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SYMBOL
LAST
BID
ASK
HIGH
LOW
NET CHG.
%CHG.
SPREAD
SPX
S&P 500 Index
6857.13
6857.13
6857.13
6865.94
6827.13
+7.41
+ 0.11%
--
DJI
Dow Jones Industrial Average
47850.93
47850.93
47850.93
48049.72
47692.96
-31.96
-0.07%
--
IXIC
NASDAQ Composite Index
23505.13
23505.13
23505.13
23528.53
23372.33
+51.04
+ 0.22%
--
USDX
US Dollar Index
98.850
98.930
98.850
98.980
98.740
-0.130
-0.13%
--
EURUSD
Euro / US Dollar
1.16582
1.16590
1.16582
1.16715
1.16408
+0.00137
+ 0.12%
--
GBPUSD
Pound Sterling / US Dollar
1.33530
1.33539
1.33530
1.33622
1.33165
+0.00259
+ 0.19%
--
XAUUSD
Gold / US Dollar
4223.96
4224.37
4223.96
4230.62
4194.54
+16.79
+ 0.40%
--
WTI
Light Sweet Crude Oil
59.456
59.486
59.456
59.480
59.187
+0.073
+ 0.12%
--

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          An Investment Strategy to Keep the European Green Deal on Track

          Bruegel

          Economic

          Summary:

          In this Policy Brief, we assess the investment needed to achieve the 2030 climate goal and climate neutrality by 2050.

          How much green investment does the EU need?

          There is no green transition without green investment. Stimulating this will be the core challenge for the European Green Deal in the next five years, making or breaking the European Union’s chances of achieving its climate targets and strengthening its competitiveness and security.
          But how much green investment is really needed to achieve the EU climate targets? To assess this, good-quality country-level information is required. But despite the European Green Deal and the many initiatives it has triggered, this remains surprisingly incomplete and inconsistent. At best, some of the national energy and climate plans (NECPs) of EU countries provide general estimates of the amount of investment needed to reach the 2030 target, without specifying how such estimates were calculated, making it impossible to assess their reliability, compare them in a consistent manner or monitor progresss towards decarbonisation (ECA, 2023).
          In the absence of reliable official national information, Europe’s green investment needs can best be grasped by looking at European Commission ex-ante estimates for the EU as a whole, in the impact assessments underlying the 2030 and proposed 2040 climate targets (European Commission, 2020, 2024).
          According to the Commission, between 2011 and 2020, total investments in energy supply (ie power plants and the power grid), energy demand (ie buildings, industry, agriculture) and transport (ie cars, trucks, public transport) averaged 5.8 percent of GDP. Achieving the EU 2030 climate target will require additional annual investments of about two percent of GDP between 2021 and 2030, a level that must be sustained for two decades to reach net-zero (Table 1).An Investment Strategy to Keep the European Green Deal on Track_1
          These estimates are broadly in line with the findings of Pisani-Ferry and Mahfouz (2023) for France and with global estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2023b), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA, 2023) and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF, 2024) . They are also aligned with the estimates for additional green investment needs in 2025-2030 in the Draghi (2024) report on European competitiveness, which are themselves based on European Commission and European Central Bank calculations . Finally, Bizien et al (2024) confirmed that the gap between current EU climate investments and Commission estimates of future needs amounted in 2022 to around 2.5 percent of GDP.

          EU climate investment needs: adjustments and caveats

          The European Commission’s headline green-investment need estimates are flawed. The investment cost of some major items is overstated. Other important climate-related investment needs are not included. Even after adjusting for over- and understatements, the figures are subject to significant uncertainty.
          Overstatements
          The Commission’s headline numbers have transport as the main spending item by far, but 60 percent of this investment need would arise from replacement of cars that would happen anyway (based on an average car lifespan of around 10 years; ACEA, 2023). If this is taken out, the Commission expects additional transport investments consistent with reaching net-zero to be limited: 0.5 percent of GDP annually from 2021 to 2030. Instead, the power sector and buildings are expected to be the main sectors requiring additional efforts to achieve climate targets. In these two sectors, investment needs are expected to almost double as a share of GDP over the same period.
          The Commission’s headline numbers also attempt to factor-in behavioural change. This is likely significant, as further behavioural measures (eg accelerated modal shifts and sustainable mobility patterns, energy conservation, recycling) could reduce EU green investment needs by about eight percent (Table 2).
          An Investment Strategy to Keep the European Green Deal on Track_2
          Understatements
          The European Commission’s numbers refer only to capital expenditures (CAPEX) and do not include financing costs. This is worth mentioning because while CAPEX represents the main cost item in the green transition, the cost of financing investment will be significant for cash-constrained agents and public finances will need to step in with de-risking instruments to facilitate private investment.
          The Commission’s numbers also only look at the deployment side of decarbonisation, and do not include its manufacturing side. That is, these figures do not take into account the clean-tech manufacturing costs required to reach EU industrial policy objectives, such as what is outlined in the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA, Regulation (EU) 2024/1735). The Commission estimates that ramping up clean-tech manufacturing capabilities in Europe to meet at least 40 percent of the EU’s annual deployment needs by 2030 would require additional total investments of about €100 billion in the period 2024-2030. This is about 0.1 percent of GDP.
          We consider this estimate to be very conservative, in particular because the NZIA focuses only on a limited selection of technologies and domestic supply chains, and overlooks the costs of skill-enhancement programmes and of securing access to underlying strategic critical raw materials. In addition, green investment needs in manufacturing might be much greater if economic security is deemed to require aggressive reshoring.
          Finally, the Commission’s estimates deal only with the mitigation side of climate action and do not include climate adaptation investment. This is a major gap, as the EU’s need for climate adaptation already is and will be substantial, even if mitigation proceeds on schedule. Estimates of adaptation investment involve considerable uncertainty. For the EU they are currently estimated to range between €35 billion and €500 billion annually, a huge range that reflects different underlying assumptions and methodological approaches (EIB, 2021a). It is urgent to narrow the range of plausible estimates and develop better assessment of the distribution of those investments over time and across countries.
          Additional uncertainty
          The above estimates are underpinned by a number of assumptions, including on the trajectory of the carbon price, timing of decarbonisation efforts, the role of innovation in slashing clean-tech costs and system substitutability. These of course could change. It should also be clear that the estimates are only for decarbonisation investments, and do not include the other environmental and circular economy parts of the European Green Deal. Nor do they include the investments required to mobilise all the necessary resources, such as reskilling/upskilling of workers from brown to green industries and measures to tackle the social implications of climate policy. This last point is particularly relevant, because there will be a great need from 2025-2030 to deal with the complex distributional implications of buildings and transport decarbonisation, from which emissions reductions have so far been relatively small. Avoiding political backlash may involve offering financial incentives to households in return for adopting costlier green technologies.
          To summarise: because behavioural changes could be more significant than assumed, the European Commission’s headline investment estimates could be overestimating overall and private mitigation-related investment needs (section 2.1). However, total climate-related transition needs should also include adaptation investments, the costs of reskilling and the cost difference between investment in green tech and the investment in brown tech that would otherwise have happened. The size of these excluded items in very uncertain, mostly because of uncertainty surrounding adaptation needs. Consequently, the total investment need for the green transition up to 2030 is likely to exceed the Commission’s estimates by a wide margin. This is even more the case for the transition up to 2040.

          Public investment needs to reach the EU 2030 climate goal

          If achieving the EU climate goals requires a substantial increase in investment, who is going to pay? The European Commission does not provide specific figures for this, mentioning only that the private sector is expected to be the main source of investment in the electricity system and industry, while public funding is expected to play a substantial role in the buildings and transport sectors, and in supporting innovative clean-tech uptake in the energy system and the industrial sector.
          EIB (2021b) and Darvas and Wolff (2022) estimated the public share of green investment to be about 25 percent. However, these exercises are characterised by high uncertainty. For instance, by providing estimates for each category of investment, Pisani-Ferry and Mahfouz (2023) estimated this share to be higher for France: 50 percent in an optimal scenario for the country, also because of France’s larger public sector and greater share of public buildings than other countries. This higher figure is in line with a granular analysis by Baccianti (2022) for the EU, the central scenario of which also points to a roughly 50 percent public share of green investment.
          Based on these different exercises, we can assume the public share of additional green investments from 2025-2030 to range between 25 percent and 50 percent. Given that the annual additional investments to reach the EU 2030 climate target are estimated at two percent of GDP, the additional public effort to reach the EU 2030 climate target would thus range between 0.5 percent and one percent of GDP over 2025-2030.
          Given limited public finances, it will be crucial to make all the necessary efforts to stay at the lower end of this range. In other words, the available resources should be focused on those areas where private finance alone cannot deliver (ie where clear market failures exist). This includes:
          R&D support and support for early adoption of innovative clean technologies. This is what allows the creation of economies of scale, leading to steep cost reductions, which in turn progressively reduce the need for public support as the ‘green premium’ thins out. This has happened with wind and solar energy. IRENA estimated that between 2010 and 2022, the average cost of generating electricity from solar PV fell by 89 percent – currently almost one-third cheaper than the cheapest fossil fuel globally – while the cost of generating electricity with onshore wind fell by 69 percent. This is why countries including Germany have been able to rethink their investment support for renewables, and why the share of public investment to meet EU climate targets in the power sector is estimated in the relatively low range of 15 percent to 20 percent (Baccianti, 2022).
          Financing electricity and transport infrastructure, as well as renovation of public buildings. For example, public funding will need to pay for a significant share of investment in railway networks, public transport and district heating (Baccianti, 2022; OBR, 2021).
          Provision of financial de-risking tools to lower the cost of capital for private investors in green projects. Many clean technologies are characterised by high CAPEX and low operating costs (OPEX). This is true for wind and solar generation, electric vehicles and buildings retrofitting. The cost of capital thus plays a key role in the green transition, providing a critical benchmark to assess the risk and return preferences of investors, and acting as a lever for financial flows to influence prices and choices in the real energy economy (IEA, 2021). Lowering the cost of capital to foster private investment can be done through instruments such as preferential loans and guarantees to both firms and households. For instance, zero-interest loans in France, granted under the éco-Prêt à Taux Zéro (éco-PTZ) programme boosted energy-renovation rates across the country thanks to high take-up among the middle class (Eryzhenskiy et al, 2022).
          Provision of direct financial support and compensation to the most vulnerable to ensure a socially fair transition. For most vulnerable households, direct public support is needed to compensate for the higher energy costs linked to climate policy, and to ensure take-up of green alternatives. For example, the phase-in of an EU carbon price on household and road transport emissions will likely be regressive, disproportionally affecting vulnerable households that rely on fossil fuels for domestic heating and lack the resources needed to change their vehicles. Directing support to the most vulnerable would help reduce both emissions and energy poverty. For instance, prioritising grants for the worst-performing buildings, often occupied by vulnerable consumers, will yield climate benefits and benefits in terms of improved air quality, health, productivity, energy security and lower future government outlays to alleviate energy poverty (Vailles et al, 2023; Keliauskaite et al, 2024).
          The upshot is that the EU has embarked on a transformational transition without mapping out in detail how much investment this transition will require, and without equipping itself with the capacity to monitor, either at EU-level or national level, the actual efforts and the remaining investment gap. Knowing the rough direction of travel is like crossing the Atlantic without a compass, and is not enough.

          A perfect storm for 2025-2030

          Even if governments can ensure the substitutability of public finance with private finance, achieving the EU’s 2030 climate goal will still require public investment during 2025-2030 of at least 0.5 percent of GDP. Delivering this will be tough for five main reasons.
          The main source of EU grants for the green transition is running out
          Since the launch of the European Green Deal in 2019, the EU has played an increasingly direct role in fostering green investment, including through carbon pricing and regulations, and also by offering financial incentives. Balancing prohibitions and incentives is crucial to ensure the political viability of the green transition and to avoid a dangerous ‘blame game’ with national capitals (Pisani-Ferry et al, 2023). Two major steps have been taken on the financing of the green transition. First, its was decided to set a 30 percent minimum green spending threshold in the EU budget (the multiannual financial framework, MFF), amounting to about €1 trillion for 2021-2027. Second, a 37 percent minimum green spending threshold was established for the main part of the NextGenerationEU post-pandemic instrument, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which was endowed with financial firepower of €723 billion for 2021-2026, including €338 billion in grants.
          The RRF is currently the largest source of EU grants for the green transition, especially for buildings and transport decarbonisation (Lenaerts and Tagliapietra, 2021). On top of the MFF, green grants from the RRF and other instruments – the Innovation Fund, the Modernisation Fund and the Just Transition Fund – amount to about €50 billion per year.
          But the RRF ends in 2026. This will leave a major gap in EU funding for the green transition, which will decrease to slightly less than €20 billion per year. In other words, a gap of about €180 billion for the 2024 to 2030 period will open up (Pisani-Ferry et al, 2023). This is highly problematic. It will happen just as EU countries are required to deepen their decarbonisation efforts substantially, starting with difficult sectors such as buildings and transport. The risk of political pushback from national capitals will likely be serious as a result.
          The reformed EU fiscal framework is not conducive to green investment
          A reform of the EU’s fiscal framework – which implements the EU Treaty requirement for countries to keep their budget deficits within 3 percent of GDP, and their public debt within 60 percent of GDP – took effect in April 2024. The framework as updated imposes restrictions that could make the financing of new green investment at national level very difficult for countries with debts and deficits considered excessive. Furthermore, the reformed fiscal framework does not include a ‘green golden rule’, which would exclude any increase in net green public investment from the fiscal indicators used to measure compliance with the fiscal rules. Nor does it provide exemptions even for EU-endorsed national green investments (see Box 1). These constraints make public investment for decarbonisation harder to realise.
          False narratives on climate policies are increasingly promoted
          Even before the 2024 US presidential election, swings to populist nationalist parties in large countries including Germany and France suggested unease among voters about climate policy. These parties indeed often preach the false belief that decarbonisation is detrimental to competitiveness and security, when it is exactly the opposite. Green investment is fundamental for the EU to meet its pressing competitiveness and security objectives, even if complex trade-offs exist between these different societal objectives.
          Being poorly endowed with domestic resources, Europe is highly dependent on fossil-fuel imports, as dramatically illustrated by the 2022-2023 energy crisis. This exposes the EU to global oil and gas market volatility, undermining competitiveness and threatening security. For Europe, the only structural solution is the green transition. The EU is endowed with abundant domestic renewable energy resources, which can be exploited in a cost-effective manner, as generating electricity with wind and solar energy is now cheaper than doing so with coal and gas (Ember, 2024).
          It is important to note that these estimates exclude subsidies, tax credits and system integration costs (eg grid connection and flexibility solutions to cope with intermittent renewable energy sources). It should also be mentioned that deploying renewables rapidly will not only lower wholesale power prices, but also cut bills for households, even accounting for additional costs such as grid expansion (Ember, 2024). This is the result of the global roll-out of clean technologies and continuing cost reductions in this sector (Claeys et al, 2024). According to the IEA (2023a), EU electricity consumers saved €100 billion during the peak of the energy crisis in 2021-2023 thanks to additional electricity generation from newly installed solar PV and wind capacity.
          While decarbonisation was a priority in its own right until 2022, it is now the only available way to structurally secure energy supplies and to lower energy costs for the European economy. However, it will take time to get there. Most modelling exercises, including the European Commission’s, expect renewables to really cut electricity prices only in the early 2030s (Gasparella et al, 2023). For this to happen, massive investments will be required for renewable generation build-up, electricity grid expansion and provisions of flexibility solutions, such as electricity storage.
          The trade-offs between decarbonisation, competitiveness and security are increasingly difficult
          Decarbonisation raises three main issues: the fiscal cost, impact on competitiveness and implications for economic security. All three objectives of fiscal sustainability, competitiveness and economic security are worth pursuing, but cannot be achieved simultaneously, at least over a five-to-15 year period. Policy must therefore confront trade-offs. For example, relying on Chinese green equipment may help contain the fiscal cost of the transition and be good for competitiveness, but at the cost of undermining economic security. Conversely, European sourcing may head off economic security risks, but is likely to increase the fiscal cost of the transition.
          Moreover, the nature or the acuteness of the trade-offs depend on the instruments chosen to reach net zero. Carbon pricing (through taxation or the auctioning of emission permits) alleviates the budget constraint but raises issues of social acceptability. Regulation does not raise fiscal concerns, but by shifting the decarbonisation cost onto the business sector, it may negatively affect competitiveness. Subsidisation of green investment may be good for economic security and competitiveness, but entails a fiscal cost (which the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) suggests could be major). Trade-offs are therefore instrument-specific.
          EU green investment needs, and the public share of them, depend on the industrial policy approach. A strong industrial reshoring strategy would, for instance, lead to higher costs for clean technologies and therefore to higher green-investment needs. On the contrary, a more balanced and innovation-driven industrial policy might foster clean-tech cost reductions and therefore reduce green-investment needs. As industrial competitiveness will be a major driver of the 2024-2029 EU cycle, this trade-off will have to be confronted by policymakers at both EU and national levels.
          In summary, Europe is currently not on track to reach its climate targets. It is at a juncture where political resistance to decarbonisation is mounting and where budgetary means to buy off consent are becoming scarce, at both EU level (because the main source of financing is drying up) and national level (because the fiscal rules leave little room for green investment). Moreover, the EU faces increasingly acute trade-offs between fiscal sustainability, competitiveness and economic security.
          The return of President Trump further exacerbates the problem
          The return of President Trump is set to exacerbate competitiveness and economic security challenges. His expected dismantling of US climate and environmental policies will fuel the narrative of populist nationalist parties in Europe, while his agenda is set to worsen Europe’s decarbonisation, competitiveness and security conundrum. As more public spending is likely to be needed in the defence sector, less public resources might be available for the green transition.
          Confronting this challenge, it must be clear that Europe’s own economic interest is to push ahead with the green transition, for at least three reasons. First, global decarbonisation is vital for the EU in seeking to limit increasingly expensive climate damage in the future. Second, it will help the EU enhance its economic competitiveness and economic security. Third, it represents a clean-tech export opportunity for Europe. The EU must stick with its plan even as difficult trade-offs get tougher, and try to turn this situation into an opportunity to attract those clean investments that might now not materialise in the US, at least over the next four years.
          It is important to stress that Trump’s fossil-fuel agenda is in the selfish interest of the US but it has no content for the EU, which is not endowed with fossil-fuel resources. Trump will aim to make the US not just ‘energy independent’, but ‘energy dominant’. He has pledged to halve natural gas and electricity prices within a year, largely through increased natural gas production. If this happens, it would widen the EU-US energy price gap, further undermining EU industrial competitiveness. As previously illustrated, the only way for Europe to provide a structural solution to this problem is to accelerate green investments. Trump’s return should thus be taken as a substantial boost to the implementation of the EU’s clean investment agenda.

          Six proposals to make the necessary climate investments happen

          To reach the EU’s 2030 climate target, the European Commission should put forward a new transformation programme, with both a private and a public strand. For the private strand, policy should aim at ensuring the credibility of the climate-policy strategy, and at creating the framework conditions for a full mobilisation of savings. For the public strand, the aim should to maximise the firepower of limited fiscal resources.
          The business strand: ensure credibility and the full mobilisation of savings
          Proposal 1: Ensure the credibility of the EU climate-policy framework and overall policy consistency
          Credible carbon pricing signals and credible climate and environmental regulations drive expectations and underpin the green investment decisions of households and firms. Effective implementation of this toolkit can reduce the overall fiscal cost of the green transition.
          The European Green Deal must thus be implemented fully, avoiding the temptation to water down its provisions because of competitiveness concerns. Reopening and weakening laws agreed after years of negotiations would do nothing to support the competitiveness of European industry and would only risk postponing the green investment decisions of families and businesses by undermining confidence in the reliability of Europe’s green trajectory.
          An element that should not be neglected is taxation. Current European taxation systems still provide generous fossil-fuel subsidies and it is urgent to rethink them. After previous failed attempts, the now more than two-decades old EU Energy Taxation Directive (Council Directive 2003/96/EC) must be revised to align European taxation systems with EU climate policy, and to incentivise clean-tech uptake.
          Proposal 2: Unleash green private investments through a capital markets union that works, an effective sustainable finance framework and a stronger European Investment Bank
          As the private sector will have to account for most green investment, the capability to adequately leverage private investments will ultimately make or break the European Green Deal. The EU can take two important actions on this: i) deliver an effective capital markets union (CMU); ii) deliver an effective sustainable finance framework and iii) increase the firepower of the European Investment Bank (EIB).
          A CMU that works
          The cost of accessing finance is an important factor in determining whether households and firms can undertake capital-intensive green investments. The EU financial system is highly bank-dominated and fragmented along national lines, making it ill-suited for enabling the massive investments needed for the green transition through the provision of private capital. As a consequence, as noted by Letta (2024), the EU’s share of global capital-market activities – including equity issuance, total market capitalisation and corporate bond issuance – does not align proportionately with its GDP. Economic analysis suggests that this situation makes the EU more prone to crises and more likely to grow at a slower rate (Sapir et al, 2018).
          Twin projects have been undertaken to move from fragmented national financial systems to a single European financial system that can finance projects at a European scale: the banking union (since 2012) and the capital markets union (since 2014). Although integrating and deepening capital markets has been a long-standing EU goal, actual progress on the CMU has been very limited. Giving substance to this project is now urgent to spur the private investments needed for the green transition. As suggested by Merler and Véron (2024), the European Commission should advance the CMU primarily by focusing on the integration of capital-markets supervision at EU level, as that is the area with the most immediate potential for progress.
          Reform should also streamline the jumble of market infrastructures, asset management and auditing frameworks that currently prevent the efficient pan-European allocation of European savings to European projects, including those needed for the green transition. After years of procrastination, it is time to move and create a direct connection between the funding of the green transition and the development of the CMU.
          Deliver an effective sustainable finance framework
          The EU has been a first mover in sustainable finance. However, as pointed out by Merler (2024), the EU’s legal framework on sustainable finance suffers from three flaws:
          Its centrepiece – the Taxonomy Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2020/852), which defines what counts as sustainable – is hampered by conceptual and usability shortcomings and as a result has not gained traction as the reference framework among corporates and investors for issuance or investment.
          The second pillar – the EU Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/2088) – suffers from a structural weakness: its key concept of ‘sustainable investment’ is not clearly defined.
          Lastly, the EU lacks a coherent framework for transition finance, which is currently not properly defined in EU legislation.
          These flaws risk limiting the effectiveness of EU regulation in leveraging financial markets to meet climate goals. As suggested by Merler and Véron (2024), the EU should take three actions to address this problem: i) better define ‘sustainable investment’ in the disclosure regulation, and ‘transition finance’ in the EU legal framework; ii) develop a standard for sustainability-linked bonds and other types of transition-finance instruments; iii) review how environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings are regulated to make them more impactful.
          Increase the firepower of the EIB
          The EIB has played an important role in fostering clean investments under the auspices of the so-called Juncker Plan (now renamed InvestEU), a 2015 EU initiative to boost investment. EIB guarantees should amount to €33.7 billion to support about €370 billion in private investments by 2027. But more can and should be done to increase the role of the EIB in fostering investment across the EU, and also to increase its risk profile.
          An important but still modest step has been taken by the EIB Board of Governors, which in 2024 proposed to change the statutory limit on its gearing ratio (ie how much it can lend in relation to its own resources), raising it from 250 percent to 290 percent. With a total balance sheet close to €600 billion, the EIB has played an increasingly significant role in the financing of the green transition, in accordance with its 2019 decision to become ‘the EU’s climate bank’, and to devote more than 50 percent of its investments to projects supporting climate action and environmental sustainability.
          The EIB Board of Governors in June 2024 confirmed the financing of the green transition as the bank’s first priority, envisaging an increase in its lending to interconnectors and grids, energy efficiency, energy storage and renewables, and clean-tech manufacturing projects (EIB, 2024a). Financing activity of up to €95 billion is foreseen for 2024-2027, with well above half of investments going to the green transition. This compares to financing activity of €84 billion in 2023, of which more than half is already focused on the green transition (EIB, 2024b).
          This is a good step but a modest one, given the scale of investment the EU needs in the coming years. The EIB should be more ambitious on the level of its financial activity. The EU should continue to provide the EIB with sufficient mandates and guarantees from the MFF, as these are essential to maintain the EIB’s current funding levels and to deploy more high-risk impact finance – similarly to national promotional banks (eg Germany’s KfW, France’s Groupe Caisse des Dépôts, Italy’s Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and Spain’s Instituto de Credito Oficial), which are underwritten by national guarantees.
          An additional step to form up the EIB’s role in fostering private green investment was proposed by Letta (2024): the launch of a European Green Guarantee (EGG). This would entail the European Commission and EIB developing jointly an EU-wide scheme of guarantees to support bank lending to green investment projects and companies, with the EIB evaluating specific proposals from commercial banks and/or national financial institutions, and awarding the guarantee that would enable them to provide the necessary funding to companies. Based on a resource multiplier of 12 (like the original Juncker Plan), €25 billion to €30 billion in guarantees would trigger €300 billion to €350 billion in green investment. Under this scheme, European banks would be able to play a greater role in funding green companies, as the EGG would neutralise the so-called ‘green transition risk’, which prices the inherent risk of lending to green companies. The EGG would thus allow the EIB to reinforce significantly its catalytic role in private green investment.
          The public strand: maximising the firepower of limited fiscal resources
          Proposal 3: Turn NECPs into national green-investment strategies and attach conditions to the disbursement of EU funds
          The national energy and climate plans (NECPs) of EU countries remain bureaucratic exercises without substantial impact on the formulation and implementation of national energy policies (Pisani-Ferry et al, 2023). NECPs must be turned into real national green-investment strategies, providing a point of reference for investors, stakeholders and citizens in making investment decisions. Governments should be obliged to set out in their NECPs a detailed, bottom-up analysis of their green investment needs, and an implementation roadmap with clear milestones or key performance indicators (KPIs).
          The disbursement of EU green funds should be made conditional on the efficient achievement of these KPIs. This would be in line with the approach of linking the future EU budget with national reforms and investments, put forward by Ursula von der Leyen ahead of the European elections. As part of this, EU funds should be better focused on European green public goods with a high level of additionality (eg electricity interconnections) and measures that tackle the distributional impacts of climate policy.
          Much more coordinated development of renewable energy and electricity-grid investment across Europe would yield substantial ‘techno-economic’ benefits, based on the design and operation of several European national electricity systems jointly, rather than individually. These benefits will increase massively with the development of renewables because of the harnessing of regional advantages, reducing the need for expensive back-up capacity and enhancing resilience to shocks (Zachmann et al, 2024).
          Proposal 4: Revise the EU fiscal framework to introduce a ‘fiscally responsible public investment rule’
          The reform of the EU fiscal framework has not left adequate room for green public investment. The framework should be revised by exempting well-specified public investment in decarbonisation, approved by the Council of the EU, from the application of minimum adjustments required under the EDP and the associated safeguards.
          The problem with public investment in decarbonisation is that many of these investments are unprofitable at the current carbon price, taking into account the prevailing discount rate (for households) or the cost of capital (for businesses and local governments). Belle-Larant et al (2024) estimated that in France, only one-third of green investments in the transport and building sectors are profitable at the current carbon-price level. This implies that they won’t happen without public support.
          Governments should thus play an important role here. But the new EU fiscal rules prevent countries that are subject to the EDP from sustaining clean investments. The framework should be amended so that economically-sound public investment that is expected to result in measurable reductions in emissions can happen. As a rule, this exemption should be conditional on: (a) the allocation of the future savings from reductions in fossil-fuel consumption to the reduction of public deficits and (b) adequate monitoring of implementation.
          Proposal 5: Put the EU budget at the service of the green transformation
          Increasing the minimum green spending threshold in the EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) from 20 percent in 2014-2020 to 30 percent in 2021-2027 was an important step, consistent with the EU’s tougher climate goals. However, no interim assessment has been performed on compliance with the threshold and effectiveness of the spending. This should be done, taking into account that the European Court of Auditors found that the reported green spending in the MFF from 2014-2020 was not always relevant to climate action and that climate investment reporting was overstated (ECA, 2022).
          In the context of the approaching phase-out of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, maintaining the current green spending threshold in the 2028-2034 MFF should be seen as a bare minimum for the EU. New strategic priorities, including security and defence, should be met in parallel – and not at the expense – of the green transition. The EU budget should also be more focused on European green public goods and measures aimed at leveraging national actions to tackle the distributional impacts of climate policy. As we have noted, the disbursement of the EU green budget should be made conditional on the achievement of KPIs.
          Commission President von der Leyen is right to propose the creation of a new European Competitiveness Fund to invest in clean-tech manufacturing, AI, space and biotech technologies (von der Leyen, 2024). EU countries should not kill this proposal, as was done with the European Sovereignty Fund, and should instead consider different funding options, including new EU joint borrowing as suggested by Draghi (2024). The European Competitiveness Fund should accompany the implementation of a truly European industrial policy, and could become the main EU industrial policy investment vehicle in the context of which other tools, such as the EU Innovation Fund, could be framed while maintaining their operational autonomy. That is, the European Competitiveness Fund should be a one-stop-shop able to ensure the availability and accessibility of EU funds for clean-tech manufacturing.
          Availability and accessibility are essential to maximise the impact of public money. Without such a vehicle at EU level, public incentives to spur private investment in clean tech and other technologies would predominantly come from national state aid, which would create risks of single-market fragmentation. The new Competitiveness Fund should:
          Focus on supporting the development and scaling-up of pan-European public-private eco-systems, for instance topping-up national support for Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs);
          Support the whole innovation cycle in an integrated manner, from disruptive innovation to deployment at scale;
          Prioritise areas in which market, network and transition failures are most likely and government selection failures least likely, ensuring additionality and leveraging of other (member state) public and private funding (Tagliapietra et al, 2023).
          Proposal 6: Maximise the use of ETS revenues
          As the EU carbon price has increased significantly in recent years, so too have the revenues accruing to governments from auctioning off emission permits – rising from around €5 billion in 2017 to €38.8 billion in 2022. Of the total auction revenues generated in 2022, €30 billion went directly to EU countries, while the rest went into the EU Innovation Fund (€3.2 billion) and the Modernisation Fund (€3.4 billion) (EEA, 2023). However, while between 2013 and 2022 national governments only spent around three quarters of the total revenues they received on climate-related activities, the ETS rules now oblige them to spend all their revenues for green purposes.
          In May 2023, EU countries agreed to introduce a second emissions trading scheme (ETS2). This will put a price on emissions from direct fuel combustion, including gas and oil boilers in private homes, and fuel combustion in road transport. Taking effect in 2027, ETS2 will require upstream fossil-fuel suppliers to surrender carbon certificates equivalent to the emissions generated by consumers of their fuels. The auctioning of ETS2 allowances will also generate substantial revenues of about €50 billion annually at a carbon price of €45/tonne (in 2020 prices) – the level of the cap that will be in place during the first three years of operation of ETS2. A maximum of €65 billion from the 2026-2032 revenues will be allocated to the Social Climate Fund (SCF), which is intended to support vulnerable households, micro-enterprises and transport users who face higher costs.
          To access the SCF, EU countries must develop by June 2025 social climate plans that outline how they will use these funds to support vulnerable communities. In addition, countries must contribute at least another 25 percent of the costs of their social climate plans, increasing SCF resources to at least €87 billion (Cludius et al, 2023). The remaining ETS2 revenues will be managed by national governments; EU rules require these revenues to be used to deploy low-emission solutions in transport and heating, or to mitigate social impacts.
          Cautiously assuming an ETS carbon price of €75 in 2030, and an ETS2 carbon price of €45, total revenues would amount to €65 billion in that year, of which €50 billion would accrue to EU countries. If carbon prices rise by 2030 to €130 and €100 on the ETS and ETS2 markets respectively, total revenues would be €134 billion in that year, of which around €100 billion would accrue to member countries. Being in the order of €50 billion to €100 billion in 2030, ETS revenues accruing to member states would thus be significant, and should be used to maximum benefit for the transition. The EU should closely monitor member state policies to ensure the money is well spent.

          Conclusion

          To achieve its climate targets, the EU will require additional annual investments of about two percent of GDP between 2025 and 2030, comparable to EU R&D spending in 2022 – estimated at 2.2 percent of GDP (Eurostat, 2024). These investment needs are significant, but manageable.
          Finding the sums is also urgent and necessary. With the European Green Deal, the EU has positioned itself as the global frontrunner in climate policy. Given the political economy of global climate action and the likely withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, the success of the European Green Deal is vital for global decarbonisation to stand a chance. This is more important than ever, as climate-change impacts around the world are becoming increasingly visible and costly.
          From this global perspective, it should be recalled that the cost of climate action is far lower than the cost of inaction, especially for Europe which is the fastest-warming continent Extreme flooding in Slovenia in 2023, for example, caused damage estimated at around 16 percent of national GDP (IMF, 2024). Such events cause severe, direct impacts on settlements, infrastructure, agriculture and human health. They also led to wider economic impacts in the affected regions and major fiscal challenges at national levels.
          As we have shown, the public share of the additional investments needed for the EU to meet its 2030 climate target should range between 0.5 percent and one percent of GDP in 2025-2030. Fiscal constraints must not stand in the way of mobilisation of these resources. Public debt for such investments should be seen as ‘good debt’, fully justified by the one-off financing needs of an extraordinary and temporary transition that will massively benefit future generations. It should also be stressed that public spending on climate mitigation today will lessen the potentially much higher needs for public spending on climate adaptation in the future. A responsible green investment framework along the lines we suggest would help convince markets that this green debt can and must be financed.
          To stay updated on all economic events of today, please check out our Economic calendar
          Risk Warnings and Disclaimers
          You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.
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          From Rare Soft Landing to Common Bull Market

          Owen Li
          There have been just four soft landings in history — in 1968, 1985, 1995, and now, in 2024. Because soft landings are so rare, market participants don’t have a lot of data points to make bold predictions about the future. But, historically, economic growth has accelerated in the years following a soft landing. And that pattern is likely to repeat in 2025.

          Bull Market Continues

          The soft landing outcome has propelled stocks to all-time highs in 2024. Meanwhile, credit spreads are historically tight and most measures of market volatility are tranquil. Solid corporate profits are forecast to accelerate throughout 2025, especially in the US. And the Trump administration’s policy goals — including deregulation, lower energy costs, and tax cuts — could boost an already growing US economy.
          The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta GDPNow forecast suggests that the economy will expand at a 2.6% annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2024.Most forecasts predict that US GDP will grow by 2% to 2.5% in 2025, far from recession territory.
          The labor market remains resilient. The US has added more than 2.1 million jobs in the past 12 months. The unemployment rate is at a historically low 4.1%.Wages are growing faster than inflation. And businesses are reluctant to lay off workers, a positive leading indicator for the economy.
          Fully employed consumers are likely to keep spending. The top 20% of income earners are responsible for 40% of consumption,and they are in great shape.
          Somebody’s consumption is somebody else’s profit. S&P 500® companies are projected to grow their earnings by 9.4% in 2024. Remarkably, analysts are forecasting even better earnings growth of 15% in 2025. If S&P 500 companies deliver on earnings, already lofty profit margins would reach all-time highs.
          At the same time, inflation continues to crawl back toward the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) 2% target. The Fed’s preferred inflation measure, the Core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index, has fallen by 0.4% over the past 12 months, from 3.2% to 2.8%.

          Bull Markets Don’t Fade Away

          There’s an old market adage that claims economic expansions don’t die of old age. The implication is that a catalyst is needed to end the good times.
          Yet, elevated valuations have rarely been a good predictor of short-term stock market performance. Expensive investments can, and often do, get more expensive in the near term. Failure to meet or exceed sky-high earnings expectations next year could disrupt the market’s rally. Resurgent inflation also could thwart the economic expansion, but rising inflation is more likely a 2026 problem than a 2025 problem. Ultimately, the direction of real interest rates may be the final arbiter on whether this expansion lives or dies.
          Still, standing on the precipice of 2025, it’s difficult to envision any of these visible risks as the impetus for an economic contraction and an end to the market’s rally next year.

          Sticking the Landing, Watching for Growth

          What did the economy withstand to achieve a soft landing in 2024? From March 2022 to July 2023, the Fed raised interest rates 11 times, the most aggressive pace in 40 years. Fed policymakers increased the target range for the federal funds rate from 0% to a peak of 5.25% to 5.50%. These rate hikes helped cool inflation from a peak of 9.1% in June 2022 to 2.6% in October 2024.
          Despite all the rate hikes, the economy avoided recession and the labor market endured. Defying the odds, the Fed slowed the economy enough for inflation to fall, but not so much that it slipped into recession.
          Economic growth has slowed from a 4.9% annual rate in the third quarter of 2023 to a 2.8% annual rate in the third quarter of 2024.The unemployment rate climbed from 3.4% in April 2023 to 4.3% in July 2024, signaling a softening labor market.And, with the target range for the federal funds rate notably above current measures of inflation, the Fed began its interest rate-cutting cycle in September, slashing interest rates by 0.75% at its last two meetings. With rates at 4.50% to 4.75% in November, most Fed watchers expect the central bank to cut rates by another 0.75% to 1.00% in 2025.
          So, what happens next?
          History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes. The Fed’s tightening cycle prior to the most recent soft landing in 1995 was also aggressive.
          From February 1994 to February 1995, the Fed raised interest rates seven times over 13 months. Inflation wasn’t the culprit then; it was an overheating labor market. The Fed doubled the target range for the federal funds rate from 3% to 6% without causing a recession. Fearing that monetary policy conditions had become too tight, the Fed made a series of mid-cycle adjustments, cutting interest rates three times by 0.75% from July 1995 to January 1996. Following the 1995 soft landing, US GDP accelerated from 2.7% in 1995 to 3.8% in 1996.
          Today’s Fed mid-cycle adjustments could produce a similar bump to the US economy in 2025.

          Learning from the Ghost of Soft Landings Past

          As the Fed aggressively raised rates through July 2023 to defeat inflation, capital formation plunged.
          Initial public offerings (IPOs) are now well below the average of the past 20 years. Mergers & acquisitions (M&A), hindered by higher rates and a tougher regulatory environment, are below 10-year averages.Private equity firms have $3.2 trillion in assets in their portfolios just waiting for an exit plan. Private equity deal values have fallen 60%, deal count has plummeted by 35%, and exit values are down 66%.Businesses' capital expenditures have been constrained by higher rates and stiff regulations, especially in manufacturing industries.
          Fed rate cuts combined with lower potential energy costs, lighter regulation, and lower taxes could unleash a period of massive capital formation through IPOs, M&A, and increased capital expenditures. Artificial intelligence (AI) also has the potential to bolster economic growth, increase productivity gains, and create the next wave of innovative new businesses.
          The 1995 soft landing also included an enormous increase in computing power that intersected with the global adoption of the Worldwide Web by both consumers and businesses. This fostered an era of exceptional economic growth and the Greenspan productivity miracle.
          In fact, the years following the 1995 soft landing up until the TMT Bubble burst in March 2000 were some of the greatest years on record for stock market performance. The S&P 500 returned 37.2% in the 1995 soft landing year, on its way to five consecutive years of annual returns above 20%. Could the year-to-date S&P 500 return of 28.1% in 2024’s soft landing be the start of another historic bull market run?
          No pain, no gain. That exceptional post-soft landing bull market run from 1995 to 1999 came with far greater volatility than today’s investors are accustomed to. Some market observers blame the Fed’s monetary policy decisions for causing the Thai baht currency crisis, Russian debt default, and Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) failure.
          Simultaneous transitions in government leadership, monetary policy, and fiscal spending are likely to increase capital market volatility in the current post-soft landing period. Greater market volatility may be the price market participants pay for faster economic growth and potentially higher stock market performance.

          Anticipating Another Multiyear Bull Market

          The current bull market celebrated its second birthday on October 12, 2024. On average, a bull market lasts a little more than five years. And if the current bull market ended now, it would be one of the shortest on record. Building on the solid gains of the past two years, the current environment suggests the rally may continue in 2025.
          What does that mean for investors looking to position portfolios for the year ahead?
          Within equities, the Fed’s easing cycle, strong US economic growth bolstered by the Trump administration’s policy goals, and AI-related leadership point to opportunities in US small caps, regional banks, and the broad AI value chain.
          Within fixed income, while monetary policy has been the recent driver of interest rate trends, expected trade tariffs, immigration reform, and tax cuts all mean fiscal policy also will likely impact interest rate volatility in 2025. But the Trump administration’s pro-business policies may boost credit’s favorable outlook.
          Finally, structural shifts in leadership, monetary policy, and fiscal spending have contributed to the high correlation between stocks and bonds that has destabilized traditional portfolios, making now a good time to consider diversifying to restore balance and help temper a potential increase in volatility.

          Source:State Street Corp

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          You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.
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          Local Government Finance Policy Statement: An Initial Response

          IFS

          Economic

          The government has published a policy statement outlining its plans for local government funding in England next year, and providing further details on longer-term reform plans.
          IFS associate director and head of devolved and local government finance David Phillips said:
          “The announcement on council funding is a clear statement of intent from the new government.
          If all English councils increase their council tax by the maximum allowed (on average, just under 5%), their overall core funding would increase by 5.6%, or 3.2% in real-terms after accounting for forecast economy-wide inflation. And add on new income from the producers of packaging, and the increase will be closer to 5% in real-terms.
          But funding increases will be very much targeted at deprived, typically urban, councils. Grants targeted at rural councils are to be abolished to part-fund a new deprivation-based grant. The government is at pains to point out that councils serving rural areas will still see a boost to their overall funding, but this will be substantially smaller than in more deprived areas.
          The government has described these changes as a stepping stone to more fundamental reforms from 2026-27 onwards. Its commitment to reform the council funding system with updated assessments of spending needs and local revenue-raising capacity is welcome – and long overdue. Existing funding allocations are based on a range of ad-hoc decisions and data from back as far as the 1990s. The current system is simply not fit for purpose and the government is right to reform it.
          The changes made for the coming year suggest these longer-term changes will also have an emphasis on redistributing funding to more deprived areas, to offset cuts they bore the brunt of during the 2010s. Whether that is fair will be in the eye of the beholder. The status quo could not continue indefinitely though, and a forthcoming consultation will allow councils and other stakeholders across England their say on what a reformed funding system should prioritise.”
          To stay updated on all economic events of today, please check out our Economic calendar
          Risk Warnings and Disclaimers
          You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.
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          Going global: Short-duration bonds well positioned for economic divergence

          JanusHenderson
          Head of Global Short Duration Daniel Siluk believes that an extension of the economic cycle in the U.S. and suspect growth elsewhere create an opportunity for bond investors to capture attractive yields and preserve capital by diversifying globally.
          In assessing the prospects for global bonds in 2025, investors must consider the inextricable links between the shifting macro and policy environments. In the U.S., even prior to November’s election, markets were calibrating expectations for the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) easing cycle. The combination of a resilient labor market and inflation falling perhaps not as rapidly as hoped lessened the urgency to cut rates as an extension of the economic cycle was priced in.
          In many respects, the election of former President Donald Trump increased the likelihood of sustained economic growth, but it also introduced new uncertainties that bond investors cannot ignore. While pro-growth initiatives such as deregulation and tax reform could spur investment and consumption, tariffs and trade barriers could be inflationary at the very least and – at worst – present potential hindrances to global growth should these measures be reciprocated.
          Already interest rates have taken notice. The U.S. Treasuries yield curve has risen across all tenors. Shorter-dated yields reflect a more subdued rate cut trajectory, and longer-dated yields have risen as investors account for greater volatility, potentially higher growth, and the possibility that the battle to fully tame inflation isn’t over.
          Facing acute headwinds, other regions – much of Europe, for example – may have to be more deliberate in easing policy. It will be the responsibility of investors digging into the details to determine which regions, sectors, and securities will be net beneficiaries of the incoming administration’s policies and which may face new headwinds.Going global: Short-duration bonds well positioned for economic divergence_1
          From an investment perspective, diverging economic and policy prospects create both opportunities and risks for bond investors. Across jurisdictions, the battle against inflation has sent yields to levels that can again provide investors with attractive income streams.
          The outlook for rates is evolving, however. With Europe facing floundering growth, bond yields may continue to fall farther, representing an opportunity for capital appreciation along the front end of sovereign curves. In the U.S., any pro-growth initiatives or barriers to trade may alter the pace of inflation’s downward trajectory. This could lead to additional volatility in mid- to longer-dated Treasuries.
          As different regions travel their own economic and policy paths, investors with a global view have the opportunity to increase diversification within fixed income allocations by incorporating issuance with attractive yields and securities in regions where rates may fall.Going global: Short-duration bonds well positioned for economic divergence_2
          One must also consider what’s already been price into markets. In the U.S., for example, the nominal yield on the 10-year note has risen by as much as 80 basis points (bps) since mid-September, with rising expectations for inflation over the next decade accounting for a considerable portion of the increase.
          We believe a similar global approach should be applied when seeking opportunities within corporate credits. Diverging economic prospects have implications for corporate issuers’ credit profiles. And with valuations elevated across the asset class, investors have the opportunity to seek out regions where stabilizing – or improving – economic conditions should fortify an issuer’s ability to meet its obligations. In contrast, where growth is more tenuous, richly valued and more cyclically exposed issuance is best avoided.
          Furthermore, valuations in some regions appear more favorable than others, often for the same credit rating – or even specific issuer. With volatile currency exposure hedged away, global investors can maximize the potential for excess return with little or no incremental increase in risk.Going global: Short-duration bonds well positioned for economic divergence_3
          One way to navigate the still-uncertain economic environment is to focus on shorter-dated corporate issuance. Higher yields relative to much of the past 15 years have resulted in the potential to generate attractive returns due to the steeper roll down of these securities as they near maturity. Over these shorter time horizons, investors tend to have better visibility into an issuer’s ability to service its debts. The rationale for a focus on the front end is reinforced by still-low term premiums, meaning investors are potentially exposing themselves to considerably more volatility for only marginally higher returns.

          Policy matters

          We expect to gain greater insight into President-elect Trump’s economic priorities during the early months of his administration. His team’s approach to trade, deficits, and the economic aspects of his national security agenda will reverberate globally. Pro-growth initiatives would likely keep Treasury yields high relative to global peers. The accompanying dollar strength would come at the expense of other currencies and also funnel a greater share of global investment toward the U.S. This could aggravate the economic positions of regions like Europe. And to the degree this agenda would alter expected growth trajectories, it would inevitably influence the decisions of the Fed and other central banks.
          Risk Warnings and Disclaimers
          You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.
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          December 5th Financial News

          FastBull Featured

          Daily News

          Economic

          [Quick Facts]

          1. Calls for Emmanuel Macron to resign after French government toppled in no-confidence vote.
          2. Fed's Daly says no sense of urgency to lower interest rates.
          3. Beige Book shows slow employment growth in the U.S.
          4. Powell says Fed can afford to be a little more cautious.
          5. U.S. services sector expands moderately.
          6. Fed's Musalem says time to pause rate cuts may be near.

          [News Details]

          Calls for Emmanuel Macron to resign after French government toppled in no-confidence vote
          The French National Assembly passed a no-confidence vote against French Prime Minister Michel Barnier on Wednesday, so Barnier will resign. This marks the first time the French government has been dismissed since 1862. Additionally, the French Patriots Party launched a petition on their website demanding President Macron's resignation.
          "Now, we should use this vote to force Emmanuel Macron to step down. For years, he has shown contempt for the French people; for years, his policies have been a complete failure in every sector. Over the last seven years, he has caused unimaginable damage to the country: dividing the nation, creating insecurity, and diminishing France's international status. He has invested in wars, weakening the country's international standing, making France's voice in the EU and NATO smaller, and implementing disastrous policies required by the EU. He has caused the collapse of sectors such as agriculture, industry, healthcare, energy, and immigration. He must resign," the petition reads.
          Florian Philippot, leader of the French Patriots Party, called for a protest march this Saturday (December 7) demanding Macron's resignation. 63% of the French public want Macron to resign after the no-confidence vote, according to a survey by the French research and consulting firm Elabe for BFMTV.
          Fed's Daly says no sense of urgency to lower interest rates
          To keep the economy in good shape, we must continue to adjust policies, whether in December or later, said San Francisco Fed President Mary Daly on Monday. We will discuss this in the next meeting, but rate cuts are still under consideration by Fed policymakers. Currently, supply and demand are roughly balanced, and inflation continues to decline. The Fed should focus on reducing rates. However, even if we cut rates again, the policy will remain restrictive, which is important.
          The neutral interest rate level may already be "close to 3%." However, given the uncertainty surrounding the neutral rate, I believe we can proceed slowly and adjust as the economy provides more information.
          Currently, there is no urgent need to cut rates. The Fed needs to "prudently adjust" its policy to ensure that inflation is reduced without unnecessarily slowing the labor market.
          Beige Book shows slow employment growth in the U.S.
          The Federal Reserve released its Beige Book on December 4, showing that economic activity has slightly increased in most Districts, with three Districts seeing moderate or modest growth. However, two Districts reported flat or slightly declining economic activity. At the same time, consumer spending remained generally stable, with consumers becoming more sensitive to prices. Mortgage demand was generally low, and commercial real estate loans were similarly sluggish.
          In terms of employment, most Districts saw stable or slightly increasing employment levels, with low employee turnover, limited recruitment activity, and minimal increases in workforce numbers. Layoffs were also low. Most Districts expressed cautious optimism about a recovery in recruitment activity. Additionally, wage growth has slowed to a moderate pace in most Districts, with further moderate growth expected in the coming months.
          Prices increased moderately across most Districts. Most businesses saw input prices rise faster than sales prices, leading to a decline in profit margins. Businesses expect price growth to remain at current levels. However, several Districts noted that the potential for tariffs on foreign goods under President-elect Trump could pose significant upside inflation risks.
          Powell says Fed can afford to be a little more cautious
          The U.S. economy is doing well, and there is no reason to believe this situation cannot continue, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell said on Wednesday. The risks to the labor market appear small, economic growth is definitely stronger than we thought, and inflation is slightly higher. Despite the lower-than-expected risks, the Fed can still cautiously move toward a neutral rate.
          The U.S. budget is on an unsustainable path and needs better coordination between revenues and expenditures. The central bank cannot consider debt and deficits when setting rates; it must focus on inflation. The Fed is not in a fiscal leadership role, but rather uses its tools to achieve its dual mandate of inflation and employment.
          U.S. services sector expands moderately
          The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) reported on Wednesday that the U.S. non-manufacturing PMI slipped to 52.1 last month, the first decline since June. The new orders index hit a three-month low at 53.7. The business activity index fell to its lowest level since August.
          The drop was mainly driven by declines in business activity, new orders, employment, and supplier deliveries. However, 14 industries saw growth in business activity, and 13 industries saw increases in new orders. This reinforces the view from recent months that the services sector is showing sustained growth.
          Fed's Musalem says time to pause rate cuts may be near
          St. Louis Fed President Alberto Musalem said on Wednesday that the Fed is close to achieving its goals for employment and price stability, and monetary policy is in a favorable position. Given the "strong" economic conditions and inflation levels under current labor market conditions, a patient monetary policy stance is appropriate. Musalem believes a patient monetary policy stance is appropriate given the current level of inflation in a "strong" economy and job market that is at levels consistent with full employment.
          It seems important to keep the option of slowing or pausing rate cuts open, as the timing may be approaching to carefully assess the current economic environment, the information received, and the changing outlook.

          [Today's Focus]

          UTC+8 14:45 Switzerland Unemployment Rate (Nov)
          UTC+8 18:00 Eurozone Retail Sales MoM (Oct)
          UTC+8 00:30 Next Day: Richmond Fed President Barkin Speaks
          UTC+8 01:00 Next Day: Bank of England MPC Member Greene Speaks
          To stay updated on all economic events of today, please check out our Economic calendar
          Risk Warnings and Disclaimers
          You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.
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          Could higher tariffs reverse the Fed's easing course?

          JPMorgan
          Just when inflation was starting to get (dare I say) boring again, the potential for higher tariffs, a central element of the incoming Trump administration’s agenda, has reignited concerns about inflation. With the much-anticipated Federal Reserve easing cycle just underway, markets must now consider the potential consequences for monetary policy if disinflationary trends were to reverse.
          We can look to Trump’s previous term for insight into the Fed’s approach to inflationary pressures from tariffs. In September 2018, the Fed modeled a scenario involving a 15% tariff on all non-oil imports with foreign economies responding in-kind. If the Fed reacted to the resulting inflation spike by raising rates, they projected a mild recession. Conversely, if the Fed looked through the rise in import prices, growth slowed to a mere 0.5% but a recession could be avoided. The Fed concluded that this “see through” response would be most appropriate. However, if inflation expectations rose, which would be more likely in a very tight labor market, then the preferred response could be to hike interest rates.1
          More recently, Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank President Neel Kashkari shared a similar perspective, describing tariffs as a one-time increase in prices that is not inherently inflationary in the long term. However, he warned that a “tit-for-tat” trade war could exacerbate inflationary pressures, sending prices higher.
          Today’s economic environment also differs meaningfully from 2018—while the inflation heatwave is mostly past us, its embers are still alive.
          Recent events have reminded companies of their pricing power, and workers are now more attuned to cost-of-living increases in wage negotiations.
          Although market-based long-term inflation expectations are anchored around 2.0%, consumer expectations have hovered around 3% since May 2021, half a %-point higher than their range in 2018-19.
          The recent experience of being slow to respond to “transitory” pandemic-related inflation may prompt FOMC members to adopt a more cautious approach to rate cuts next year, especially in the context of resilient economic growth.
          Additionally, several other trade war effects could influence the economy, such as slowing global growth, declining productivity and policy uncertainty weighing on business investment, all of which add complexity to any tariff projections. Investors should also be wary of placing too much emphasis on any specific cabinet appointments. Regardless of whether the incoming administration is staffed with tariff “hawks”, the former President has a track record of initiating trade negotiations with large, ambitious demands that are ultimately whittled down, and look significantly different, to the final agreements.
          While it may be premature for the Fed to incorporate tariff implications into monetary policy decisions, current data on resilient growth, healthy labor markets and other factors suggest that the Fed's path will be gradual, possibly settling at a higher level than their latest projections indicate. For bond markets, this, along with the impact of higher deficits, could keep long-term yields elevated in the year ahead.Could higher tariffs reverse the Fed's easing course?_1

          Source:JPMorgan

          Risk Warnings and Disclaimers
          You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.
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          Trump’s victory and equity markets: The effect of political proximity

          CEPR
          Donald Trump’s re-election as president of the United States on 5 November has stirred both optimism and apprehension in global financial markets. As his administration embarks on a policy agenda heavily focused on tax cuts, trade protectionism, deregulation, and stricter immigration policies – collectively known as Agenda 47 – investors and analysts are evaluating the implications for the economy and equity markets. This column explores the impact of Trump’s victory on financial assets and highlights how political ‘proximity’ to his agenda shaped firm-level returns.
          On 5 November, Donald Trump secured a second term as president of the United States. His victory was driven by a policy agenda focused on accelerating economic growth via tax cuts, increasing tariffs and trade protectionism, enforcing stricter immigration controls, reducing government intervention, and decreasing regulation.
          As Trump’s victory became evident – reflected in betting markets that rapidly incorporate election-relevant news in an information-efficient manner (Karau and Fischer 2024) – financial assets likely to be influenced by Trump’s agenda began reacting significantly (Figure 1). US 10-year Treasury yields rose sharply, increasing from 4.28% at 7:00 PM Eastern Time to 4.46% by 10:30 PM, driven by expectations of fiscal stimulus and inflationary pressures. Bitcoin prices surged as the cryptocurrency industry anticipated benefits from deregulation. The dollar index surged in response to higher expected yields and anticipated trade barriers, with larger depreciations against the dollar observed for currencies of countries likely to be significantly affected by heightened trade protectionism and stricter migration policies, such as the Mexican peso.Trump’s victory and equity markets: The effect of political proximity_1
          The equity market’s response was equally dramatic. On 6 November, the S&P 500 posted a gain of around 2.5%, marking its strongest one-day performance following election results in over a century. Market volatility, as measured by the VIX index, plummeted by more than four points, reflecting the resolution of pre-election uncertainty and optimism about corporate earnings growth under Trump’s pro-market administration (Albori et al. 2024). Sectoral performance, however, was heterogeneous: banks, energy, and industrials – sectors expected to benefit from corporate tax cuts and deregulation – experienced the largest gains (Figure 2).Trump’s victory and equity markets: The effect of political proximity_2

          Political proximity and firm-level returns

          To assess the relationship between firm-level returns and political proximity to Trump’s 2.0 agenda (commonly referred to as Agenda 47), we construct a textual based firm-level sentiment indicator following the methodology of Hassan et al. (2019). This indicator measures the share of the conversation between analysts and firm management that centres on terms linked to Agenda 47 and, by conditioning on positive and negative tone words, provides a proxy of firms’ attitudes toward Trump’s programme. Higher sentiment scores indicate stronger alignment with Trump’s policy priorities.
          On average, firms in the energy, financial technology, and industrial sectors exhibit higher sentiment values, while those in the renewable energy and pharmaceutical sectors show lower values, reflecting their lower likelihood of benefiting from the Trump administration’s policies (left column of Figure 3). A firm-level event study shows that firms with higher sentiment scores experienced significantly higher abnormal returns in the days following the election. We first estimate a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for each firm over the period from 15 November 2022, when Trump announced his candidacy for a second term, to 4 October 2024, one month before the election. We then compute abnormal returns around the election date, as differences between actual returns and those predicted by the CAPM model. A one-standard-deviation increase in political proximity was associated with a 7% higher abnormal return on 6 November, with the effect persisting over the subsequent two days and peaking at around 10% (see Figure 3, right column).Trump’s victory and equity markets: The effect of political proximity_3

          Equity markets and real economy disconnect

          While equity markets celebrated Trump’s re-election, other indicators suggest a more nuanced picture. The Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index (Baker et al. 2016), derived from media coverage of policy-related terms, rose significantly in the immediate aftermath of the election, contrasting with the decline in the VIX equity volatility index (Figure 4). This divergence likely reflects differing time horizons. The decline in the VIX likely captures the resolution of pre-electoral uncertainty and anticipation of near-term policies, such as the renewal of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), which is expected to face fewer obstacles in a Republican-majority Congress and boost corporate profits. On the other hand, the increase in the EPU index may reflect analysts’ uncertainty about Trump’s policies that may matter more in the medium to long term. In particular, uncertainty surrounding more controversial measures in Agenda 47, such as new tariffs and stricter immigration policies, looms large. Analysts fear that these measures could dampen long-term economic growth and exacerbate inflationary pressures (e.g. McKibbin et al. 2024, IMF 2024), even as fiscal stimulus and tax cuts provide short-term support.Trump’s victory and equity markets: The effect of political proximity_4
          We also uncover a potential disconnect between the equity market responses and those implied at the macroeconomic level due to sectoral composition. In this context, assessing the effects of Trump’s election based solely on equity returns could be partially biased, as certain sectors (e.g. information technology and financials) that reacted positively to the news are overrepresented in the stock market relative to their weights in the real economy. When returns are reweighted by GDP shares,the contribution of these sectors diminishes, underscoring potential disparities between financial market reactions and real economic prospects (Figure 5).Trump’s victory and equity markets: The effect of political proximity_5

          Conclusions

          We argue that the favourable response of US equity markets to Trump’s victory should be interpreted with caution, particularly when attempting to extract meaningful signals about the real economy outlook. First, firm-level equity returns were partially influenced by firms' political proximity to Trump’s agenda. Second, index-level returns may not accurately reflect real-economy prospects, as economic sectors’ weights in equity indices differ significantly from their contributions to GDP. Third, while equity volatility declined, measures of economic policy uncertainty increased following the election, highlighting that, especially in the longer term, there remain numerous unknowns about the implementation of Trump’s agenda.

          Source:CERP

          Risk Warnings and Disclaimers
          You understand and acknowledge that there is a high degree of risk involved in trading. Following any strategies or investment methods may lead to potential losses. The content on the site is provided by our contributors and analysts for information purposes only. You are solely responsible for determining whether any trading assets, securities, strategy, or any other product is suitable for investing based on your own investment objectives and financial situation.
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