill health and overcrowding, high labour and property costs, and low council tax bases will receive relatively higher amounts of this new grant.

A new, so-called ‘Recovery Grant’ that councils will be free to choose how to spend worth £0.6 billion. This is to be allocated based on deprivation (as measured by the average Index of Multiple Deprivation score of the small neighbourhoods in each council area), and councils’ council tax bases. Only approximately half of councils will receive it, which includes almost all metropolitan districts (33 of 36), around half of London boroughs, unitary authorities and shire districts, but just 1 of 21 shire counties. Among those that receive it, the amounts set to be received varies from less than 40 pence per resident in North-West Leicestershire, Sevenoaks and High Peak, to just over £40 per resident in Blackpool and Knowsley.

To help fund these increased and new grants, the Services Grant and the Rural Services Delivery Grant are to be abolished. These are relatively small grants overall (totalling £0.2 billion this year), but the latter is highly targeted at councils in rural areas, meaning some will lose significant amounts of funding. For example, the £600,000 received by Torridge and by West Devon (both shire districts) amounts to 7% of their core spending power this year, while the £7 million received by Herefordshire (a unitary authority) amounts to 3.2% of its core spending power.

Finally, a funding guarantee ensures that all councils will at least see their core spending power maintained in cash-terms, if they increase council tax by the maximum. This is much less generous than the guarantees offered in 2024–25 (a 4% increase before any increase in council tax bills) and represents a real-terms reduction in core spending power of 2.4% for councils in receipt of the guarantee.

In addition, the government has confirmed £1.1 billion of additional funding in England from ‘extended producer responsibilities’ for packaging: a levy scheme for producers’ use of packaging for goods used by households. This revenue is being guaranteed for 2025–26 but the amount councils will receive in subsequent years will fall if the levy leads to a reduction in the amount of packaging used. For this reason, the government has not included this revenue in core spending power, but arguably it should be: it represents an increase in councils’ funding this year, which they can use to support service provision; and if it falls back in future years, that could necessitate cutbacks in expenditure and service provision. Including it would take the increase in funding next year to 8.0% in cash-terms, on average, or 5.5% in real-terms.

Funding allocations for specific councils aim to reflect the costs of waste collection and disposal, with higher existing waste volumes, deprivation and rurality leading to higher payments. In areas with two-tier local government, provisional allocations show 53%, on average, is being allocated to the lower-tier shire districts (which collect waste), with the remainder being allocated to upper-tier shire counties (which dispose of waste). Final allocations will be confirmed following consultation with councils.

Councils will also receive other funding outside the local government finance settlement, including a range of specific grants for specific services. They will also receive additional grant funding to cover the cost of higher employer National Insurance bills for directly employed staff – but not for outsourced services, as discussed further below.

The design of the adults’ and children’s social care grants and the new ‘Recovery Grant’, together with the abolition of the Rural Services Delivery Grant, means increases in grant funding are highly targeted at councils serving deprived areas. For example, increases in grant funding amount to an average 5.8% of core spending power in the most deprived tenth of council areas, but just 0.3% in the least deprived, as shown by the grey, red and yellow bars in Figure 1.

Increases in business rates revenues are also relatively larger for more deprived (and more urban) areas, reflecting the redistributive tariffs and top-ups operating as part of the business rates retention scheme (BRRS). Partially offsetting this pattern though is the fact that councils in less deprived (and more rural) areas can raise relatively more from council tax, reflecting their larger, more valuable homes, and therefore their higher council tax bases. For example, increases in council tax are projected to raise the equivalent of 2.4% of core spending power for the most deprived tenth of councils, but 4.4% (nearly twice as much, relatively speaking), for the least deprived, if councils make full use of increases in council tax bills up to the referendum limits.

Taken together, these different components mean that core spending power is projected to increase by an average of 9.0% in cash-terms and 6.4% in real-terms for the most deprived tenth of councils, compared to 5.1% and 2.6%, respectively, for the least deprived, if all councils make full use of increases in council tax bills. For the most rural tenth of council areas, based on population density, the cash and real-terms increases would average 4.4% and 2.0%, respectively, while for the most urban council areas the equivalent figures are 6.1% and 3.6%.

Increases in council funding will therefore be highly targeted at more deprived and more urban parts of England. Core spending power is set to increase by 2.4 times as much in real-terms for the most deprived as compared to the least deprived areas, and 1.8 times as much for the most urban as compared to the most rural areas.

Some councils are projected to see particularly large increases in funding. For example, Manchester and Liverpool are set to see an increase in core spending power of 9.5% in cash-terms, or 7% in real-terms after accounting for whole-economy inflation. At the other end of the scale, 132 councils are projected to see their core spending power flat in cash-terms and hence falling 2.4% in real-terms after forecast economy-wide inflation. These are all shire district councils, seeing some combination of falls in New Homes Bonus and Rural Services Delivery Grant offsetting increases in council tax revenues.

Accounting for revenue from ‘extended producer responsibilities’ changes the picture in some important ways. It is still the case that more deprived areas see bigger increases in funding than less deprived areas, but the gap is notably smaller. For example, the most deprived tenth are set to see an increase in funding including revenue from ‘extended producer responsibilities’ of 7.9% in real-terms, roughly 1.8 times the increase of 4.4% among the least deprived. Per-person income from this new source of revenue will be roughly the same in more and less-deprived areas, and so amounts to a higher share of existing funding in the latter.

The targeting of income from ‘extended producer responsibilities’ on the basis of rurality and at authorities with waste collection responsibilities means shire districts, and particularly those losing most from the abolition of the Rural Services Delivery Grant, will gain a particularly important new source of revenue. This new income stream will amount to the equivalent of 7.8% of core spending power across all shire districts, and even more for the shire districts serving the most rural areas. This is a large and important funding boost, meaning many districts will actually see a bigger overall increase in funding than the counties they are part of. But it would not be sustained if use of packaging reduces in future years.

Even before accounting for this income from ‘extended producer responsibilities’, most councils and virtually all upper- and single-tier councils providing social care services, core spending is set to outpace forecast economy-wide inflation by a fair clip. 91% of upper- and single-tier areas will see an increase in their core spending power of at least 4.5% in cash-terms, or 2% in real-terms after forecast economy-wide inflation.

However, several costs facing councils are likely to increase by substantially more than forecast economy-wide inflation. For example:

The National Living Wage is set to increase by a further 6.7% in April 2025, with the minimum wage rates for younger employees and apprentices set to increase by between 16 – 18%. This is likely to have cost implications for adult social care services, in particular, where many employees of private or third sector care providers are paid at or close to the existing National Living Wage rate. The current lowest pay point for staff directly employed by councils (£12.26 an hour) already slightly exceeds the new National Living Wage rate planned for April next year (£12.21 an hour). However, councils are likely to want to retain some margin above this, meaning further upwards pressure at the bottom end of the local government pay scale too.

Employers’ National Insurance is also set to increase from April 2025, with the design of the increase meaning bigger proportionate increases for low earners. The government has said it will compensate public sector employers, including councils, for the additional costs for their direct employees. However, they will not receive compensation for any costs passed on from the providers of outsourced services. Again, the largest of these is adult social care services, where the Nuffield Trust has estimated employer NICs increases could amount to £0.9 billion a year, of which approximately 70% may relate to council-funded services.

More generally, the Local Government Association has estimated that a combination of increases in demand and above-inflation in costs for key services (including children’s social care, temporary accommodation for the homeless, and home-to-school transport for children with special educational needs) have resulted in spending pressures averaging around 4.5% in real-terms in recent years. At some stage, we would expect these pressures to abate, but when and by how much is unclear – and the aforementioned factors pushing up labour costs suggests the coming year may not be the time.

This suggests that the additional revenue from extended producer responsibilities, which as discussed above, would take the average increase in funding next year to 5.5% in real-terms, may be vital to address spending pressures in many parts of England. This will limit the extent to which it can fund improvements in refuse, environmental or other services.

The projected 3.8% average real-terms increase in core spending power in 2025–26 follows five years (between 2019–20 and 2024–25) during which funding for councils has increased by an average of 2.5% a year in real-terms. However, as shown in Figure 2, much larger cuts in funding during the 2010s mean that total funding in the current year is still 10% lower, in real-terms than in 2010–11, with funding per resident 19% lower in real-terms. Plans for next year would still leave funding per resident approximately 17% lower in real-terms than in 2010–11, and 15% lower even accounting for income from ‘extended producer responsibilities’ levies.

Cuts in the 2010s were much larger for councils serving more deprived areas: an average of £587 (35%) per resident in real-terms for the most deprived tenth, compared to £174 (15%) for the least deprived tenth, as shown in Figure 3. The period between 2019–20 and the current financial year, 2024–25, started to see this process reversed, with bigger funding increases in the most deprived tenth of areas (£135 or 12% per resident) than in the least deprived tenth of areas (£37 or 4% per resident). However, falls in funding since 2010–11 remain much larger in the most deprived than least deprived areas. That will remain the case next year, even as funding is set to increase more quickly in more deprived areas. Funding per resident will remain 23% lower in real-terms in the most deprived areas next year than in 2010–11, compared to 11% lower in the least deprived areas.

Thus, the changes made in the coming year (and over the last 5 years) have only partially undone the previous pattern of cuts in the 2010s, which were substantially larger for councils in more deprived (and urban) areas than those in less deprived (and rural) areas.

Turning to the future, the government has been clear that it sees the changes made to how grant funding is allocated in 2025–26 as a first step towards more fundamental reform of the local government finance system in 2026–27. Alongside the provisional financial settlement for 2025–26, it has also published a consultation on the principles for those reforms, seeking views from councils and other stakeholders on a number of key questions.

That reform is needed should not be doubted. As highlighted in multiple reports published by the IFS (such as here and here) , the current system is no longer fit for purpose. Differences in assessments of how much different councils need to spend and how much they can raise themselves via council tax were last systematically accounted for in 2013–14, since when councils have seen a series of ad-hoc changes in their funding. Moreover, the data used in those historic assessments often came from the 2001 census or even earlier. Funding allocations are therefore out of date and essentially arbitrary with respect to current local circumstances.

But as highlighted in a recent IFS report, there is no single right way forward with reform. Updated assessments of spending needs and revenue-raising capacity are vital, but depending on how one trades off different objectives (such as redistribution according to need, or incentives to tackle needs and boost revenue), one may wish to account for them to a greater or lesser extent when allocating funding. In setting out its proposals for a new system, we therefore concluded that the government should be clear about the objectives it is pursuing and align reforms with these – or spell out how different options would be consistent with different objectives if it is inviting views from stakeholders on what direction to take with its reforms. We also highlighted how seemingly ‘techy’ considerations could have a major bearing on bearing on whether a reformed system will deliver what is expected of it. How do the proposals and questions set out in the consultation stack up in this regard?

Broadly speaking, they are sensible. There will be updated assessments of spending needs and revenue-raising capacity of councils and new funding allocations that reflect these, which will be phased in over a number of years. In this, the government proposes to build on work undertaken but not implemented by the previous government, which should help speed up the design and implementation of reforms. However, there are lessons to be learned and pitfalls to be avoided – as discussed in responses from IFS researchers to consultations from the previous government (see here and here).

Proposals to simplify funding streams and reporting requirements and move to a smaller number of clearer priorities and expectations for service delivery are also welcome. Indeed, without clear expectations for service provision, it is not truly possible to assess the relative spending needs of different councils: needs will be distributed differently depending on the nature and coverage of services expected. It is important the government follows through on this, and aligns not only the funding system but funding levels with its stated expectations of councils.

This consultation has little in the way of technical detail of the various elements of a new funding system – that will come in future consultations. Where some detail is provided (for example, on assessing children’s social care needs, accounting for variation in the cost of delivering services, and assessing revenue-raising capacity), it usually appears well-considered. Not always though: proposals for ‘periodic resets’ of the business rates retention scheme after an initial full reset should be replaced with so-called ‘rolling resets’ as discussed in previous IFS analysis.

At a higher-level, the consultation recognizes a tension between the responsiveness of the system to changes in local areas circumstances (increasing or reducing their assessed needs, for example), and the importance of stability and predictability for councils. It is less clear about the related tension between redistributing funding according to need and revenue-raising capacity, and the provision of financial incentives for councils to tackle needs and boost revenues. The continuation of the business rates retention scheme following an initial reset implies incentives will remain part of the system, and in future consultations the government should be clearer about how it plans to balance ‘redistribution’ and ‘incentives’ going forwards. This consultation is an opportunity for councils and other stakeholders to offer their views on this important trade-off and other key design features. IFS researchers will provide their views on the consultation questions in due course.

As with the 2025–26 settlement, there will likely be some significant losers as well as winners from whatever reforms are implemented. With the coming year’s plans described as a step towards these long-term plans we might expect many (although not all) of the winners and losers to be similar to this year. The status quo isn’t without losers though, and it is becoming more and more absurd to base funding allocations on data from a quarter of a century ago or more.

But changes will need careful implementation, including via transitional protections for those losing funding. How generous these can be – for example, whether they can be funded by central government, or instead by phasing in gains for ‘winners’ from the reforms – will depend on the funding available from 2026–27, which will not be known until after the multi-year Spending Review expected in June next year.

Current indicative spending envelopes suggest funding will be tight though, and the Chancellor has said she does not plan further tax rises following those announced in her October Budget. Councils are likely going to have to rely on council tax for even more of the increase in their funding going forwards, and updated funding allocations could see significant real-terms cuts to some councils’ grant funding, even after transitional protection. In a world with limited funding, ensuring funding is allocated fairly and efficiently is even more vital. But it is also more difficult and politically contentious.

Economists play a crucial role in informing policies on pressing issues such as inequality, education, and public health. Over the past few decades, the discipline has undergone a ‘credibility revolution’, emphasising rigorous programme evaluation techniques to establish causal relationships. This shift has enhanced the credibility of economic analyses, but could, on the other hand, have had broader implications for what could broadly be considered marketable research in economics.

The credibility revolution is characterised by the adoption of empirical strategies designed to strengthen causal claims. Seminal works by Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Card (1990) introduced natural experiments and instrumental variable techniques to address endogeneity concerns, laying the groundwork for more credible causal inference. Subsequently, methods like difference-in-differences (DiD), regression discontinuity design (RDD), and randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have gained prominence, signalling a paradigm shift toward ‘design-based’ empirical strategies (Angrist and Pischke 2010, Pischke 2021).

To assess the evolution of these methods, in a recent paper (Garg and Fetzer 2024) we analysed over 44,000 working papers from the NBER and CEPR spanning 1980 to 2023. Our analysis reveals a significant increase in the use of causal inference methods over the past four decades. Figure 1 illustrates the proliferation of key empirical methods used in these papers.

To visualise how these methods contribute to constructing economic narratives, we use knowledge graphs to map the relationships between concepts in economic research. Figure 2 presents an example of such a knowledge graph from Banerjee et al. (2015), illustrating the causal impact of introducing microfinance in India.

In this knowledge graph, the authors examine how access to microfinance influences a range of outcomes, from business creation to household expenditure patterns. The high number of causal edges and unique paths indicates a rich and interconnected causal narrative, reflecting the complexity of economic relationships explored in the study. Such detailed mappings can help understand how empirical methods contribute to advancing knowledge in economics.

Despite the methodological advancements, there is an ongoing debate about the implications for research dissemination and influence. A particular concern may be that the credibility revolution has given rise to a specific style of economic research that may put more emphasis on the methodological toolbox, rather than the underlying question that policymakers and decisionmakers have to contend with on a day-to-day basis (Jiménez-Gómez et al. 2019). Further, assessing what is economically significant, vis-a-vis what merits consideration on statistical grounds may lead to publication bias, disadvantaging studies that, for example, produce null findings (Chopra et al. 2022) or generate a broad range of theoretically consistent, high dimensional empirical patterns on a broad range of variables of interest that may be jointly significant when viewed as being embedded in a causal chain or a graph.

To explore this, we use knowledge graphs to represent the relationships between economic concepts in each paper. We quantified narrative complexity through measures such as the number of unique causal paths and the depth of causal chains. Our findings suggest a nuanced relationship between methodological rigor, narrative complexity, and research impact.

Figure 3 shows that papers with a higher proportion of causal claims are more likely to be published in ‘top five’ economics journals. Additionally, papers introducing novel causal relationships and engaging with less central, specialised concepts have a higher likelihood of top-tier publication.

Yet, when examining citation counts – a proxy for academic influence – we observe a different pattern. As depicted in Figure 4, while the complexity of a narrative positively correlates with citation counts in top journals, the use of causal inference methods does not necessarily lead to higher citation impact once published. Instead, papers focusing on central, widely recognised concepts tend to receive more citations.

This divergence suggests that while top journals prioritise methodological innovation and complex narratives, broader academic impact is driven more by the relevance of research topics. This raises important questions about the direction and priorities of economic research, highlighting the need for a balance between methodological rigor and engagement with central economic debates (Deaton and Cartwright 2016, Pischke 2021). There is a concern that prominently published research in leading journals could encourage a shift in research focus into areas that may be of marginal broader interest, possibly creating deep ‘rabbit holes’ that may subsequently generate a self-reinforcing publication dynamic, hindering innovation more broadly.

The increased emphasis on sophisticated empirical methods brings challenges related to replication and research transparency. For example, Chopra et al. (2022) find a substantial perceived penalty against null results in the publication process, which can distort the scientific record and hinder cumulative knowledge. Such biases can lead to an overrepresentation of significant findings, inflating false-positive rates and undermining the reliability of published research (Brodeur et al. 2016).

Moreover, we observe a rise in the use of proprietary data, with the proportion of papers using private company data doubling from about 4% in 1980 to over 8% in 2023. The use of private data in fields like finance and industrial organisation exhibit the highest proportions. Proprietary data can provide granular insights, but it can also raise concerns about replicability and transparency. Limited access to such data hampers other researchers' ability to verify findings or explore alternative hypotheses (Jiménez-Gómez et al. 2019). Further, the provision of research access to proprietary private data may be skewed towards academics with a broad profile, which could further exacerbate the inequalities in the profession in terms of research access (Fetzer 2022). Alternatively, companies could strategically use (publicly funded) researchers to produce private knowledge goods, outsourcing research and development. Alternatively, they may leverage the credentials of academics or higher education institution to foster brand recognition or to boost corporate social responsibility credentials strategically (Bounie et al. 2021).

Deaton and Cartwright (2016) caution against overreliance on randomised control trials (RCTs) and emphasise the importance of understanding the mechanisms behind observed effects. They argue that without a theoretical framework, findings from RCTs may not be generalisable to other contexts, limiting their policy relevance. The generalisability and scalability of experimental results are crucial for informing policy decisions (Jiménez-Gómez et al. 2019).

These findings have significant implications for the economics profession. The trade-off between methodological rigor and broader academic impact suggests the need for a more holistic approach to research. As Jiménez-Gómez et al. (2019) argue, experimental economists must tackle the generalisability and applicability of their evidence, ensuring that findings contribute meaningfully to theory and policy discussions. This involves embracing diverse methodologies and focusing on questions with substantial policy relevance (Deaton and Cartwright 2016).

Encouraging transparency and the reporting of null results is essential to maintain the integrity of the scientific process. Miguel et al. (2014) advocate for practices that enhance credibility and accessibility, such as pre-registration and data sharing. Addressing the challenges posed by proprietary data requires balancing the benefits of rich datasets with the need for verifiable and replicable research. Initiatives promoting open science and replication studies can help mitigate these issues (Jiménez-Gómez et al. 2019, Brodeur et al. 2016).

Furthermore, there is a growing recognition of the limitations of focusing solely on statistical significance. As Brodeur et al. (2016) highlight, an overemphasis on significant results can lead to ‘p-hacking’ and inflate false-positive rates. Adopting robust statistical practices and valuing studies based on their methodological soundness and relevance, rather than just significant findings, can mitigate these issues. Emphasising the economic significance and practical implications of research findings is vital for advancing the field (Chopra et al. 2022).

On the campaign trail, Trump promised tariffs on all imports from 10 to 20 percent, with a special rate of 60 percent on all imports from China. Goods likely to see the largest proportional price increases are those facing currently low applied tariff rates and those that are sourced disproportionately from China.

Analysis of current trade flows and tariff rates indicates that machinery and electronics and electrical machinery will face the largest import tax burden if the incoming administration implements Trump’s promised duty hikes. These two sectors account for a large share of US total imports, currently face low tariff rates, and are disproportionately made in China. Imports in these industries include both capital goods and producer intermediate inputs and final goods, which implies higher costs and disruptions to American supply chains and manufacturers.

If tariffs are levied on all US trade partners as well as China, large flows of machinery, electronics, transportation equipment, and chemicals will also be subject to new taxes, with much of the burden falling on US-based businesses. Consumers, however, will also see higher costs for imported final goods, including electrical devices, toys and sporting goods, vegetable and meat products, and imported foodstuffs.

Given broad domestic consensus on the need to reduce US dependence on China, and ready access to tariff-levying authority gained from the 2018 investigation of forced technology transfer, we expect President-elect Trump to act quickly to impose new tariffs on imports from China. On the campaign trail, he proposed tariffs of 60 percent on all imports from China.

As shown in table 1, China is the dominant supplier to the United States of toys and sports equipment, provides 40 percent of US footwear imports, and is the source of about one-quarter of US electronics and textiles and apparel imports. It ships 18.3 percent of machinery and mechanical appliances imported by the United States. Of these products, electronics and electrical machinery from China comprise the largest US import bundle by value, totaling $119.9 billion in 2023 (figure 1). Within this broad sector, China is the dominant supplier of many individual products.

A tariff of 60 percent on China would be a major shock to international goods markets. After the US-China trade war of 2018–19, 62 percent of US imports from China are currently subject to an average tariff rate of 16 percent, well above most favored nation (MFN) rates but far below the rate promised by Trump on the presidential campaign trail.

Some products remain lightly taxed, as seen in figure 1. Three categories of imports currently face average tariff rates below 10 percent—toys and sporting equipment, minerals, and electronics and electrical machinery. Indeed, partly because of US dependence on Chinese-based production, many products in the electronics sector were largely shielded from trade war tariffs, including cell phones, laptops, and smartwatches. There are few alternative locations for large-scale production of these devices, despite movements in supply chains since the trade war, and a 60 percent tariff would feed through to higher consumer prices for these devices as well as for video gaming consoles and many other consumer electronics.

Consumers will also feel the impact of tariffs on everyday purchases of toys and sporting goods, footwear, and textiles and apparel. Of these sectors, the United States is most reliant on China for purchases of toys and sports equipment. While toys seem like products for which substitute sellers would be readily available, China maintains a dominant position in toy production for several reasons, including its not-easily-reproduced capacity to produce materials that meet US product safety standards. Toys and sports equipment are currently very lightly taxed, as shown in figure 1, and a 60 percent tariff almost certainly will be felt directly by American households.

US businesses will also feel the pain of higher tariffs on China. They are end-users for many of the electronics products and electrical machinery discussed above. But with US imports from China heavily weighted toward capital equipment and intermediate goods used by US-based companies, new taxes on imports of machinery and mechanical appliances will certainly raise costs for American manufacturers. US imports of these products from China, which totaled $81.4 billion in 2023 (second only to electronics), would be subject to a 49-percentage point tariff increase if Trump levies the promised “flat 60” import tax rate.

The United States purchased 13.6 percent of its 2023 merchandise imports from China and another 38.3 percent from free trade agreement (FTA) partners; the remaining 48 percent of American imports come from other sources and currently are taxed at MFN rates. As seen in figure 2, even a 10 percent tariff would be a significant increase in the tax rate applied to these purchases. Only three groups of imported products—textiles and clothing, footwear, and hides and skins—currently are taxed at MFN rates that exceed 10 percent (see figure 2). Nevertheless, tariff rates on these products from non-FTA partners are less than those currently levied on similar ones from China.

Trade with non-FTA partners includes large two-way flows with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan. Purchases are concentrated in five physical- and human-capital sectors: chemicals, machinery, electronics and electrical machinery, transportation equipment, and miscellaneous manufactures (which includes precision instruments, as described in the appendix below). All would be subject to tariff rate increases of between 7.9 and 9.6 percentage points. The bulk of American imports of these products are used by US-based companies, who would be burdened by higher production costs even if they switch to domestic or alternative foreign suppliers.

Almost 40 percent of US imports are sent from FTA partners. Existing tariff rates on these partners are close to zero, with only textiles and clothing and hides and skins facing rates above 1 percent, as seen in figure 3. Consequently, almost all flows would face about a 10-percentage point increase in the applied tariff rate if Trump carries through on his pledge to tax all US imports from FTA partners at the 10 percent rate. A particularly hard-hit sector will be transportation equipment, with 2023 US imports of $235.7 billion from these sources. Within North America, production of cars and trucks is highly integrated, with some vehicles crossing US borders multiple times before completion. It is not clear how these flows would be taxed. South Korea also supplies a significant share of US transportation product imports, and it has emerged as one of the largest foreign investors in the US automobile sector. Clearly, new tariffs on its exports to the United States will affect Korean manufacturers’ US-based operations.

Also caught in the Trump tariff crosshairs are fuel products, machinery, and electronics and electrical equipment. As shown in table 1, FTA partners supply more than half of America’s fuel and transport equipment imports, about one-third of imported machinery, and one-fourth of imported electronics and electrical equipment.

America’s FTA partners are also important purchasers of US exports, particularly Canada, Mexico, and South Korea. They are likely to react to the proposed US deviation from FTA rates with tariffs of their own, reducing access into their home markets for US manufacturers, farmers, and ranchers.

US companies rely on FTA partners for trade that takes place under policy certainty—that is, with the expectation that tariffs will remain at negotiated low rates. Consequently, countries with whom the United States has signed an FTA have been seen as possible locations for production moved away from China. Tariffs that deviate from agreed rates in unpredictable ways make these decisions riskier.

Trump recently threatened tariffs of 25 percent on Mexico and Canada, countries that currently enjoy favored access to the US market thanks to the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). If these tariff increases were to be implemented, the largest flows affected would be those of transportation equipment and machinery, as seen in figure 4. Higher tariffs on USMCA partners would also tax large flows of electronics, miscellaneous manufacturers, and possibly fuel. Currently, the average US tariff applied to imports of goods from USMCA partners is generally below 1 percent.

USMCA partners are also important sources for the United States of vegetable products (47 percent of total imports), prepared foodstuffs (42 percent of total imports), and animal products (33 percent of total imports). Higher tariffs on Mexico and Canada will, therefore, put upward pressure on US food prices.

At this date, we know little about how the Trump administration will implement new tariffs. Fundamental policy designs have yet to be announced, including the tariff rates that will be ultimately applied, if tariffs will be phased in, if any products will be excluded, and whether FTA partners will be exempt. During the US-China trade war an exclusion process was set up allowing firms to apply for tariff exemptions for imports of Chinese machinery used in domestic manufactures. The bulk of these exclusions were allowed to lapse under the Biden administration. Given the blanket application of proposed tariffs and the high rates promised, any exemption process is likely to be swamped with petitions from US manufacturers.

With the United States acting against their interests and in violation of its World Trade Organization (WTO) and FTA commitments, retaliation from trade partners is to be expected. As experienced during the US-China trade war, retaliation can include not only new tariffs on US exports but also other restrictive commercial measures. China deployed countermeasures to US trade restrictions, including blacklisting foreign companies and applying export controls to curtail US access to critical supplies. With Trump’s promise to use tariffs as leverage in negotiations over other policy issues, such as migrant and drug flows, the response of US trading partners is likely to be influenced by the cost of meeting the Trump administration’s demands and by their commercial and security dependency on the United States.

The only certainty is that new tariffs will be costly for the United States. While the ultimate impact on prices will depend on import demand and supply elasticities, research on the US-China trade war found resounding evidence of complete pass-through of tariffs to importers. The implication for the domestic market is that American consumers and firms will bear the effect of higher tariffs, with substantial costs for the average American household, and a burden that falls more heavily on lower income households. Moreover, well anticipated effects of protection are to stymie competition, resulting in higher prices for goods made in the United States as well as those that are imported. Even without the expected retaliation from its trading partners, higher US tariffs adversely affect American companies and exporters.